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Recent clashes between law enforcement and civilians have brought the issue of policecommunity relations to the forefront of many political discourses. While community policing has
achieved a degree of success in alleviating these problems, many of the issues raised by the
seminal Kerner Commission in 1967 remain today. This phenomenological case study represents
a contemporary look at a city named “Heartland,” which has received accolades from numerous
organizations for its community policing efforts. The primary source of data were in-depth
interviews with police officers, and members of community organizations in the city of
Heartland, analyzing how these two parties collaborate towards community policing.
The results indicate that group violence intervention (GVI) is the most sophisticated
collaborative effort between police and community members. Heartland police utilize this tactic
to not only combat violent crime, but also reduce the number of adverse police-citizen
encounters, within a community policing frame work. This phenomenon which I call
“reconciling the state’s use of violence,” shows how citizen activism, along with police
leadership, can represent a crucial step in improving police-community relations. As GVIinfluenced programs continue to gain influence, they must be considered within the discourse of
community policing. Issues related to drug abuse, mental illness, police unions, among others,
represent further obstacles to improving police-community relations in Heartland.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Community policing arose in the 1970s as a response to what was seen as abrasive
policing, discrimination against African Americans, and the legitimacy crises of the 1960s
(Goetz 2017; Reisig 2010). It has been the main philosophical alternative in policing to the
“professional” model, which stressed rapid response to 911 calls for service, random squad car
patrols, and reactive investigations by detectives to crimes that had already taken place (Skogan
and Roth 2004). It also came about in an era when the idea that highly centralized hierarchical
organizations (like “professional” police agencies) were the best at delivering services came into
question (Ostrom 1972; Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1973).
Scholars and practitioners have also held that community policing is the answer to many
crime, disorder, and problems with broken police-community relations (Chappell 2009). The
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) a branch of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) defines community policing as follows: “a philosophy that
promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problemsolving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety
issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (Community Oriented Policing Services
2012:1). Broadly speaking, it involves decentralization of police departments, community
engagement by sharing information and developing partnerships, and problem solving in order to
achieve crime prevention (Skogan and Roth 2004).
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Beginning in the 1990s, community policing became a mainstream policing philosophy,
largely thanks to COPS providing over $13 billion dollars to hire community policing officers
and promote community/problem-solving policing strategies (Chappell 2009; Reisig 2010). By
2013, all police departments saw an increase in their community policing components, with 68%
of all police departments having a mission statement which includes community policing
(Reaves 2015).
Community policing has been found to net certain positive benefits like increased citizen
satisfaction, improved perceptions of disorder, and better police legitimacy (Gill et al. 2014). Yet
problems of police-community relations have occurred in the 21st century that were identified as
an issue in the 1960s, and have prompted action from the local, state, and federal level
(President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Police-citizen encounters such as
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Laquan McDonald in Chicago, and Freddie Gray in
Baltimore, have cast a negative light on law enforcement and created enormous tension (Austen
2016; Stamper 2016; U.S. Department of Justice 2015, 2016). Furthermore, controversial, broad
sweeping policing tactics (such as stop-and-frisk) have been challenged on constitutional
grounds, and through the lens of racial profiling against African Americans (Anderson 2014;
Goldstein 2013; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 2018). These
problems of police-community relations, coupled with the significant, steady decline of violent
crime, have created an opportunity to critically examine policing practices (Tyler 2017).
Conversely, scholars have begun to question whether or not focused deterrence strategies
could not only decrease crime, but also help to alleviate strained police-community relations
(Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan 2018; Brunson 2015; Corsaro and Engel 2015). Braga and
colleagues state that: “Focused deterrence interventions are aimed at influencing the criminal
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behavior of individuals through the strategic application of enforcement and social service
resources to facilitate desirable behaviors” (2018:208). The most famous example of focused
deterrence was the “Boston Miracle” of the 1990s, which resulted in a 50 percent reduction in
homicides among all age groups (Kennedy 2011).
Proponents of focused deterrence argue that these programs direct resources at specific
individuals and groups who are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime, and can help
facilitate collaboration and problem solving between criminal justice and community actors
(Brunson 2015; Corsaro and Engel 2015). It’s also said that focused deterrence coincides well
with the community policing goals outlined in the President’s Task Force on 21 st Century
Policing (2015) (Braga et al. 2018). These programs have also begun to exert significant
influence on communities, as well as city, state and federal criminal justice agencies. Examples
include Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007), the
Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) (Roehl et al. 2008), and the
National Network for Safe Communities (Braga et al. 2018, National Network for Safe
Communities 2019).
However, researchers have called for addressing the inherent complexities of community
policing collaborations (Gill et al. 2014), and how focused deterrence strategies in particular can
aid in improving police-community relations (Braga et al. 2018). Brunson has coined this
complicated relationship as a “black box,” and stated that, “we stand to learn considerably more,
however, regarding…whether focused deterrence strategies yield other important societal
benefits” (2015:507).
This thesis represents an attempt to unpack the “black box” of modern-day policing
tactics and police community relations. The study location Heartland is a single metropolitan
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statistical area defined as an urbanized area with a population of at least 50,000 (United States
Census Bureau 2012). The Heartland Police Department (HPD) holds jurisdiction over Heartland
and was the employing agency for all law enforcement interviewees. Phenomenological and case
study methods were used to focus on the phenomenon of collaboration between police and
community organization leaders within the single-bounded case Heartland. The central findings
of this thesis were that a focused deterrence strategy, GVI, was the most significant collaborative
effort in Heartland.
The city’s GVI program arose as a consequence of controversial police citizen
encounters, and an attempt to reconcile the community’s desire for more outreach, with the
traditional enforcement function of policing. An arrest of a young, African American resident,
Barry1, was the main catalyst for examining the HPD’s pattern of pretext traffic stops, which
were found to disproportionately affect the city’s African American residents, and major reforms
followed. Heartland’s police officers and the various organizations affiliated with this study are
outlined in the following section, then an outline of the remainder of this thesis is given
afterwards.

Heartland

According to the HPD’s website, their department has had some form of community
policing since 1977. But there have been significant obstacles for police-community relations in
the city, and subsequent changes in the nature of police-community collaboration. As we will see
later, Heartland has built community policing partnerships across multiple criminal justice

1

Aliases were assigned to all interviewees and other residents and landmarks from Heartland. Issues of
confidentiality will be discussed in chapter 3.
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agencies, and participated in national discussions effected by the President’s Task Force on 21 st
Century Policing. Despite Heartland’s problems with police-community relations, the HPD has
received accolades from the DOJ, as well as independent research bodies which specialize in
policing. The department’s stated commitment to GVI also provides for an opportunity to place a
modern day deterrence strategy under close scrutiny, alongside an analysis of the important issue
of police-community tensions.
Wells, Soho, Dartmouth, and Franklin were deemed as “core neighborhoods” by the
HPD. This was because each neighborhood surrounds the central downtown district of the city,
comprises the bulk of the HPD’s neighborhood-based community policing efforts, and has a full
time neighborhood association president for whom the neighborhood CPOs (community policing
officers) have working relationships with. Because of these factors, and since the majority of
community interviewees’ main affiliation was to the core neighborhoods, they will be the main
focus. Adams is also included since it has its own assigned CPO, but it is not located in the city’s
core, and does not have the same crime-related issues that CPOs have to grapple with in other
neighborhoods. The CPO for Adams is also assigned to work with an adjacent public university
in a community policing context. Neighborhood-specific crime and disorder problems, along
with community policing strategies aimed at these issues will be discussed beginning in chapter
four.
The assigned role of interviewee officers included Kevin (Franklin), Will (Dartmouth),
Martin (Wells), and Austin (Soho) as neighborhood-based CPOs for the city’s core
neighborhoods. Jim was a CPO jointly assigned to the Adams neighborhood situated on the
outskirts of Heartland, along with a public university adjacent to Adams. Charlie was a school
resource officer (SRO) stationed in a local high school. These officers were also free from
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typical dispatch calls, only responding to close in-progress crimes, or when officers were in need
of urgent assistance. Three officers (Wallace, Harris, and George) were supervisors to the CPOs.
The recruitment of police participants and their work will be discussed in chapters three and four
respectively.
The community interviewees’ work was restricted mostly to the core neighborhoods
outlined above. While the participants’ organization affiliations were numerous, their primary
institution allows for us to get a sense of the different initiatives of the core neighborhoods, the
intricacies of Heartland’s GVI program, and various religious, political, and nonprofit influences
on community policing across the city.
Each neighborhood association president was included in the interview process. These
individuals were Claire of the Franklin Neighborhood Association, Homer from the Soho
Neighborhood Association, Donna from the Dartmouth Neighborhood Association, and Wendy
of the Wells Neighborhood Association. All four presidents spoke about their primary role as
“empowering residents” of their neighborhood. This included not only issues related to crime,
but many public health concerns such as economic development, housing, and wellness.
Association presidents saw themselves as liaisons between the police, as well as other
government agencies, and their communities. Community policing was seen as a way to mend
broken police-community relationships and offer multi-faceted approaches to solving social
problems in their neighborhoods. Their roles as presidents provide a valuable perspective of how
community policing functions in Heartland.
Three interview participants (Shannon, Juan, and Rhonda) were mainly associated with
community policing through Heartland’s GVI program. Shannon and Juan served the vital role
of “street outreach workers,” who are able to work with the police, while also reaching youths
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and young adults caught up in serious criminal behavior. Their past lives as former offenders
helps to lend street credibility to the HPD’s GVI program, while also reaching potential targets
of GVI’s mixed enforcement and outreach message on a personal level. Shannon’s organization
Brotherhood Over Violence is led by him and another man who had a violent past with each
other, then decided to solve their differences after they got out of prison, and then go around to
various organizations speaking to kids about the harsh realities of criminal life. Juan was the
founding member of Franklin’s most notorious street gang, before becoming a street minister,
and working with the Heartland Urban Association. This organization, situated in a church based
in Franklin, seeks to provide job and life skills training, as well as reach local residents through
street ministry.
Rhonda works for the nonprofit Hope Initiative, which provides education, employment,
and family training services throughout the community. She also serves the vital role as the
social services lead for GVI. This means that her primary responsibility is to provide access to
employment, counseling, drug rehabilitation, and other services meant to avert violent offenders
away from a criminal lifestyle. Outside of GVI, Rhonda often serves as an informal referral
source for CPOs. The combined experiences of Shannon, Juan, and Rhonda provide a view of
the community outreach perspectives of GVI, and how the HPD attempts to balance enforcement
and outreach within its community policing.
Melissa’s organization Families of Love is based in Dartmouth and started as an attempt
to create a drug treatment facility for mothers with children, so that families could remain intact
during the treatment process. Their organization has expanded to tackle physical, mental, and
spiritual health for both men and women. Families of Love encourages local residents to be
responsible and hold the HPD accountable through efforts like “know your rights forums,” while
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also advocating for community policing as a way to build better police-community relations, and
for the HPD to be conscious of the health issues that they raise. Families of Love also has what
Melissa termed as a “placeholder” on the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board (HCAB). The
perspective from Families of Love shows how organizations can serve to provide legitimacy to
HPD initiatives, while also providing healthy criticism, and a historical backdrop of why the
HPD is where it is at today.
Travis is the leader of the Wells Church, a large congregation located in that
neighborhood. His role as he described it was “community churching” in Wells, where the
congregation serves as a meeting place for community organizations, a referral source for needy
individuals, and a facilitator for community action. Travis also has the unique perspective of
being a former officer who practiced community policing in Heartland before entering religious
work after retirement. He has also served extensively in the HCAB, and collaborates extensively
with the Wells Neighborhood Association and the HPD. Travis was able to provide unique
historical perspective of the strategies of the HPD, and the point-of-view of an organization
which tries to broker relationships between the police and the community.
Patrick also provides another religious organization’s perspective from his church’s
location in the central downtown district. His primary role is that of the vice-chair of the HCAB.
Much like Melissa, his organization seeks to encourage relationships between the police and the
community, while also holding the HPD accountable for his actions. His church also works
closely with the HPD by helping pay for the salary of a CPO, and trying to develop humane
solutions to dealing with the city’s homeless population in town. Patrick provides another
perspective of how citizens seek to hold the HPD accountable and try to effectively deal with
quality of life issues.
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Susan works with Heartland Improvement, an organization born out of a sociology
course at a local college, which seeks to work with neighborhood associations, and foster
resident action through community improvement projects. The result of a lot of these
improvement projects included residents working to fix blight issues, shutting down drug houses,
and forming relationships with CPOs in the process. Heartland Improvement attempts to foster
community solidarity and informal social control. As of this writing, Susan’s organization was
based in Soho and Wells, with plans to expand into Dartmouth. They’ve partnered with the Soho
Neighborhood Association and the Wells Coalition, an organization of Wells-based community
groups which includes the Wells Church and Wells Neighborhood Association. Heartland
Improvement represents another nonprofit which attempts to foster better police-community
relations, while also empowering residents to take action and hold the HPD accountable to its
neighborhood crime.
It is the objective of this thesis to analyze the organizational process by which the HPD
seeks to collaborate with community organizations and reconcile the dual desires of community
outreach with enforcement. Given the central role that GVI was found to have in Heartland’s
community policing, it is also necessary to place this tactic under close scrutiny in its ability to
foster community policing goals. Hopefully, this research will serve as a guide for future work
on other jurisdiction which seek to repair police-community relations through focused
deterrence.
Outline of Thesis

The remainder chapters will be organized along the following lines. Chapter two, will
provide a literature review. The topics addressed will be the rise of community policing,
including seminal events, underlying theories, and it’s three key components (community

10
partnerships, organizational transformation, and problem solving) as stated by COPS
(Community Oriented Policing Services 2012). Studies examining the effectiveness of
community policing at reducing crime, increasing legitimacy, and reducing perceptions of
disorder will be considered, as well as criticisms that have been levied against community
policing.
Chapter three discusses the methodologies used. More details will be given about what
constitutes a phenomenological case study. Issues of confidentiality will be addressed. Details
about the participants’ occupations and their affiliated organizations will be given without
revealing their identities. The strategy by which interviews were analyzed will be outlined, as
well as secondary sources used in addition to the interviews.
Chapter four will be devoted to discussing the structure of the HPD, characteristics of the
neighborhoods with assigned CPOs, and various projects that Heartland’s CPOs and community
organization members perform with each other, and in the community. Participants performed
various strategies conducive to community policing and problem solving philosophies. These
included increasing the amount of nontraditional (nonarrest) contacts between police and
community members, blight sweeps, and crime prevention through environmental design
(CPTED).
Chapters five and six are directly related to one another and include some of the most
significant examples of police-community collaboration in Heartland. Five deals with issues of
police use of authority and citizen accountability. Heartland was the site of a controversial
police-citizen encounter surrounding the traffic stop of a black teen that resulted in a civil rights
lawsuit. There was also a study which found that African Americans were disproportionately
subject to investigatory stops and searches despite being less likely to have illegal contraband.
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Also known as “pretext” stops, these are designed to find probable cause through minor traffic
violations in hopes of discovering a more serious offense (Gau 2012; Goetz 2017). One result of
this legitimacy crisis was the reestablishment of a citizen oversight board to hear complaints of
citizens filed against the HPD.
Another significant result, discussed in chapter six, was the implementation of group
violence intervention by the HPD. GVI has its origins in Boston’s “Operation Ceasefire”
program of the mid-1990s. It partners community members, social service providers, and law
enforcement towards a small number of chronic offending street groups, to offer them a way out
of their criminal paths, clearly communicate to them the consequences of their repeat offending,
and prosecute them with harsh sentences if they reoffend (National Network for Safe
Communities 2015). GVI is influenced by the ideas of focused deterrence. I argue that the
sequence of events in chapters five and six represent a phenomenon called “reconciling the
state’s use of violence.” This is where a local crisis brings the state of police-community
relations into question, citizen activists place pressure on the police to enact reforms, then leaders
within government and law enforcement create institutional change relating to use of force,
within a community policing paradigm.
The essences of collaboration are discussed in chapter seven. Based primarily on issues
raised through in-depth interviews, four themes were identified. These themes were
relationships, legitimacy, and transparency, nontraditional police contacts, the normative order of
policing, and focused deterrence. A general theme of compromise between competing citizen
demands and the realities of policing are apparent.
Chapter eight addresses various concerns raised in my interviews with police and
community members. Some of these included needing ways to deal with Heartland’s homeless
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and drug addict populations, issues with Heartland’s police union and further accountability
problems, and how these factors contribute to the continuing struggle to balance outreach and
enforcement within community policing. Study limitations will also be discussed, then directions
for future research will be considered.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Rise of Community Policing

Community policing in many was a repudiation of the “professional” or “reform” era
after the turbulent 1960s (Goetz 2017; Reisig 2010). The professional model of policing had its
roots in the Progressive Movement and its effort to disentangle municipal governments from
corrupt politicians (Kelling and Moore 1988; Reisig 2010). Significant efforts began in the 1890s
to address patronage era corruption and professionalize police forces, such as the Lexow
Committee which sought to address questionable practices within the NYPD (Goetz 2017).
August Vollmer was among the loudest advocates for professional reforms, convincing police
executives to go along, and introducing police college-level courses at the University of
California in 1916 (Kelling and Moore 1988; Goetz 2017).
By the 1920s professionalization had become institutionalized. Police legitimacy became
tied to professionalism and enforcing the law. Thus the police function became narrowly defined
as that of law enforcement agencies, who controlled crime principally by apprehending
criminals. Other responses came to be seen as “social work” and not real policing (Kelling and
Moore 1988). Organizational structures became much more stringent, following a centralized
chain-of-command, specialization of police tasks, and a strict code of conduct for officers (Goetz
2017; Reisig 2010). Regarding external relationships, professional organizations (like doctors or
social workers) were expected to stick to their expertise and citizens were only passive recipients
of police services (Kelling and Moore 1988; Sadd and Grinc 1994).
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Technological innovations were also seen as crucial for efficiency (Crank 1994; Goetz
2017; Kelling and Moore 1988). Centralized dispatch systems that would send officers to
respond to calls were formed. Foot patrols, which would later become popular again in
community policing, gave way to more efficient motorized patrols. This was seen as necessary to
combat criminals who used automobiles and to be able to effectively patrol growing cities and
suburbs. Detective units developed and their forensic capabilities improved. The mantra of
randomized patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigations became the core strategy for
professional policing and clearance rates became the main measure of success.
Skogan and Hartnett (1997) acknowledge that the professional era was necessary to
confront extreme political corruption and inefficiencies, yet it had the consequence of
disconnecting them from the communities they serve. What arose during the 1960s was a
legitimacy crisis driven primarily by increased racial tensions, especially for African Americans,
and rising crime rates (Crank 1994; Eck and Spelman 1987a; Goetz 2017; Reisig 2010). From
1964 through the rest of the decade, the civil rights movement, antiwar movement, and increased
black militancy put violent police-community encounters in the spot light and showed how bad
police-community relations had become (Crank 1994; Goetz 2017; Kelling and Moore 1988;
Radelet 1974). Some examples included the controversial killings of Black Panther leaders by
Chicago police, and the 1965 Watts riots where 35 people died and $200 million in property
damage was committed. Then, during July and August of 1967, the country faced its worst civil
unrest yet, which was highlighted by Newark and Detroit, where 23 and 43 people respectively
were killed (Goetz 2017; Radelet 1974).
In response, President Johnson created the National Commission on Civil Disorders to
investigate the causes of the racial disorders, or the Kerner Commission (National Advisory
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Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). Among its most important findings were that 40 percent
of the riots between 1964 and 1967 were the direct responsibility of the police (Crank 1994). The
Kerner report also stated what it saw as an “abrasive” relationship between police and minorities,
and it called for various reforms such as installing grievance mechanisms, creating community
service officers, and making an effort to hire and promote more minority officers (Crank 1994;
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). President Johnson also convened the
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice which published its
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. It also recommended a “community-relations machinery”
so that police could build relations with minority communities (President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967).
In addition to strained race relations, the professional model of policing was failing at its
narrowly defined goal of reducing crime (Crank 1994; Gill et al. 2014). This was not only felt by
the seemingly endless tide of violent clashes between police and civilians through the 1960s, but
a number of influential studies starting in the 1970s began to challenge the effectiveness of
professional policing (Reisig 2010). President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement
would influence the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which created the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The LEAA encouraged research and
innovation in policing (Crank 1994), an era that Walker and Katz called the “research
revolution” of policing (2011:44).
One major blow to the professional philosophy was the Kansas City Preventive Patrol
Experiment, which showed that randomized patrols did not prevent crime, nor did they reduce
citizens’ fear of crime (Kelling et al. 1974). Conversely, Flint, Michigan’s foot patrol of the late
1970s and early 80s was found to have led to higher levels of satisfaction with police officers
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and feeling safer from crime (Trojanowicz 1983). Rapid response has also been found to not
effect arrests rates, with one study finding that immediate response strategies for serious crimes
only lead to arrests at the scene in 29 out of every 1,000 incidents. Citizen-reporting time, not
police response time, was found to have a greater impact on on-scene arrests (Spelman and
Brown 1984). Furthermore, much of the reactive investigation work of detectives, including
follow-up investigations and evidence collection, was found to not significantly help with
solving crimes (Chaiken, Greenwood, and Petersilia 1977; Eck 1983).
The 1970s and 80s saw various grassroots attempts across the country to address the
inadequacies of the professional model, which would bridge the gap to community policing as
we know it today (Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004). Skogan (2004) has identified five main thrusts in
this transition period: team policing, community outreach, community crime prevention,
problem-oriented policing, and fear reduction.
Team policing challenged the hierarchical structure of police agencies and created turfbased assignments for officers (Eck and Spelman 1987a; Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004). A specific
number of “basic cars” as they were called in Los Angeles were assigned to a beat, they were the
first to receive calls for service in the area, and these officers were beholden to a lieutenant, who
was also in charge of all special units in the area. Some studies found that the model was popular
and certain neighborhood conditions improved. However, officers had a difficult time
maintaining a balance between taking calls for service and trying to foster community
development (Reisig 2010). Team policing also suffered from resource constraints, opposition
from those in the chain of command, and an organizational culture hostile to changing the
professional model (Greene, Bergman, and McLaughlin 1994; Skogan 2004). Yet team policing
was important for setting the precedent to make the neighborhood a unit of analysis for policing.
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In an effort to facilitate community outreach, community liaison offices or community
relations units were created (Skogan 2004). These units often became the “eyes and ears” for
departments and helped to facilitate communication between police and the community. One
example of outreach was the “storefront” police station which was actually stationed within the
community (Eck and Spelman 1987a). The rationale was that civilians would be more willing to
enter a station that was in their own neighborhood if they had valuable information on
neighborhood problems. Other examples of outreach included visiting schools and hosting public
meetings. These initiatives helped departments to see the value in forming closer bonds with the
community, which countered professionalism’s isolation (Skogan 2004).
Community crime prevention movements were important because they emphasized
collaboration between police and community organizations, rather than the community just being
a passive recipient of police services (Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004). They relied on the premise
that organized citizens can fight crime and improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods. So
police should then try to mobilize these citizen groups (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994).
Neighborhood watches became the most common example of community crime prevention. But
crime prevention efforts could take many forms including efforts to harden homes and
businesses from burglary, citizen patrols to report suspicious behavior, conducting blight sweeps
to improve the appearance of a neighborhood, and even lobbying local government agencies for
better services (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994; Eck and Spelman 1987a; Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004).
Problem-oriented policing was proposed in Herman Goldstein’s seminal article (1979)
and this approach would soon overlap with community policing (Skogan 2004). Goldstein
(1979) argued that police departments suffered from the “means over ends” syndrome, meaning
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that they stressed secondary goals of improving the organization over their actual intended
purpose of dealing with problems. Goldstein described how problems relate to policing:
the police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral and social problems
that arise in a community – that the end product of policing consists of dealing with these
problems. By problems, I mean the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that
prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, residential burglaries,
battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism,
even fear. These and other similar problems are the essence of police work. They are the
reason for having a police agency (Goldstein 1979:242, emphasis original).
The SARA acronym became a popular way to outline the process of problem-oriented
policing (Reisig 2010). Scanning involves the identification of specific problems. Analysis leads
to the collection of information, both inside and outside of law enforcement, in order to
understand the problem in-depth. Response is when intelligence is used to create and execute a
solution to the problem. Assessment then is done to determine if the solution was effective and
ways that responses could be improved in the future (Eck and Spelman 1987b).
The concepts of community and problem-oriented policing overlap, yet they’re also
distinct from one another (Skogan 2004). Community members can often be useful in defining
problems, understanding the contexts of these problems, and providing information to law
enforcement that police often wouldn’t be able to detect (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). But
problem-oriented policing does not necessarily seek community involvement as an end in it of
itself unlike community policing (Skogan 2004). Problem-oriented policing involves crafting
solutions to specific issues at hand. These issues may be more adequately addressed through
community input and inter-organization collaboration, or a traditional police response may be
more appropriate (Gill et al. 2014).
Finally, fear reduction became crucial in the rhetoric and practice of community policing
(Skogan 2004). Fear was found to be an obstacle for community action against crime and two
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strategies were promoted to cope with fear: police foot patrols and policing disorder. The
infamous Flint, Michigan foot patrol experiment lead to reductions in citizens’ levels of fear, and
was so popular that voters passed taxes to continue the strategy (Trojanowicz 1983). However,
the policing of disorder proved to be much more controversial due to its origins in James Q.
Wilson and George Kelling’s 1982 Atlantic Monthly article “Broken Windows” (Reisig 2010;
Skogan 2004). Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) argument followed that if physical decay (i.e. broken
windows) and social disorder (such as public drunks) were left unattended, then it would send a
message that law breaking was acceptable, and neighborhoods would deteriorate.
The rise of broken windows theory had two direct consequences in practice. First, the
broken windows metaphor became a unifying principle, to get officers to see the importance of
seemingly low-level order maintenance issues like addressing blight, and to reconcile the
concerns of citizens and everyday quality of life issues with the work of law enforcement
(Skogan 2004; Thacher 2001a). Second, broken windows theory led to “zero-tolerance” or
“order-maintenance policing” of minor offenses (Crank 1994:342; Skogan 2004:xxiii). This
broadly represented a “conservative” political view of the time emphasizing community
protection. The view becomes that: “Community breakdown occurs not from underlying social
or structural problems in those communities but from criminal invasion into those communities”
(Crank 1994:343).
But even Wilson and Kelling acknowledged that: “None of this is easily reconciled with
any conception of due process or fair treatment” (1982:35). To critics of broken windows
policing this shows that the tactic allows for an extreme amount of police discretion to deem
what is “disorderly” or not (Muñiz 2015; Roberts 1999). This may lead to over-policing of racial
minorities and lower-class people in public spaces. The theoretical link between disorder and
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crime advocated by Wilson and Kelling has also been questioned. For example, Sampson and
Raudenbush (2004) state that observed disorder can predict perceived disorder but that racial and
economic variables matter more. Residents of all races perceived disorder as minority groups and
poverty increase regardless of neighborhood characteristics.
These grassroots movements of the 1970s and 80s led to the 1990s when community
policing became institutionalized. In 1994 Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act (also known as the Clinton Crime Bill) which allocated $9 billion to hire
100,000 police officers with their goal being to: “foster problem solving and interaction with
communities by police officers” (Skogan 2004:xxvi). Title I of the bill created the COPS office
to coordinate funding. Among the bills intended purposes was the assist in implementing and
training in community policing and provide technological assistance. In the program’s first year
it received $148.4 million in funding, which jumped to $1.42 billion next year, and totaled
approximately $8.8 billion between 1995 and 2000 (Balko 2013; Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004).
Research has shown that the Clinton Crime Bill did lead to an increase in community
policing. Roth, Roehl, and Johnson (2004) utilized survey data of pre-1995, 1996, 1998, and
2000 implementation of tactics for partnership building, problem-oriented policing, crime
prevention, and organizational mechanisms. The results showed that large and small agencies
(above or below 50,000) showed significant increases in all four tactics from pre-1995 to 2000,
although large agencies remained steady between 1998 and 2000 (Roth et al. 2004). The findings
of the authors’ field research yielded mixed results regarding the degree of community policing
approaches used. Departments seem to accept the usefulness of partnership-based problem
solving (such as partnering with certain city government agencies) and prevention strategies (like

21
CPTED), but evidence from some COPS sites showed: “a lesser degree of comfort when it
comes to developing and appreciating community partnerships” (Roth et al. 2004:25).
Scholars have noted that the extent to which community policing is actually implemented
on the ground may vary against national data which seems to show more community policing
(Maguire and Mastrofski 2000). There has also been significant debate about whether or not
COPS grants contributed to the crime drop which began in the 1990s (Reisig 2010). Those such
as Zhao, Scheider, and Thurman (2002) and Evans and Owens (2007) found that COPS grants
did reduce crime, while other studies have shown that COPS did not contribute to the crime drop
(Worrall and Kovandzic 2007).
Critics have also argued that the trend towards federalization through programs such as
COPS contradicts many of the central tenants of community policing and entangles it with other
federal mandates (Balko 2013; Boettke, Lemke, and Palagashvili 2016). They point to laws such
as the 1981 Military Cooperation with Law Enofrcement Act, and the Comprehensive Crime Act
of 1984, which allow for the armament of state and local agencies with federal military weapons
and for local police to share asset forfeitures if they participate in federal drug raids respectively.
It’s argued then that militarization, anti-drug, and anti-terror policy has become the norm in
modern day policing, and that this makes it difficult for local citizens to exert influence, which
compromises relationships (Balko 2013; Kraska 2007; Boettke et al. 2016).
Still, the COPS program was renewed by Congress in 2005 (Reisig 2010). Overall
support waned during President Bush’s administration, especially given post-September 11
priorities (Balko 2013; Skogan 2004). However, Barack Obama and Joe Biden expressed their
support for COPS during the 2008 presidential campaign when they credited the program for the
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national crime drop beginning in 1994. By 2008, the budget for COPS increased 250 percent to
$1.55 billion (Balko 2013).
Community policing also still appears to be a mainstream policing strategy on the
national level. Utilizing data from Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) which is run by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 2,059 police departments
completed a survey on their policing practices in 2013 (Reaves 2015). Roughly 7 out of 10
departments had a mission statement including community policing, and these departments
employed 88% of all police officers. Departments that had a problem-solving partnership
employed 63% of the sample of officers. These partnerships tended to be with a wide range of
actors, from other law enforcement agencies, to neighborhood associations, and faith-based
organizations.
In the 1990s Eck and Rosenbaum stated that: “community policing has become the new
orthodoxy for cops” (1994:3). One meta-analysis of 25 community policing studies found
positive effects on satisfaction with the police, police legitimacy, and perceptions of disorder, but
no significant effects on crime prevention and citizens’ fear of crime (Gill et al. 2014). Despite
the mixed results for community policing, it has remained in place to this day. This is seen in the
political discussions mentioned in chapter one in light of recent events of strained policecommunity relations. There is also no doubt that the ideals of community policing are still felt at
the federal level with President Obama’s Task Force On 21 st Century Policing. The fourth
“pillar” of the task force is entitled “Community Policing and Crime Reduction” and one of the
overarching recommendations was that: “the President support programs that take a
comprehensive and inclusive look at community-based initiatives addressing core issues such as
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poverty, education, and health and safety” (President’s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing
2015:1).

Underlying Ideals and Theories of Community Policing

Community policing came to embody a radically different set of ideals from that of the
professional era. With regards to legitimacy, although the law is still the main source of police
legitimacy, it doesn’t guarantee legitimacy. Community support becomes essential and can
compromise the integrity of law enforcement functions if it’s not secured (Kelling and Moore
1988; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Due to the increasing importance of the community in police
functions, the policing mandate necessarily broadens. It can include order maintenance, problem
solving, and the provision of services. Although crime control remains crucial, community
policing stresses “crime control and prevention” (Kelling and Moore 1988:11, emphasis original)
in conjunction with other services.
Organizational design then must become vastly different. Decentralization is essential to
allow officers to identify and respond effectively to changing conditions at the neighborhood
level, and mid-level managers (such as sergeants) can become prominent leaders in the push to
community policing (Kelling and Moore 1988). Geographic (or “beat”) assignments allow for
officers to provide better service and form stronger bonds with community members to address
problems. Despecialization of officers can better prepare them to deal with a wide range of
circumstances (Community Oriented Policing Services 2012). It has also been recommended that
problem solving partnerships should be institutionalized when appropriate. Furthermore,
performance measures should expand beyond traditional measures such as arrests and tickets
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issued to include measures like community satisfaction, and fear of crime (Community Oriented
Policing Services 2012).
External relationships, rather than being discouraged, are a necessary component to
community policing (Kelling and Moore 1988). One of the most important lessons learned
during the community policing/problem-oriented era of policing is that it is difficult for the
police to solve most problems alone. Therefore, community partnerships can be a valuable tool
to develop solutions and improve trust (Community Oriented Policing Services 2012). COPS
lists other government agencies, community members/groups, nonprofits/service providers,
private businesses, and the media as examples of potential partners.
Reisig (2010) has argued that neighborhood theories and criminal opportunity theories
have influenced community and problem-oriented policing. Broken windows and social
disorganization theory provide neighborhood-level variables which could address crime and
disorder. While criminal opportunity theories, like routine activities and environmental
criminology, have guided problem-oriented policing.
As discussed in the previous subsection and in chapter one, broken windows theory links
the rise of disorder to crime (Reisig 2010; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Kelling and Bratton
(1998:1219) refer to the “downward spiral of urban decay,” which leads to increases in fear of
crime, which indirectly leads to more crime, and the overall deterioration of the neighborhood.
George Kelling and NYPD commissioner William Bratton argued that the use of broken
windows policing had contributed to New York City’s historic crime drop and that there was no
evidence to the contrary (1998). One example that the authors point to as a sign of the strategy’s
success was the aggressive enforcement of homeless panhandlers in New York’s subway system
(Kelling and Bratton 1998).
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But despite the support from some members of law enforcement and scholars, the
effectiveness of order maintenance policing is far from conclusive. Corman and Mocan (2005)
tested the effects of economic variables (unemployment and minimum wage), along with
sanctions, on murder, assault, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny and rape from 1974
to 1999. Misdemeanor arrests were utilized in order to test the effects of broken windows
policing on New York’s crime rates. The results indicated that misdemeanor arrests had a
significant negative effect on robbery, motor vehicle theft, and larceny. The authors’ economic
indicators were found to have a significant effect on all crimes except assault and rape. However,
further analysis found that felony arrests and misdemeanor arrests were found to have a greater
effect than economic variables (Corman and Mocan 2005).
Harcourt and Ludwig (2007) levied two critiques against those who advocated for the
effectiveness of broken windows policing. First, misdemeanor arrests for smoking marijuana in
public view (MPV) increased 2,670%, from 1,851 arrests in 1994, to 51,267 in 2000, and thus
contributing to 15% of all felony and misdemeanor arrests in the city at that time. These
practices also disproportionately targeted black and Hispanic residents (Harcourt and Ludwig
2007). Therefore, the idea of what “disorder” was and whether or not serious crime issues were
being dealt with was controversial at best. But the authors also argue that there was a lack of
account for “mean reversion” in studies supporting broken windows policing (Harcourt and
Ludwig 2007:168). They stated that these studies failed to take into account national variables
effecting crime rates during the 1980s and 90s.
It has also been noted that order maintenance policing may not only be equated with
misdemeanor arrests in certain situations (Braga and Bond 2008). Scholars have pointed to the
wide range of behaviors that have been conceptualized as disorder in research. This includes
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such things as the density of liquor stores, public urination, abandoned buildings, broken
streetlights, unkempt parking lots, and excessive trash (Braga and Bond 2008; Skogan 2015). In
turn, responses may require arrests, but can also include strategic partnerships, and innovative
solutions. A strategy which only relies on aggressive misdemeanor arrests has been argued to be
a “weak strategy” because it doesn’t address the sources of crime and disorder (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999:638).
Social disorganization theory within community policing can trace its roots to the
community crime prevention movement from the 1970s (Reisig 2010; Skogan 2004). The theory
derives from Shaw and McKay’s influential 1942 work Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas
and associates neighborhoods with lower economic status, ethnic diversity, and residential
instability with higher levels of crime (Bursik 1988; Sampson 2012). Social disorganization
came to be defined as: “the inability of a community to realize the common values of its
residents and maintain effective social controls” (Sampson 2012:37).
The argument follows that informal social networks embedded in neighborhoods are a
strong deterrent of crime. Therefore, community policing officers should reach out to
neighborhood organizations and community members, and work with them to reduce crime and
improve quality of life (Reisig 2010). This phenomenon has also been conceptualized as the
officer being a “community builder” who has the ability to: “act as an organizer who works to
mobilize the “social capital” of a neighborhood to prevent social disorder and thereby crime”
(Goetz and Mitchell 2003:222). Some examples of officers trying to foster stronger social
networks include organizing neighborhood watches and placing mini-stations within
neighborhoods (Crank 1994).
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A more recent branch of social disorganization theory “collective efficacy” has also
begun to intersect with community policing (Reisig 2010). Collective efficacy is defined as:
“social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the
common good” (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997:918). Collective efficacy has been found
to be significantly negatively associated with concentrated disadvantage and immigration
concentration, whereas residential stability was significantly positively associated with collective
efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997). Collective efficacy was also found to be significantly negatively
correlated with neighborhood crime levels, including violent crime (Sampson et al. 1997).
Sampson’s (2012) utilized a wide array of qualitative and quantitative methods including
a longitudinal cohort study of 6,200 children, a survey of over 8,000 Chicago residents,
systematic social observations, interviews with 2,800 community leaders, a study of 4,000
collective action events, and field experiments to measure altruism. Collective efficacy was
measured using surveys which assessed how much residents believed that their neighbors would
take action on a number of community problems. Residents were also asked about their
assessment of community relationships on a number of “social cohesion/trust” measures.
Collective efficacy was found to be associated with lower rates of violence regardless of
concentrated disadvantage. Amazingly, collective efficacy in the early 1990s was found to
significantly lead to decreases in crime during the decade of the 2000s.
Research has shown that social disorganization theory holds some promise in helping to
guide community policing. Reisig and Parks (2004) sought to determine whether or not policecommunity collaboration could reduce reported neighborhood problems and feelings of fear, and
also whether or not these effects would be restricted to affluent neighborhoods. Community
surveys were administered to individuals in Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida.
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Results indicated that more positive perceptions of police-community partnerships had a
significant effect on reducing perceived incivility and increasing feelings of safety regardless of
a neighborhood’s level of concentrated disadvantage. The authors conclude that their findings
lend support to social disorganization theorists, and police collaboration can be a valuable tool in
neighborhoods with concentrated disadvantage.
Lombardo and Donner (2017) studied whether or not community policing can improve
informal social control within neighborhoods. Informal social control was defined as: “the scope
of collective intervention that a community directs toward local problems” (Lombardo and
Donner 2017:6). The independent variable was a dummy variable about whether or not Chicago
Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was being implemented in the respondent’s census tract.
Several control variables, including demographics, economics, disorder, and police satisfaction
were used.
An initial bivariate regression analysis found that CAPS was significantly positively
related to informal social control (Lombardo and Donner 2017). However, a multivariate
analysis showed that CAPS was not statistically significant after controlling for other variables.
Police satisfaction was still found to be statistically positively significant towards informal social
control. Therefore, the authors conducted an additional analysis to see if the effects of
community policing on the dependent variable were mediated by satisfaction with the police.
The results indicated that CAPS was insignificant with regards to informal social control. But
CAPS was found to have a positive statistically significant relationship on police satisfaction,
and police satisfaction was found to have a positive statistically significant effect on informal
social control. Roughly 67% of the total effect of CAPS on informal social control was mediated
by police satisfaction.
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These findings concur with other research that has pointed to the importance for police
departments to increase their perceived legitimacy (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). And these efforts
can lead to more cooperation with the police and even more willingness on behalf of
communities to fight crime (Tyler and Fagan 2008). It also points to the core ideal of community
policing. That is legitimacy is secured through community support, and this support is necessary
for the police to function (Kelling and Moore 1988; President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing 2015).
Problem-oriented policing involves preventing and controlling future crimes rather than
responding to crimes that have already occurred, and routine activities theory and environmental
criminology have been influential to this task (Reisig 2010). Routine activities theory states that:
“criminal events result from likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable
guardians against crime converging nonrandomly in time and space” (Sherman, Gartin, and
Buerger 1989:27). Practitioners of routine activities approaches often use the “crime triangle”
(Community Oriented Policing Services 2012:12; Porter and Graycar 2016:426; Reisig 2010:41).
The crime triangle is formed when the victim, offender, and location converge to form a problem
for police officers to deal with. Then officers can determine which of the three sides of the
triangle is most vulnerable to police intervention, then strategies can be developed.2
Environmental criminology, or the criminology of place, is associated with routine
activities theory (Reisig 2010; Sherman et al. 1989). This perspective stresses how ecological
features and architectural design can be criminogenic factors that need to be altered in order to
deter criminals (Fowler, McCalla, and Mangione 1979). A popular variant of environmental
criminology that has gained international support is CPTED (Cozens and Tarca 2016). CPTED is
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COPS utilizes a crime triangle with an additional layer including handlers, managers, and guardians, to deal with
offenders, places, and victims respectively.
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intended to control access, increase casual surveillance, and advocate a feeling of ownership,
with the goal of reducing crime and improving quality of life (Vagi et al. 2018). CPTED has its
roots in community crime prevention efforts from the 1970s and 80s (Roth et al. 2004).
Strategies can include improving lighting and sidewalks, which is also consistent with theories
that address disorder (Skogan 2015).
All of these strains of problem-oriented policing have the intention of a: “resolution of
root causes rather than symptoms” (Capowich and Roehl 1994:128). Sherman and colleagues
(1989) shed light on how problem-oriented tactics can be used. Their analysis of all dispatch
calls for service over a year-long span during 1985 and 1986 in Minneapolis revealed that 50.4%
of these calls were confined to 3.3% of all addresses and intersections (Sherman et al. 1989). A
further analysis of these calls revealed an even greater concentration of three types of offenses
(criminal sexual misconduct, robbery, and auto theft) in these “hot spots of predatory crime”
(Sherman et al. 1989:39). The identification of hot spots can be a useful strategy within the
problem-oriented framework (Scott 2000; Telep and Weisburd 2012).
The identification of crime-prone locations can also coincide well with community
policing. Eck and Spelman (1987a) provide an example of problem-oriented policing involving
Baltimore County’s Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) which used CPTED.
Residents of Loch Raven Apartments were hit by a string of street robberies in 1984. The leading
officer of the project conducted door-to-door interviews and found out that elderly women felt
the most vulnerable. This feeling of fear by the residents was exacerbated by broken street and
building lights, unkempt shrubs, and other signs of dilapidation. A number of local community
and government organizations were brought in to help residents and improve quality of life at the
apartments. This included Baltimore Gas and Electric and the Housing Department who were
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crucial to fixing dilapidation issues. The robberies stopped completely, living conditions
improved, and a new community association was formed to serve the area’s neighbors. As Eck
and Spelman point out, the police can utilize “hidden allies” who need police guidance, and use
their resources to help law enforcement’s problem solving efforts (1987a:41).
Research has shown that problem-oriented policing can have modest but significant
reductions in crime, although some police agencies have implementation issues, and many
studies were less scientifically rigorous (Eck 2004; Reisig 2010; Telep and Weisburd 2012).
Scott (2000) has identified the assessment stage of the SARA model (Eck and Spelman 1987b)
as the most problematic aspect for police officers. A crucial aspect of assessment is that
independent researchers would have an important place in creating solutions but police often do
not have access to these resources (Scott 2000).
Corder and Biebel (2005) conducted research on problem-oriented policing in the San
Diego Police Department (SDPD). Interviews with 320 officers and surveys with 267 officers
centered around problem solving activities and attitudes were conducted. Most officers (slightly
over 50%) focused on small-scale problems defined as one person, address, building parking lot,
or intersection, and most problems involved drug or disorder issues (Corder and Biebel 2005).
During the scanning stage, specific observations or complaints were the most common method,
data analysis or other sophisticated strategies were less common, and projects were rarely
assigned by supervisors or initiated after crime analysis. Analysis was most often done through
personal observation, or speaking with involved individuals, while call-for-service or crime data
was also used fairly often. The methods for coming up with a proper response was fairly
informal with “personal experience” (62%) being the most common tool for officers, and the
most common response was targeted enforcement (46%). Assessment was done mostly through
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“personal observation” (51%), while analyzing radio calls (14%) and speaking with community
members was far less common (13%) (Corder and Biebel 2005).
The authors had mixed feelings about the results from San Diego: “the POP [problemoriented policing] glass was half-full. Ordinary patrol officers engaged in everyday activity that
was recognizable as problem solving, but they rarely made rigid and formal use of the SARA
model or the crime triangle” (Cordner and Biebel 2005:177). Cordner and Biebel make the
distinction between problem solving and problem-oriented approaches when describing this.
Problem solving involves a minimal level of being thoughtful, gathering some information, and
possibly using a multifaceted approach. Whereas problem-oriented policing is far more
analytical and comprehensive to the department than just problem solving. In his review of the
past twenty years of problem-oriented literature, Scott (2000) also finds this distinction to be
common among police departments.
Maguire, Uchida, and Hassell (2015) studied the extent to which problem-oriented
policing was implemented by the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD). The primary
methodology was a content analysis of 753 case files on problem-oriented projects obtained from
CSPD. Officers with CSPD also tended to focus narrowly on one person, area, or building as
their unit of analysis (Maguire et al. 2015). CSPD also tended to utilize the scanning and analysis
stages with police personnel or police data (approximately 70%), while it was far less common
(roughly 16%) to nominate problems to be addressed using sources outside the agency. But there
is strong evidence that CSPD does use partnerships, although the authors acknowledge that their
data didn’t allow them to analyze the quality of these partnerships. Officers also used a wide
range of response strategies besides normal law enforcement actions. The most common
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methods were educating community members (11.7%) and environmental changes (10.3%).
Formal assessment was extremely rare, and no assessment at all was the norm.
This study points to collaboration as being a key obstacle for police officers. Despite the
wider range of problems addressed by CSPD, they still tended to focus on small-scale problem
solving, rather than significant problem-oriented approaches, much like in San Diego (Corder
and Biebel 2005; Maguire et al. 2015). The authors point to a reoccurring theme in problemoriented research, where there is a tension between Goldstein’s original ideal, and how problem
approaches look in practice stating: “these studies illustrate a natural tension in the POP
movement between the experiential, on-the-job knowledge that is valued so heavily in police
culture, and the analytical, empirical approach to solving problems that is valued by reformers”
(Maguire et al. 2015:88).
Despite the mixed results of problem-oriented policing, scholars still acknowledge that
some level of problem solving still represents an improvement over traditional/professional
approaches to policing (Cordner and Biebel 2005). Telep and Weisburd (2012) concur with this
view stating that a specific focus rather than a general focus, and proactive rather than reactive
strategies are more effective, and all things considered problem solving/oriented approaches are
better than traditional/professional methods. Integrating problem-oriented approaches within
community policing, while also stressing procedural justice, has the potential to increase police
legitimacy (Telep and Weisburd 2012). Problem-oriented approaches if realized to their full
potential can combat crime in a way without alienating citizens. But much like community
policing and other reform efforts, many obstacles such as time, organizational resistance and lack
resources stand in the way of full implementation (Chappell 2009; Maguire et al. 2015).
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Collaboration

In addition to organizational transformation and problem-solving, community
partnerships are typically identified as the third key pillar for community policing (Skogan
2004). However, it has been one of the most, if not the most, difficult objective in community
policing reforms (Makin and Marenin 2017; Thacher 2001a). Given that the central focus of this
study is on the phenomenon of police-community collaboration, this section will be devoted to
addressing the difficulty of partnerships, some theories, and examples of collaboration, both
within and outside of the community policing literature.
Despite the potential of highly specialized and isolated organizations and professions to
perform more tasks more efficiently, a trend began in the 1970s and 80s to go against this logic
(van Dijk and Crofts 2017). Rather than being completely isolated from one another, it was
argued that organizations could benefit from forming closer partnerships with other players to
address a wider range of problems more effectively (van Dijk and Crofts 2017; Rosenbaum
2002). These organizations involved are also argued to have “superordinate goals,” which are
essential to all parties, and can benefit from partnerships (Radelet 1973:25). In community
policing the ideal type of partnership is that of co-production, where police become equal
partners with non-law enforcement, and share responsibility for crime control (Hawdon and
Ryan 2011; Makin and Marenin 2017). The work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom in the early
1970s proved to be instrumental in this line of thinking and to the idea of co-production of
services (Osborne and Strokosch 2013).
Research in a wide variety of fields such as “public housing” and “urban renewal” began
to challenge the notion that highly centralized, hierarchical government organizations were the
most efficient and provided the greatest satisfaction to their citizens (Ostrom 1972). Regarding
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policing, smaller police departments which were centrally located in their neighborhoods, as
opposed to being incorporated in the larger city departments, were compared to larger
departments in Indianapolis and Grand Rapids (Ostrom 1972; Ostrom et al. 1973). Using citizen
satisfaction as a measure of output, smaller departments were found to have better results than
their larger counterparts (Ostrom 1972; Ostrom et al. 1973). Ostrom and colleagues
recommended that police departments should strike a chord between total consolidation and
complete decentralization, and increase opportunities for community control. The authors noted
that police departments with greater citizen satisfaction and community control had greater
communication between police and community members. These communities were also marked
by a perception that government services worked more effectively, and that police-community
relations were less of a concern than in comparison communities.
Since then, there has a been a general rise in co-production across the world and in a wide
range of fields (Osborne and Strokosch 2013). The rise of community policing has called for the
breakdown of old barriers between police and the community because, among other reasons, the
police do not have the knowledge or the resources to handle all problems in their jurisdictions
(Peaslee 2009). The move towards community partnerships has given rise to the concept of
collaboration in policing defined as: “when a number of agencies and individuals make a
commitment to work together and contribute resources to obtain a common, long-term goal”
(McCampbell 2011:15).
Smith and Wohlstetter (2006) developed a typology of partnerships in their study of
charter schools in the United States that can be applied to help us understand community
policing partnerships in Heartland throughout this essay. The authors state that partnerships can
have a “diversity of partnership types,” which are therefore, “more open to individual need and
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context” (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006:263-4). Collaborations varied based on four dimensions:
origin, content, form, and depth.
Partnerships can be distinguished by the origin of the relationship (Smith and Wohlstetter
2006). These partnerships may be formed independently of its organization. An example may
include a tutoring service reaching out to a charter school to provide more one-on-one attention
to students. Spin-offs refer to partnerships that are started when an organization is formed out of
a pre-existing organization as an outgrowth of it. This situation doesn’t necessarily apply to the
HPD. My research indicated that the CPS Unit as it’s currently organized was a recent formation
by leaders within the HPD. But this Unit, which is the main source of partnerships between the
police and community organizations, is simply a portion of the HPD and doesn’t qualify as a
“spin-off” organization.
Smith and Wohlstetter (2006) acknowledge that the content of resources exchanged
between partnering organizations can vary widely and that the flow of resources can go in either
direction of the two organizations. This can include financial resources, human resources in the
form of shared staff, experts and other valuable individuals, physical resources such as buildings
to house meetings, and organizational resources such as programs, networks, and even
legitimacy. Crime partnerships have been acknowledged as potentially being able to provide
invaluable resources to help officers more effectively deal with crime issues (Rosenbaum 2002).
Form becomes an important distinguishing feature of partnerships and can greatly affect
the nature of a given partnership (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006). These may include informal or
formal agreements. That is, partnerships may operate on an informal basis, such as through
friendships, or connections through pre-existing networks. Or agreements may be established
through contracts, leases, or other written documents that outline the nature of the partnership.
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Whether in the case of charter schools or community policing, researchers have acknowledged
that a lack of formal agreements in place can make collaboration harder to initiate (Sadd and
Grinc 1994; Smith and Wohlstetter 2006).
The depth of a partnership can be distinguished between one-level or multi-level
involvement (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006). One-level involves a single level of employees
utilizing the partnership, whereas multi-level implies employees from multiple levels of the
organization being crucial to the partnership. Organizational reform, which involves
decentralization, and heavy involvement of mid and low-level officers, has been identified as
crucial to community policing (Kelling and Moore 1988). Yet organizational culture has been an
obstacle to true reform, either from lack of support from chiefs and other police leaders, or lack
of buy-in from frontline officers (Chappell 2009; Rosenbaum and Wilkinson 2004). Therefore,
community policing partnerships are necessarily a multi-level effort or else they will fail.
Boston has often been pointed to as an exemplar city of innovative partnerships to
address crime. Winship and Berrien (1999) argue that the development of the Ten-Point
Coalition made up of prominent black ministers played a crucial role in reducing Boston’s rates
of youth violence. The Ten-Point Coalition (TPC) served as an intermediary between police and
members of the community, thereby changing the way each group interacted with one another.
The TPC helped to reconcile the communities desire to address serious crime issues in their
neighborhoods, with its hesitation for seeing their children in jail by creating an “umbrella of
legitimacy.” The umbrella of legitimacy is defined as enabling: “the police to do their job in a
way that is in the best interests of the larger community and youth without an inordinate fear of
public criticism” (Winship and Berrien 1999:64).
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From the polices’ perspective, the mishandling of the Carol Stuart murder investigation
and stop-and-frisk scandals intensified strained police-community relations (Winship and
Berrien 1999:55-6). In the murder investigation Carol Stuart’s husband Charles Stuart claimed
that an anonymous black male had murdered his wife. In response, Boston police cast a wide net
looking for suspects and in the process coerced and generally abused innocent black men. The
handling of the investigation enraged the African-American community and Charles was later
found to be guilty of the crime. Stop-and-frisk was the department’s policy to addressing gunrelated violence. Black males in mass were stopped in high crime areas and officers even
acknowledged that it was hard to “distinguish the good guys from the bad guys” (Winship and
Berrien 1999:56).
These controversies challenged the Boston Police Department (BPD) to change their
tactics and utilize inter-agency collaboration to come up with innovative solutions. The Boston
Gun Project beginning in 1995, involved local to federal-level criminal justice agencies, policy
researchers from the John F. Kennedy School of Government (most famously David M.
Kennedy), and community leaders working together to address a small number of chronic,
violent offenders. This project would later become Operation Ceasefire, and inter-agency
collaboration became institutionalized within the BPD (Winship and Berrien 1999). One of the
most significant realizations of these efforts was that the overwhelming majority of community
members in high crime neighborhoods were not involved in serious crime. This strategy based
on a “pulling levers” strategy of deterrence was argued to have led to a significant reduction in
youth homicides (Braga et al. 2001:195).
Ministers also realized that despite the troubled past with BPD, they needed to work with
the police to address the dramatic violence in their neighborhoods. The drive-by shooting at a
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church funeral, along with the shooting of Reverend Eugene Rivers’ home led to this change in
their tactics and the TPC was formed to work with law enforcement (Winship and Berrien 1999).
Ministers often have powerful moral standing in their communities, they are often seen as a
source of leadership, and as being truly concerned about the best interests of their communities.
They communicate with at-risk youth the choice they need to make between a criminal and
noncriminal path, while helping the kids to find work and succeed in school. Conversely, officers
reorient their strategies to only focus on a small number of serious offenders, and work in
collaboration with ministers to police more justly (Winship and Berrien 1999). The authors state
that these previously hostile parties can work together when: “police focus on the truly bad
youths, when they deal with these youths in a fair and just way, and when all this is done in
cooperation with the ministers, their activities fall under the umbrella” (Winship and Berrien
1999:67).
In-depth interviews with members of the BPD and TPC were conducted to examine how
these relationships could improve legitimacy in black communities and crime prevention efforts,
along with the challenges in maintaining police-clergy relationships (Brunson et al. 2015).
Interviews were conducted with 30 TPC clergy, 30 BPD managers, and 10 community workers
who focus on high-violence Boston neighborhoods. Results indicated that many potential
benefits related to improved legitimacy, including the ability of clergy to explain police actions,
such as gang enforcement that didn’t target black youth indiscriminately. Positive crime
prevention results were seen including the ability of clergy to deliver improved informal social
control and collective efficacy. Challenges arose amongst the BPD-TPC coalition including
minister rivalries and infighting, the need for more street ministers, and too much power
concentration in the TPC. Despite these challenges, the authors found that these partnerships
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helped to maintain the umbrella of legitimacy as described by Winship and Berrien (1999)
(Brunson et al. 2015). The role of black churches in organizing their communities has long be
documented (Mears and Corkan 2007; McAdam 1999), and these institutions have the potential
to help community policing as well.
There is also the potential for police to partner with the public health field. Goetz and
Mitchell (2003:225) studied efforts to implement “reintegrative” approaches for drug offenders.
Rather than using punitive strategies, drug offenders are meant to be linked with social services
during the “pre-booking” or pre-arrest stage. This study involved two case studies of Baltimore
and Norfolk (Goetz and Mitchell 2003). Norfolk ran into difficulties in sustaining its drug
treatment partnerships through the Police Assisted Community Enforcement (PACE) and the
Family Assessment Service (FAST) programs. The most glaring issue was Norfolk’s civic
organizations and police made aggressive order maintenance a higher priority over substance
abuse treatment. Although police were often organizers under the PACE model, order
maintenance was heavily favored, and police were often hostile to using the reintegrative
approach with drug users. Baltimore was able to operate a needle-exchange program, yet they
would also eventually succumb to a zero-tolerance approach signified by the hiring of the more
hard-lined commissioner Edward Norris.
The concerns raised by Goetz and Mitchell in creating drug treatment partnerships are
issues seen in community policing in general, but specific issues related to the war on drugs are
evident as well. Community members and groups with more social capital had a greater
influence over the agenda set than marginalized populations (Goetz and Mitchell 2003), which
has been a reoccurring theme in other locations (Muñiz 2015; Skogan 2004b). The concerns of
these citizens coincided well with the normative order of law enforcement which tends to favor
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order maintenance and nuisance abatement (Goetz and Mitchell 2003). Police and citizen groups
have a tendency to unite their goals under the guise of broken windows (Thacher 2001a:), and
these strategies have the potential to be used against undesirable populations (Muñiz 2015).
Order maintenance is also a useful strategy for the crime-fighting mentality of the war on
drugs (Goetz and Mitchell 2003). This in turn has led to post-arrest interventions like drug courts
to be a popular option. Yet pre-arrest options, where police partner with other community groups
to treat drug use as a health problem rather than a crime problem thereby keeping these
individuals out of the criminal justice system, have not gained as much of a foothold.
Movements have been successful in reducing the punitive nature of drug policy, with
organizations such as Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP) leading the effort (Stamper
2016). Yet mass incarceration and the war on drugs continue to be a problem today (Alexander
2010).
Hunter, McSweeney, and Turnbull (2005) studied the use of pre-arrest (or arrest referral;
AR) schemes in London. Despite some positive outcomes of the program, there was subpar
communication between AR workers and the police, lack of adequate training, and not enough
emphasis given to the harm reduction efforts of AR. This inability to share resources and to not
have enough of a standard protocol can be a hindrance to effective partnerships (Smith and
Wohlstetter 2006). The authors also found a concern among AR workers that their association
with the police could undermine their work (Hunter et al. 2005). Critics have not only questioned
how effective police can be as partners but they have also seen police involvement as being
damaging. Other have noted instances of austerity measures related to public health placing too
heavy of a burden on police officers, and thereby decreasing the effectiveness of outreach
programs (Klinenberg 2015; Telpin and Pruett 1992).
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Not only has this been an issue raised in public health, it has also been a concern in
working with juveniles. Peaslee (2009:126) has argued that too much police-social service
collaboration can subject youths to “net-widening”, while Rios (2011:xiv) has chronicled a
“youth control complex” where policing has merged with a wide array of institutions to subject
adolescents to hypercriminalization.
Still, law enforcement and public health continues to be a point of collaboration. Van
Dijk and Crofts (2017) have argued that law enforcement and public health (LEPH) is an
emerging field due to converging developments. It’s stated that both fields were influenced by
movements to become closer and more accountable to their communities during the 1970s and
80s, and that both fields had a dramatic effect on vulnerable populations that require a multipronged response. The first LEPH conference was held in Melbourne, Australia in 2012, where
topics such as needle syringe programs and safe injecting facilities were discussed by law
enforcement as an alternative drug policy. The second LEPH conference in Amsterdam in 2014
addressed the Netherlands’ successful “Top600” program, which identified the top 600
offenders, responsible for an overwhelming number of police contacts, and used a multi-agency
collaboration of police and non-police agencies. Police and public health has the potential to be
an integral form of collaboration, yet special attention has to be made to maintain the balance
between the two perspectives, and making sure the health of citizens is paramount.
As stated previously, a popular strand of community policing states that CPOs should
help neighborhoods organizations increase their informal social controls in order to prevent
crime (Goetz and Mitchell 2003; Reisig 2010). Yet many obstacles stand in the way of fostering
these neighborhood-based collaborations. Outside of the needs of white, upper class, and homeowning residents, it can be difficult to provide other citizens with assistance, and poorly
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organized groups had trouble sustaining community activism (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Fear
of repercussion from criminals also inhibits cooperation with the police (Sadd and Grinc 1994;
Taylor 2015).
Despite these challenges, partnerships with grassroots based organizations with dedicated
staff and leadership, clear targets for action, and the right balance of support from government
and institutional autonomy, can be an effective crime fighting tool (Friedman 1994). The
organizational strength of a community is said to increase elements of collective efficacy, and
informal social controls in particular (Sampson 2012). Research has also shown that collective
efficacy increases the likelihood of reporting crime to the police (Taylor 2015). Neighborhood
organizations have the potential to attract residents who want to get involved in informal social
control, but who would rather do so as a group instead of on their own (Carr 2003).
Hawdon and Ryan (2011) studied the effects of joining a neighborhood anti-crime
organization on assisting the police. Forty-two neighborhoods in western South Carolina were
selected and 1,479 telephone interviews with residents were conducted. Participation in anticrime neighborhood organizations and neighborhoods organizations not focused on crime were
significantly positively correlated with assisting the police. Participating in neighborhood
organizations focused on crime increased the likelihood of assisting the police by 54%.
Numerous other variables related to community policing such as police legitimacy, whether the
neighborhood had a police station or substation in it, social cohesion, and fear of crime were also
significantly related. The authors conclude that neighborhood organizations can be used by
police to help communities co-produce public safety. Yet police legitimacy, which is strongly
influenced by police behavior, was also among the strongest influencers of residents’ willingness
the help the police (Hawdon and Ryan 2011). This coincides with research cited earlier that
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police officers must be cognizant of their own legitimacy if they want to use community policing
to increase informal control in a neighborhood (Lombardo and Donner 2017).
Involving the community is a problem of all sorts of coalitions, not just for law
enforcement (Rosenbaum 2002). Still, the above examples give us some clues about what
successful collaboration might look like. Collaborations should involve the sharing of financial,
human, physical, and organizational resources by both parties. Informal agreements can work but
formal agreements would be ideal in many situations. And community policing is necessarily a
multi-level effort from the organizations. Police departments should lend their support to
grassroots community organizations, yet still allow for these groups to operate with some
autonomy. Government institutions are valuable partners, but numerous sectors such as religious,
health, and neighborhood organizations can provide additional skills and knowledge and even
mobilize citizens. Police must also make an effort to maintain high levels of legitimacy and truly
equal partnerships with their collaborators.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Phenomenology and Case Study

Phenomenology can trace its roots to the German mathematician and philosopher
Edmund Husserl and his mission to understand how individuals make sense of phenomenon
within their “natural attitude” (Arrigo 1998:73). The natural attitude refers to taken for granted
notions (Creswell and Poth 2018). This approach has even called traditional scientific
approaches as being too detached, and in order to get back to understanding “things themselves”
that the researcher must be more involved with their participants to comprehend their experience
(Arrigo 1998:74). Phenomenological method involves three crucial steps: the phenomenological
reduction or reflection, description, and finding essences (Creswell and Poth 2018; Giorgi 1997).
The phenomenological reduction involves approaching the experience under consideration
without preconceived ideas about the truth of it. This has been referred to as approaching a
phenomenon with a sense of “newness” or “astonishment” about what could be learned
(Anderson and Spences 2002:1341; Merleau-Ponty 1956:64). Scholars have advocated for
bracketing as a strategy for achieving phenomenological reduction/reflection (Anderson and
Spences 2002; Creswell and Poth 2018; Dukes 1984; Giorgi 1997). This involves the researcher
discussing their past knowledge with the phenomenon that’s being studied. By confronting this
past, one can “put aside” associated beliefs and feelings in order to approach the topic in a less
biased manner.
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It has been noted that a central feature of phenomenology is description rather than
explanation (Merleau-Ponty 1956). That is, description seeks the logic or meaning of the
phenomenon in of itself, whereas explanation attempts to apply causality or correlations to said
phenomenon (Dukes 1984; Giorgi 1997). This gets to much of the core of what phenomenology
is intended to do and that is: “to see the inherent logic of human experience and the articulate
that logic or sense faithfully, without distortion” (Dukes 1984:198). In this process the
phenomenon is portrayed in a way that makes sense to those who have lived it, rather than
through explanations that are external to those who have lived it.
The ultimate goal of phenomenology is to discover and report on the essence of a
phenomenon (Creswell and Poth 2018). Essence has been described as: “the most invariant
meaning for a context” (Giorgi 1997:242). Meaning, all individuals experience it, and it’s
therefore the essential elements of the phenomenon (Creswell and Poth 2018). Dukes (1984)
gives the example of grief as a universal human experience with its own distinct essence.
Regardless if a woman loses her husband, or a father loses his son, there is a typical course of
grief that all humans tend to suffer in their struggle. It is the goal of a researcher to find this
essence in grief, or whatever phenomenon is under scrutiny.
Although other forms of data may be used, in-depth interviews are by far the most
common method utilized (Bevan 2014; Creswell and Poth 2018). Broad, open-ended questions
are ideal so that the research participant may express their views in detail and interviews should
be recorded and transcribed (Giorgi 1997). Then researchers comb through interview transcripts
to find “significant statements” from participants’ quotes in a process called horizonalization
(Creswell and Poth 2018:79). Then statements can be combined into “meaning units” or “clusters
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of meaning”, that are used to develop themes, which are then reported in a study (Creswell and
Poth 2018:79-80, 313; Giorgi 1997:246).
Case studies have a wide range of influences including psychology, medicine, case law,
anthropology, and sociology. They can be categorized not only by their case, but also by being in
a bounded system, applying multiple sources of data, and case description through themes
(Creswell and Poth 2018). Two primary types include intrinsic and instrumental case studies
(Baxter and Jack 2008; Creswell and Poth 2018). The former refers to a unique case that
warrants study because of how different it is, and the latter is when a case or cases are selected to
better understand a particular problem. Case studies may also be characterized based on whether
or not they are a single case or multiple/collective case study (Baxter and Jack 2008; Creswell
and Poth 2018). In certain situations, researchers may decide to select multiple, representative
cases, in order to find additional conclusions.
Bounded systems refer to the need to restrict the scope of analysis for a case study so that
the integrity of the work isn’t compromised. Examples of how to bind a case include time and
place, time and activity, and definition and context (Baxter and Jack 2008; Creswell and Poth
2018; Asmussen and Creswell 1995). If a case and its binding parameters can be clearly defined
and if one is seeking an in-depth understanding of this case, then case study methods can be
identified as appropriate (Creswell and Poth 2018).
Utilizing multiple sources of data is a hallmark of case study and can include
observations, interviews, documents, reports, or audiovisual data (Creswell and Poth 2018; Kruth
2014). It has also been argued that quantitative data sources can be combined with qualitative
methods (Yin 2013). This combining of data sources has been conceptualized as a method of
triangulation by Yin (2013) or as an integrated approach by Kruth (2014). Multiple data sources
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can be pieces of the “puzzle” of a case study, in order to provide greater understanding of the
case, and to strengthen the findings (Baxter and Jack 2008:554).
A description of case study findings involves setting the context of the case for readers
but also the development of themes that have arisen as important after clustering from all data
sources (Creswell and Poth 2018). These themes can be organized chronologically, across
multiple cases to compare and contrast, or as part of a theoretical model. This is somewhat
similar to the creation of themes in phenomenological research. But case study analysis also
includes assertions made by the author(s) where sense is made of the data, through personal
views, or findings in scholarly literature. Researchers also have the goal of reaching naturalistic
generalizations where lessons are learned from the case, and also possibly applied to other cases
(Creswell and Poth 2018).
Phenomenology and case study overlap, yet they significantly diverge also (Creswell and
Poth 2018). Both methods may include several individuals as their unit of analysis and as a
crucial part of the data collection process through interviews. They also both have the
identification of themes within the data analysis process. However, case studies necessarily need
more data sources besides interviews, and phenomenology may include additional data sources
but almost always relies on in-depth interviews. Phenomenology is also narrower in its focus on
the essence of an experience derived from research participants, while case studies seek to make
broader assertions and possibly apply their findings to other cases.
Despite these differences, researchers have been able to combine these two methods into
phenomenological case studies. One example was a study which used four phenomenological
case studies of professors from the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
field to study how they balance teaching responsibilities with other professional obligations
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(Robert and Carlsen 2017). This work combined the two approaches by bounding the study by
time and place, through a single university, and a ten-month period. The authors also set the
context of the study by describing the case of the university in detail before further analysis was
conducted. Participants were all subject to four 90 minute phenomenological interviews, but data
triangulation was also done through observation of meetings and classes and document
collection. The findings of this research were framed through what the essence of STEM
professor’s experiences are, but also with an eye towards cross-case analysis and how to guide
interventions meant to foster a better classroom environment.
This study also seeks to combine phenomenological and case study methods. The case is
bounded by place (Heartland), time (focus mostly on 2006-2018), and activity (collaborationfocused). While in-depth interviews are the primary data source, other sources such as
newspaper articles, agency documents, and reports will be used to triangulate data. This study
also hopes to not only speak to the essence of collaboration, but to analyze how one example of
community policing in practice may teach us lessons about contemporary police-community
relations. Case studies also have the ability to capture the complex, fluid nature of community
policing and problem-solving initiatives (Rosenbaum 2002). Qualitative studies also have the
potential to help create variables and offer guidance to future quantitative research (Kruth 2014).
Therefore, this study will utilize in-depth phenomenological interviewing techniques
developed by Bevan (2014), which will be discussed in the Interviews section of this chapter.
The case study strategy used will be that of a single-site, instrumental case study, which is
bounded by time, place and activity, and triangulates its data. Themes will then be developed for
naturalistic generalization, in order to develop assertions about community policing, and
hopefully guide future quantitative research.
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Recruitment of Participants

Before participants were recruited for interviews, protocols were followed as outlined by
Western Michigan University’s (WMU) Institutional Review Board (IRB). An application for
project review was submitted to the IRB and a protocol outline was submitted as well. A consent
form based on the IRB’s template was also drafted and approved by the IRB. The forms discuss
in laymen’s terms the following topics: the purpose of the study, who can participate, where the
study will take place, what are the time commitments, what participants will be asked to do, what
information is being taken, what risks are involved, what are the benefits, are there any costs, is
there any compensation, who will have access, and what to do if they decide to stop
participating.
Participants were administered consent forms before interviews began. They explicitly
stated that interviewing was their only obligation to the study, and that only background
information and police-community partnering relevant to the study will be collected during
interviews. Confidentiality was the biggest risk identified and was maintained by either omitting
names or assigning aliases for participants, the city, organizations, and landmarks. The main
benefit mentioned was the ability to shed light on police-community interactions, and therefore
possibly benefit Heartland and other cities. No costs were incurred and no compensation was
given. Forms clearly stated that participation was voluntary and that subjects could drop out at
any time without consequences. Contact information from the author and the IRB was given if
participants had any questions. Interviewees signed and printed their names and dated their form.
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Two sampling techniques were used to recruit participants: criterion and snowball.
Criterion sampling involves seeking individuals who meet very specific requirements for the
study, whereas snowball sampling is when research participants can be asked to identify others
similar to themselves, who fit similar criteria, and would be willing to participate (Birzer 2008).
In this case, subjects had to be police officers or members of community organizations who have
had experience collaborating to prevent crime and improve quality of life in the city of
Heartland. When I told both police and community member participants about the types of
individuals I was looking for, they would often recommend others for me to talk to. This was a
valuable source of data but I also wanted to avoid relying on all police or all community member
recommendations in order to try and reduce bias. If police were to only tell me about civilians
with positive relationships, or community members with an axe to grind became the most
motivated to participate with me, these would both potentially distort the findings in a serious
way. Therefore, participants were also selected based on thesis committee professor
recommendations or my own independent research.
Nine current police officers and one retired officer from the Heartland Police Department
participated in interviews. The HPD holds jurisdiction over a single metropolitan area in an
Upper-Midwest state. Metropolitan statistical areas are defined by the United States Census
Bureau as urbanized areas with a population of at least 50,000 (United States Census Bureau
2012). Six officers were CPOs of the Community/Problem-Solving Unit (CPS). This unit is
housed alongside a Drug Unit within a single division of the HPD. All divisions are managed by
the Central Operations Division (COD), which include the chief of police among other
prominent officials. Three of the other current officers are higher ranking officers than the CPOs.
The HPD has a number of titles for these officers including sergeants, lieutenants, division
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commanders, chiefs, among many others. However, due to issues of confidentiality these three
officers will be referred to simply as “supervisors.” The retired officer was a CPO (known as a
neighborhood liaison officer (NLO) at the time) from 1999 to 2005. Since then, he was written
published work on community policing in Heartland, and helps train new officers for the HPD’s
police academy.
Officers begin their careers in the patrol division responding to calls for service, but they
have a wide range of paths to choose once they have achieved seniority. The officers in this
sample have held a number of positions including SWAT team, canine work, Drug Unit, shift
commander, among others. At one point or another all officers sought to work in the CPS
division. The officers totaled between three and 23 years of total experience with the HPD.
Eleven community members who have collaborated with the HPD participated in
interviews as well. Four community members were the leaders of neighborhood associations in
the city. Each of these neighborhoods has a CPO assigned to the neighborhood, and CPOs often
work closely with the leaders of neighborhood associations on crime prevention and quality of
life issues. The neighborhood associations perform a number of crucial functions in Heartland,
including advocacy on behalf of the residents of their respective neighborhoods, and acting as a
liaison between community members and the police.
Religious organizations play a crucial role in community policing matters in the city.
Two participants were former gang members and current street ministers. Both of these men
perform outreach through different organizations but they also serve an important role in
Heartland’s GVI program in attempting to reach youths who are at risk of committing violence
and trying to get them to leave behind the street life. Two other participants are prominent
leaders in their churches who perform extensive community outreach and are strong believers in
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the ideals of community policing. These two individuals have performed a number of
collaborative efforts, served on the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board, and performed other
crucial services in Heartland.
In addition, three community members from local non-profits participated in the study.
Two are affiliated with groups which seek to organize citizens and perform a wide range of
services, including empowering citizens to revitalize their neighborhoods, and provide treatment
for individuals with drug problems. One person in this sample has a close relationship with the
HPD and performs a vital role as a broker of social services for violent offenders who have been
identified for GVI.
The officers selected for this study represented all HPD officers who were employed as
CPOs at the time of this study and an additional group of officers who have extensive experience
as CPOs themselves, have performed supervisory duties for CPOs, and/or have had a direct hand
in the organization of the CPS as it’s constructed today. Therefore, this represents a strong
sample of the perspective of law enforcement for community policing in this location and time.
Heartland has a long history of activism, and a sophisticated network of community
organizations who could be said to contribute to crime prevention and quality of life issues in the
city. Although these individuals do not represent the totality of community perspectives, they
represent a wide range of organizations, functions, and are dispersed in the neighborhoods which
have the most sophisticated amount of community policing. These individuals are in a unique
position to provide us a multi-faceted view of community policing in Heartland.
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Interviews

In total, 21 interviews were conducted with the participants. Regarding the current
officers of the HPD, I first meet with two supervisors and conducted a joint interview with them
in one of the supervisor’s offices. Then, a group interview was conducted with a supervisor and
the six current CPOs in a conference room at the HPD main headquarters. I did a ride
along/interview with five of the CPOs who had neighborhood assignments at the time of this
study. Then, I met with a CPO in his office who was assigned to a high school in Heartland as a
school resource officer (SRO). Afterwards, I had a closing interview with the supervisor who
was present for the conference room interview. I also interviewed the retired HPD officer at the
office of his current employer. For the community members I conducted one-on-one private
interviews with each of them. We met at the offices of each community member, with the
exception of two community members, whom I met with at an agreed upon location which
allowed us privacy.
The length of interviews varied greatly. The shortest interview was 41 minutes long,
while the longest interview was two hours and twenty-five minutes. Community member
interviews totaled fifteen hours and thirty-nine minutes. Police interviews totaled eleven hours
and forty-nine minutes. Approximately twenty-seven hours and twenty-nine minutes of
interviews were conducted. All interviews were recorded with a handheld audio recording
device, played back using iTunes, and transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. Using the
strategies presented here from phenomenology and case study methods, quotes from the
interviews will be presented here as the primary data source, and used in conjunction with other
sources to advance arguments made.
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Appendix A presents the questions used for police and community members. They were
organized around background information, reforms/rationale of community policing, specifics of
community policing, how to collaborate, and the results of collaboration for the police.
Community member questions were organized around background information, organization
details, collaborations with the police, the process of collaboration, and overall results and
thoughts on collaborating with the police. Questionnaires followed the general structure of these
five themes for each sets of participants, while also being open-ended and allowing flexibility for
participants to speak about their specific experiences (Giorgi 1997). For example, some
participants’ experiences were mostly limited to GVI work, while others worked mostly with
their neighborhood organizations. Therefore, some participants emphasized one aspect of the
questionnaires over another. Bevan (2014) provides us with a useful way of approaching
phenomenological interviews that guided this research.
His adaptation includes three central components: contextualization, apprehending the
phenomenon, and clarifying the phenomenon. Contextualization questions are meant to gain
insight into a person’s history and experiences in order to understand where their perspective on
the research topic comes from (Bevan 2014). Questioning of both police and community
members began with asking about their backgrounds, both personally, and with the city of
Heartland. This helps provide us with useful information, such as why someone became a police
officer, or why someone is motivated to participate in community activism. In turn, we can see
where their wisdom comes from, and find topics to question later.
Apprehending the phenomenon is meant to direct the participant’s focus towards the
topic of interest and begin to explore it in-depth (Bevan 2014). This aspect was built into the
questionnaires with categories such as the reforms/rationale of community policing, specifics of
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community policing, and how does one collaborate for the police-side. Apprehending the
phenomenon was also done in a less formal way during interviews. For example, when I was
talking with one of the former gang members who does outreach in collaboration with the HPD
through GVI, he discussed his past on the streets and how his relationship with the cops has
changed dramatically. After he presented me with this context, I probed him further about GVI
by asking: Now why don’t we talk about your role in GVI more?
Clarifying the phenomenon involves analyzing the experience in depth with the intent of
providing more details (Bevan 2014). Imaginative variation is a useful tool in this regard, which
is when question structures are changed for clarifying phenomenon. On way this came up was
when community members would say that getting average citizens involved could be better, yet
they felt that there was a fair opportunity for them to have their voices heard. I would point out
contradictions such as this and bring up specific situations along these lines, such as if citizens
were afraid of the police, could their organizations be an effective liaison between citizens and
the police?
Interviewees also often discussed the experience of others in this sample, and how their
experiences were similar or different to others regarding community policing. Morse (2000:4)
refers to this as “shadowed data” and argues that it can be a valuable source of information to
provide additional clarity to a complex situation. This is especially useful given the variant
nature of crime partnerships and this was also considered in the analysis.
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Secondary Sources

Triangulation has been discussed as a common theme of case studies and as a means of
strengthening validity in qualitative research as a whole (Creswell and Poth 2018; Yin 2013).
Therefore, additional sources are used to either corroborate or point out inconsistencies in the
statements of participants, and also provide a more complete portrayal of events in Heartland.
Confidentiality was also an issue with these sources as it was for research participants.
Multiple local media sources were included in the analysis. To conceal their identity, all media
sources were lumped into the name Heartland News. If in-text citations were necessary, then
media sources were cited the same way as ordinary American Sociological Association (ASA)
citations, with the year of the story included (i.e. Heartland News 2018). Websites for
community organizations and the HPD were used to obtain additional information and keep up to
date on what these groups are doing. This also includes social media platforms, which have
begun to be used by law enforcement agencies to promote their community policing platforms
(Bullock 2018; Williams et al. 2018). Some of the research participants provided documents
from their organizations related to community policing which chronicled various efforts.
Numerous reports have also been conducted on policing in Heartland by national
nonprofit organizations and government agencies. These reports have been both positive and
negative towards the actions of the HPD, and have addressed a wide range of topics including
foot patrol, traffic stops, procedural justice, and hiring practices. They are able to corroborate
events and initiatives that have taken place in Heartland, while also providing some historical
context for the city, and seeing how key players in Heartland have contributed to the national
conversation on police-community relations. The issue with citing these reports is not only that
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they reveal the identity of the site of this case study, but they also often include names and
photos of police and prominent community members from Heartland. Therefore, the names of
these reports will not be revealed. Data sets that were obtained by me or local media sources will
be cited to help provide a criminological and sociological picture of the city.

A Pragmatic, Bleeding Heart

The use of bracketing to approach a phenomenon with a fresh perspective is difficult to
achieve perfectly. Yet, it is often useful to discuss one’s own experiences before dealing with the
experiences of research participants (Creswell and Poth 2018). As someone who has never been
a police officer, nor been a part of a controversial police-citizen encounter, I might seem like an
odd choice to tackle the important issue of police-community relations. But I feel as though my
experiences put me in a position to be sympathetic towards, and gain rapport with, both sides. I
would call myself a pragmatic, bleeding heart. That is, someone who has long been concerned
with issues of criminal justice reform, but also aware of the crucial role that police and other
public officials play.
A significant part of my time was spent living in the city, but most of my life before this
research was growing up in a rural, Midwestern setting. What tensions there were between police
and citizens lacked the racial and violent elements that Heartland has been known for. My
tension with cops was them busting friends and family members for drug offenses, and the
feeling that the law was sort of omnipresent, annoying, and largely spent enforcing minor things
that were the private business of adults. Offenders in jumpsuits and chains were paraded in front
of classmates and I with the classic “drugs are bad” mantra, people who seemed to be far more
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powerful and dangerous weren’t punished for their crimes, and criminal justice seemed to be a
contradictory system that didn’t make much sense.
This mindset led to a further interest in law, crime, and the dynamics between individuals
and groups and the state. My later years of high school then college introduced me to ideas like
the war on drugs, mass incarceration, racial bias in policing, and a ruthless system that seemed to
be all about oppression. Much of my time at university was spent studying sociology and
criminology, the concept of deviance, and how systems of social control often failed us. The
narrative that formed for myself was “us versus them,” the oppressors, versus the oppressed.
After my undergraduate work and into my mid-20s, I began to develop a more nuanced
view of these problems. In addition to studying these criminal justice issues further, I had the
opportunity to perform an internship with a probation department for adult, felony offenders
starting in 2014. I got my first opportunity to be a cog in that “oppressive” and “contradictory”
system. During that time, I saw a series of complex institutions working together, a number of
good people with good intentions, and efforts to bring about smart reforms. Some offenders felt
like decent people who had made terrible mistakes, while for others it was hard to show much
sympathy towards them.
Around this time was when a number of controversial police-citizen clashes became the
subject of front-page news as discussed in chapter one. Innocent civilians and police officers
were being killed, both sides of the police-community conflict seemed to be digging their heels
in and not working together, and it was as though a lot of people only wanted to use the crises for
their own political ends and not try to solve these problems. Scholars, civil rights activists, police
reformers, and the Obama administration made calls for change which either directly or
indirectly cited community policing as the solution to heal a divided nation.
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This era, which seemed to mark another legitimacy crisis, had a profound impact on me. I
began to learn more about my relatives who “walked the beat” in Fort Wayne, Indiana in a time
long passed. I began to take courses that greatly increased my knowledge of policing, and
developed a greater sense of empathy towards people on both sides of the issue. Much like
former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper, I saw nonviolent, intelligent criticism of the police
and authority as a healthy part of our democracy, but detested the “the only good cop is a dead
cop” (Stamper 2016:xix) feeling of those on the fringes. I was generally saddened and appalled
by the situation and wanted to gain a greater depth of understanding of contemporary policecommunity relations that seemed to be lacking in public discourse.
The perspective that I bring to this study could be said to largely be a left realist
criminology perspective. Left realism developed as a response to far-left notions of left idealism
and conservative administrative criminology. It concerns itself with crimes of the powerful, but
does not divorce itself from the reality that crime is largely the poor victimizing the poor, while
also criticizing the overreliance on top-down, heavy-handed policing (such as policing disorder)
(DeKeseredy 2011; Lea 2015). Much of left realism calls for solutions that are like community
policing. These include calls to “democratize” the police in order for communities to take more
ownership for their own crime prevention, increase police accountability, and to decentralize
police offices to local neighborhoods (Lea 2015). And as the flow of information about crime
between the police and community is seen as crucial to dealing with crime, a breakdown of this
relationship leaves these communities vulnerable to civil unrest, or a “vicious circle of police
community alienation” (Lea 2015:172). As Lea describes:
As the police receive less information, so they turn to trawling mechanisms such as stop
and search. This in turn alienates the community further as innocent people, particularly
young black men, are stopped and searched. The whole process then is repeated
(2015:172).
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So my research could be described as an attempt to further understand the circle of police
community alienation, how one community is seeking to grapple with this problem, and what we
may be able to learn from this case going forward. I hope my readers will acknowledge the
efforts I’ve made to set aside my experiences, and approach the topic of police-community
collaboration with a sense of “newness.” I’ve tried my best to grapple with my preconceived
notions about both sides and let the police and community organization leaders in this study tell
their story.
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CHAPTER 4: THE WORK THAT WE DO

Before analyzing the various ways in which Heartland’s police and community members
engage in collaborations, it will be helpful to discuss the general structure of the HPD, and how
it relates specifically to community policing efforts. Then, an overview of the five
neighborhoods with assigned CPOs (with a specific focus on the core neighborhoods Franklin,
Wells, Soho, and Dartmouth) will be given. This will include socio-demographic information,
along with crime and disorder problems that residents must grapple with.

Heartland Police Department

All new officers began their careers in the patrol division, or “working the street” as they
called it. But all new officers are cross trained in police, firefighting, and emergency medical
service (EMS). This goes back to the city’s decision to merge the police and fire departments in
1982, which would eventually lead to the consolidation of police, firefighting, and medical
services into one department.
But once officers achieve a level of seniority, they’re able to change career paths within
the department and have a wide range of options. This included the community policing unit
(CPU), which was considered a specialty unit, and all specialty units are voluntary. The officers
of this unit were initially considered neighborhood liaison officers (NLOs). According to my
interviews with Travis and Red, both of whom were NLOs, these officers existed from the mid-
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1980s, into the 2000s. Their main objectives revolved around crime prevention and quality of life
issues. Responses could include organizing neighborhood watches, citizen foot patrols, or using
a cell phone or email to address concerns from citizens or partnering organizations one-by-one.
Officers had strict neighborhood-based assignments. More serious calls in progress close
by or where officers needed assistance had to be answered. But NLOs were free from responding
to dispatch calls. With this there were a higher number of NLOs on staff than there are the
current CPOs. There were two NLOs each in Dartmouth, Franklin, and Soho, while all of these
neighborhoods have one CPO each right now. Wells also had an NLO, and additional
neighborhoods which don’t currently have a CPO, such as Hartford and Englewood, were able to
share an NLO. Community organizations, such as churches and neighborhood associations, had
office space they donated to NLOs, which were used on a regular basis. Community members,
such as Donna and Wendy, who remember the differences between NLOs and CPOs described
NLOs as being more involved and able to keep more regular contact with citizens.
NLOs also had other officers and criminal justice actors assigned to their neighborhoods
in order to partner with them. Red gave the example of a regularly assigned detective he would
collaborate with, along with a prosecuting attorney who focused on quality of life issues in an
assigned neighborhood. Travis also discussed the existence of a “tactical response unit,” which
he supervised for a while, as a unit of five that could “bring power to bear” for intense problems
such as crack alleys. There was also a crime prevention officer, whose job it was to help organize
neighborhood watches, and spread public information for citizens related to crime prevention. In
total, the CPU unit was comprised of 15 officers who had an enforcement aspect, but who were
also more widely spread out across Heartland’s neighborhoods to entrench themselves in the
communities.
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The roles of NLOs were described by Travis and Red as being an ambassador of the city,
in order to hear the complaints of citizens, and leverage the resources of the city in a team effort
towards a particular problem. Red described how one quality of life issue that citizens raised
could result in crime issues, which can then be addressed through an NLO approach:
Red: So that could be anything from lighting, that was an issue in Franklin. There was a
city parking lot at Stockbridge and Lima that was dilapidated. It had one light for a
parking lot which covers a block. The lot was full of potholes. It was great place if you
were a hooker to be a hooker. Because it was dark and prostitution was running rampant
back then. And it was dangerous cause people were getting shot by that lot. So as a
neighborhood officer it was simple. I simply drafted a letter to the housing and zoning
department leaders, who I had met and had coffee with. And I simply said: look here’s
the problem, I did a crime analysis of all the crimes that took place in that one block area,
and determined how many happened in this lot. And this isn’t someone’s private
property. This was our problem is how I looked at it. And everyone was in agreement, the
city got several hundred thousand dollars, they upgraded the lot, repaved it, relighted it,
and crime went away.
Two main factors contributed to the rebranding of CPU officers from NLOs to CPOs.
First, the HPD has faced numerous budget cuts, beginning in the late 1990s, and most
significantly during the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis. Supervisor Harris described the budget as
a serious obstacle to overcome:
Harris: Well since probably 1998 to 1999, we’ve had pretty consistent reductions to our
budget and our staffing. We were at 270 officers and we’ve dropped down to 212 sworn
officers. We have as a core mission to respond to 911 calls. So we have to make sure if
you call 911, we have to people to answer you. Everything else is extra.
Second, the shooting death of a 22-year-old man Neil in Dartmouth prompted the HPD to
investigate all homicides, from March of 2009, until March of 2012 when Neil was murdered
(Heartland News 2012i). Then, Chief Jefferson announced to the City Commission that the
department would create the CPS division, which houses the CPU alongside the Drug Unit
(Heartland News 2012a). The division was meant to tackle violent crime in the city, while also
engaging with citizens to address crime and quality of life issues. This new division was also
meant to execute the city’s GVI program, which will be discussed in chapter six.
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But what this means is that the separate roles of the NLO and the tactical response officer
become combined into the new CPOs of the CPS division. As supervisor Wallace states, CPOs
can hear the complaints coming from neighborhood residents, partner with a Drug Unit officer to
execute a search warrant, and then inform residents of the problem house that was dealt with.
CPOs will tailor outreach and education of residents towards the problem of guns and drugs,
which they say are the number one complaint of residents.
There’s a mostly negative image of the NLOs in the eyes of CPOs which seems to
contradict the importance that Travis and Red placed on their work, with supervisor Wallace
providing an example of their sentiment:
Wallace: Now before it was one of these specialty units that they called neighborhood
liaison officers (or NLOs) right? People got into those positions because they were lazy,
they wanted to do the dog-and-pony show, they didn’t want to take calls for service
anymore. It gave what we now call community policing officers (CPOs) a bad image, a
bad rap.
But as we’ll see in chapter four, CPOs are still expected to perform much of the old
neighborhood-based outreach that the HPD has been known for.

Heartland’s Neighborhoods

Below is a table which presents Heartland and neighborhood-specific census data
compared with the United States. Then general characteristics of Adams and the four core
neighborhoods are described, with a focus on crime and disorder problems, along with some of
the strategies meant to cope with these issues.

66
Table 1. Heartland and Neighborhood versus United States Census Data

Population
Median Age
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Two or More

United
States
Heartland
327,167,434 75,000
37.8
26.8

Wells
2,820
25.5

Soho
5,113
24.4

20%
55%
12%
0%
13%

72%
6%
10%
4%
9%

Dartmouth Franklin
5,270
7,193
33
32.7

76.6%
13.4%
18.1%
5.8%
2.7%

64%
21%
7%
2%
6%

$31,177

$26,434

$11,260 $19,490

$14,027

$15,956 $27,531

$57,652

$42,271

$27,923 $35,433

$29,118

$26,726 $38,511

Percent Below Poverty
Line
Childlren Under 18

12.3%
20.3%

25.2%
31%

47.4%
64%

37.5%
40%

43%
57%

31.8%
38%

37.9%
18%

Household Type
Female Household
Male Household
Married Couple
Non-family

12.7%
4.8%
48.4%
34.1%

19%
9%
35%
37%

53%
8%
26%
13%

10%
6%
13%
71%

54%
12%
20%
14%

36%
21%
28%
16%

5%
2%
35%
58%

Ownership of Occupied
Unit
Owner Occupied
Renter Occupied

63.8%
36.2%

47%
53%

55%
45%

16%
84%

47%
53%

52%
48%

32%
68%

87.3%

90.8%

77.9%

91.1%

75.7%

81.2%

97.2%

30.9%

37.2%

10.8%

30.7%

5.8%

9.1%

60.3%

Income Per Capita
Median Household
Income

Educational Level
High School or Greater
Bachelor's Degree or
Higher

6%
84%
2%
1%
7%

50%
25%
20%
0%
5%

Adams
7,100
23.7

Note: Heartland’s population has been rounded, in order to provide readers an approximate size
of the study site, while also maintaining confidentiality.
United States Census Bureau. 2017. American Survey 5-year Estimates. Retrieved from Census
Reporter. Accessed February 13, 2019. (http://censusreporter.org).

78%
9%
3%
6%
4%

67

Adams

The Adam’s area comprises roughly ten plus apartment complexes on the edge of the
local college campus, along with an assortment of rental houses and townhomes, that cater to a
large student population. There is also a large residential area, which is considered the Adams
neighborhood. Table 1 from chapter one points to a high degree of racial homogeneity, along
with higher income levels and rental occupancy, which reflects the suburban/residential
characteristics and high student population of the area.
Jim described how crime is extremely low in the Adams neighborhood with almost no
crime to discuss at monthly meetings. This is reflected in the fact that their neighborhood
association doesn’t have an office, and all of their board members are part time. As opposed to
the core neighborhoods, which have full time board members, and neighborhood associations
with more crime and quality of life issues to deal with.
Meanwhile, crime is significantly higher for the areas with student populations. Drug use
and partying often encourages rowdy behavior in student neighborhoods and attracts criminals
who scope out places for robberies and home invasions. A typical response that Jim and others
have developed is to contain parties, rather than arrest everyone and write tickets, which
encourages cooperation against more serious criminals. These areas are also susceptible to
breaking and entering if students go away for vacation or the weekends. One strategy Jim
suggests is for apartment managers to adopt motion activated lights and other CPTED strategies.
This younger population also uses a lot of social media, and Jim takes advantage of it by using a
Facebook page, to communicate with students who have concerns, and share crime prevention
tips.
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College-aged kids can often have mental illness and drug abuse issues that surface. Crisis
Intervention Training (CIT) can be used as a way to deescalate emotional students. Although
marijuana is by far the most popular among students, there is the occasional abuse of prescription
pills and heroin, with campus officers carrying Narcan as a way to reverse heroin overdoses.

Soho

Soho is one of the more unique neighborhoods in the city. It has a large population of
young people who are students, while also being known for housing its own subculture of artists,
musicians, and entrepreneurs. The racial makeup of its residents is only slightly more mixed than
that of Adams. It can be called a stereotypical community for “hipsters,” “yuppies,” and
generally trendy young adults. But my research participants praised Soho for its “small town
feel,” where people like to beautify their neighborhoods, and people work across the street from
where they live.
Still, it was known 10 to 15 years ago as being a “nefarious and wild” place for students.
We begin to see income levels below the city average, increased childhood poverty, and a much
higher level of rental properties, all of which contribute to Soho having lower socio-economic
indicators than other parts of the city. It is characterized as having less violent crime than other
parts of the city. However, drug use has been a problem in numerous ways. Predatory dealers
have been known to infiltrate rehabilitation centers to sell to recovering addicts. There is also a
motel, as well as the back of a coffee shop, that are known hot spots for drug use, including
methamphetamine, and heroin laced with fentanyl. The motel, as well as the occasional
problematic house, can also have prostitution, and even the occasional instance of human
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trafficking associated with prostitution at the hotel. Soho also has some homeless people who
camp in a wooded area in a park on the southern edge of the neighborhood.
The large number of rentals also creates a situation of uncertainty as to who one’s
neighbor is at times, which can hinder neighborhood action. The draw of artists and other
creative individuals, while bringing its own unique flavor to Soho, creates a community which is
often hesitant to cooperate with the police. Its so-called “house leadership,” which organizes
house parties and music events, will usually only speak with Homer or other long established
residents.
In addition to a full time neighborhood association, Soho does have other community
groups such as Heartland Improvement, which seek to foster neighborhood action, and better
relations with the police. Crime has also been on the decline in their neighborhood, according to
Homer and Austin, and Soho’s bad reputation from 10 to 15 years ago has seemed to wane.

Wells

Wells is the smallest of the core neighborhoods and is made up primarily of residential
homes and apartment complexes. What was once a mainly white, Polish community now has the
second highest percentage of African Americans among the core neighborhoods. Wells also
exhibits many markers of a lower socioeconomic status when compared to the city as a whole.
For example, Wells has the lowest income per capita of the core neighborhoods, as well as
highest percentage below the poverty line, and highest percentage of children under 18 below
poverty.

70
The most common crime and disorder problems mentioned were drug houses and
juveniles. Residents commonly complain about “problem houses” on their streets, some of which
sell marijuana, but it not uncommon for a problem house to sell methamphetamine, or ice (a
stronger form of methamphetamine also known as crystal methamphetamine). Some houses will
even utilize “one pot meth labs,” which are a rudimentary method to manufacture the drug in
one’s home. This can lead to the contamination of homes, or even start fires, all of which pose a
danger to neighboring residences.
Juveniles could also diminish the quality of life in Wells. Acts of vandalism such as
throwing rocks would occur. It was also not uncommon for kids to be disruptive at their schools
and have to be disciplined or removed. In addition to problems of poverty among children, Wells
also had the second highest rate of single parent households (61%), with Females constituting the
majority of them (53%).
Wells’ community activism has a heavily religious focus, including many Christian
denominations, and even some Muslim ones as well. The Wells Coalition, which is hosted by the
Wells Church, is the center of activism, and often various other local businesses and nonprofits
from the community. These organizations seek to provide mentorship for kids, alleviate poverty,
and deal with its drug issues. Many residents will work with CPO Martin one-on-one to identify
problem houses on their streets, and property managers will also frequently work with Martin on
tenants who are involved with drugs. Gangs were a problem in the past but were said to have
resided. Firearm incidents are minimal when compared with Franklin and Dartmouth.
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Franklin

Franklin is the largest and most racially diverse neighborhood in the city. While half of
its population is white, there’s a sizable black population (25%), which is higher than the overall
percentage for the city (21%). Franklin also has, by far, the largest Hispanic population of the
core neighborhoods at 20%. The neighborhood was once known as the manufacturing hub of
Heartland and a vibrant immigrant community centered around Cedar Square going back to the
1940s and 50s (Heartland News 2018a). One can see the signs of this bygone era by the
numerous abandoned warehouses and factories in the neighborhood.
But the area has had to grapple with the reputation as one of the heaviest crime areas in
the city since the 1980s. Significant amounts of Franklin are marked by stark poverty and rental
homes with some signs of dilapidation that cater to poorer residents. Prominent gangs exist in
some of these areas of the neighborhood, such as FSB, but many have decreased in size in recent
years. Although, CPO Kevin stated that if other violent groups come into a gang’s territory, these
groups have been known to retaliate with violence. These groups were selling marijuana and
homemade methamphetamine, but they have shifted towards selling ice (crystal meth). Claire of
the Franklin Neighborhood Association and Kevin frequently deal with quality of life issues such
as loud houses late at and dilapidated homes. While used by other neighborhoods, Franklin most
frequently uses “Hot Spot Sheets” as a way to anonymously report quality of life issues to Claire.
Targeted enforcement of gang leaders, coupled with gang leaders aging out and leaving
the lifestyle, has decreased the danger of these groups. However, youth gangs still in high school
shooting each other have been identified as a problem. For example, an analysis of 44 reported
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calls for gun shots during a portion of 2018 found that 70 percent of these calls came from the
Franklin and Dartmouth Neighborhoods (Heartland News 2018c).
Although business has begun to come back into the neighborhood. Organizations like the
Franklin Collaboration seek to attract investors and entrepreneurs to the neighborhood. The once
completely abandoned Cedar Square has begun to attract businesses into most of its buildings,
while abandoned warehouses have been turned into various businesses, like coffee shops, and
paintball ranges. One gets the sense of a neighborhood which has struggled, but is fighting to
regain its old, prouder form.

Dartmouth

Dartmouth is the second largest of the core neighborhoods and is overwhelmingly
African American (84%). It has the second lowest income per capita and second highest rates of
poverty, with Wells being first in both figures. Dartmouth must also contend with the highest
number of single-headed households at 66%, with the majority of these being female households
(54%). Dartmouth residents are also the least educated based on achieving a high school degree
or higher (75.7%), or a bachelor’s degree or higher (5.8%).
Dartmouth Neighborhood Association Director Donna brought up housing as a major
source of crime and quality of life issues in the community. She brought up the 2007/2008
financial crisis as having hit the neighborhood hard. This often resulted in residents having their
home foreclosed, and being susceptible to slum landlords from out of town who charge high
rents. Section 8 housing, which residents often have to resort to, can become a haven for fights,
drugs, and shootings. As referenced in the Franklin section, Dartmouth is often a hot spot for
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shootings that occur in the city. This is a narrative that has long been discussed in the city, such
as when chief Jefferson chose to analyze a recent string of homicides leading up to the decision
to implement GVI, and found that one area of Dartmouth accounted for nearly half of the city’s
homicides (Heartland News 2012i).
Other crime and quality of life issues include a heavy density of corner/convenience
stores, which sell a lot of tobacco and alcohol, and become a center for loitering, drugs and
fighting. In certain areas, groups of juveniles have been known to get into fights, and congregate
around troublesome houses. Dartmouth also lies adjacent to some homeless shelters and other
areas for the homeless, and houses can sometimes be vulnerable to burglaries from homeless
people looking for warmth, or a place to use drugs.
Various strategies and groups have been involved in attempting to deal with issues in
Dartmouth. Corner store owners often use the practice of placing “no trespassing” orders up, and
letting officers enforce at their stores. Apartment managers and school employees are often
crucial partners in identifying troublesome residents, and singling out kids in need of extra
mentoring.
Despite its many problems and negative history of police-community relations that is
more pronounced than other neighborhoods, Dartmouth is home to many community
organizations seeking to make a difference. Families of Love is a crucial broker of relations
between the police and the community. The Dartmouth Neighborhood Association seeks to
provide quality, affordable housing, as well as provide a quality grocery store as an alternative to
the many corner stores. The Ministry Alliance has agreed to become a partner with Heartland
Improvement to encourage citizen empowerment at a grassroots level. Other groups such as the
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Boys and Girls Club, and the Community Center exhibit the amount of fight that is shown in this
neighborhood.
A Typology of Partnerships

Origin

Through HPD’s website, police and community interviews, and independent research,
dozens of independent organizations that have worked with the HPD were identified. These are
categorized into four broad categories: local government agencies, criminal justice agencies,
national organizations with Heartland chapters, and community-based organizations from
Heartland. Appendix B list the community members in brackets next to their primary group of
identification. Although, many of my participants belonged to other groups on this list, and in
positions of government in some cases.
Numerous individuals I interviewed expressed a strong willingness to utilize local
government services to help achieve various goals related to community policing. CPOs and
community members discussed strong connections and friendships they’ve developed during the
course of their work. CPO Martin gave the example of the housing and zoning departments as
two key entities he has strong working relationships with:
Martin: Yeah the zoning commission, I have a couple of contacts, and they help me out a
lot…the housing inspectors. I have a couple contacts there. And the zoning people help
with the inspecting and condemning of properties. And they have contractors they work
with, to come in and board everything up, and padlock it so no one can come in. It’s
about having a good relationship with them to.
Melissa expressed support from a number of individuals from the department and even
the mayor’s office for community policing: “I have really good relationships with several folks
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on the department, even the new chief. I would call someone and say: ‘Hey this is a project we’re
working on.’ I’d even call up my friend the mayor.”
Criminal justice agencies from the city, county, and even federal level were identified as
key partners. Supervisor Harris discussed their weekly crime prevention meetings as crucial to
identifying the most serious, violent offenders in the area:
Harris: Our number one best crime prevention strategy is that we have our weekly crime
prevention meetings. We have frontline officers from the department. We have juvenile
probation and adult probation. We have our prosecuting attorney there. We have county
and township representatives there. We have Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) there. Sometimes we’ll have a U.S. Attorney there. We all get in a room together,
we discuss the previous week, and we identify violent, priority offenders. What are the
other issues in the community? And we go out from there. It’s just getting everyone on
the same page and being more ahead of what’s going on.
CPO Austin emphasized about the crime prevention meetings that: “we meet every
Wednesday; the CPOs are always there.” CPO Will stated how other criminal justice institutions
can work with community groups meant to provide services to juvenile offenders:
Will: I work with the juvenile courts a lot and the Heartland After School Program. It’s
an important program for empowering youth. It’s geared towards youth who are on
probation, or are having other issues. They go through programs to address interpersonal
and behavioral issues. They collaborate with the youth’s family to provide a communitybased alternative to placing kids in juvenile detention. They have one for girls and guys. I
went in for the After School Program a few times last month and it was a good
experience.
National organizations with local chapters have also played a role in community policing
efforts. One example is Coffee with a Cop which has as its intended purpose to bring: “police
officers and the community members they serve together-over coffee-to discuss issues and learn
more about each other,” with the idea that, “In a short time, citizens and police officers get to
know each other and discover mutual goals for the communities they live in and serve” (Coffee
with a Cop 2015). CPOs Jim and Kevin discussed how the program is an easy way to establish
nontraditional police contacts and hopefully build relationships:
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Jim: Come to this coffee shop, enjoy a cup with us, ask any questions you like, don’t be
shy. You can ask questions about the law, or a person-to-person basis. Let’s just come
here and enjoy coffee and fellowship. We’re normally really busy, and we don’t always
have time with calls and stuff. But it’s nice when we can to just chill out, have coffee,
and sit down with people.
Kevin: That’s a nation-wide program. If you go on the Coffee with a Cop website, they’ll
give you fliers, or let you post on their Facebook to advertise the event. You can register
through them, and they help with the advertisement portion of it.
National Night Out was introduced in 1984 as a way to promote and connect
neighborhood watch groups (National Night Out 2018). The CPOs stated that the neighborhood
associations help to coordinate National Night Out. Homer, executive director of Soho’s
neighborhood association, described it as having the following purpose:
Homer: that’s an opportunity for residents, it was initially developed as a street-front,
barbeque type of thing to connect with your neighbors. So that you can connect with your
neighbors, and have a better idea of what’s going on in your neighborhood, then public
safety officers became a large component of that as well. Over the last five years it has
become about celebrating that relationship with public safety officers and residents.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) also has a
significant presence in Heartland. Heartland’s chapter of the NAACP lists among its initiatives
national efforts to address stop-and-frisk abuses, how to craft anti-racial profiling bills, and steps
to implement effective civilian review (see National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People 2018). The HPD website lists the NAACP as a central partner in its stated goal
of “developing and maintaining strong community partnerships.” Donna, told me about Willis:
“He’s a black minister whose also president of the NAACP. He also sits on the Heartland
Citizens’ Appeal Board.”
Heartland has a wide range of community groups that have left their mark in policecommunity relations, but perhaps none are mentioned more than neighborhood associations.
Claire (Franklin), Donna (Dartmouth), Homer (Soho), and Wendy (Wells) described unique
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challenges for their neighborhoods, but much of their actions revolved around advocating for
their residents and neighborhood, empowerment, and providing a sense of community. In
community policing, this often takes the form of the neighborhood associations being a liaison
between police and average residents of Heartland. Claire describes how this liaison relationship
works when dealing with various quality of life and drug issues in Franklin:
Claire: that’s the “Hot Spot” thing you circled on the annual report sheet. Those are very,
very successful here. We do a hundred or so of these, and when I first started we did a
thousand of these dang things. It was ridiculous. People were constantly calling about
different things. This is a Hot Spot Sheet and this is a way for a resident to turn in a
quality-of-life issue anonymously. So they can call me at two ‘o clock in the morning and
leave a voicemail, they email them to me, they text me. I try to ask people to give me the
information in this format, but 99% of the time I know the person who’s calling, which is
good. But when I turn it in to public safety, or to housing inspection services, or animal
control, wherever I turn in the issue to, I turn it in as though I’m doing it. That way the
resident doesn’t have to worry about repercussions later. This works; I mean it has really
worked. (emphasis added)
According to a 2017 annual report obtained from the Franklin Neighborhood Association,
145 Hot Spot Sheets were turned in to anonymously report quality of life crimes. Claire
attributes years of using this strategy and a strong working relationship with the HPD to crime
reductions in her neighborhood.3
Association leaders have a strong desire to help the HPD reduce crime but they must
balance their relationships with the police with the interests of their residents. Homer and Donna
gave examples of how their relationships with police and the community came to a head:
Homer: I was asked by the previous chief to serve on the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal
Board. I knew it was because I’m friendly. But my first priority is advocating for the
residents of Soho. There are some times where friction rose because of those sides, and I
said: “I’m sorry chief but I think your guys were wrong here.” That’s a committee, not
just us watching videos and making brief comments on them.
Donna: So I have a balance between…. I like most of the police officers. (Laughs) I’ll
stand up for them when I think they’re right. But when they’re doing something stupid?
Uh sorry, excuse me, that’s my job. I had to tell one of the black officers, because he felt
3
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like I wasn’t supporting him. I’m like I called you because they wanted to do a complaint.
But if they want to still do the complaint, my job is to show them how to do the
complaint. It doesn’t mean I’m not supporting you…
Neighborhood association leaders also raised numerous issues that weren’t crimespecific, but that they saw as being crucial to the social fabric of the neighborhood, and making a
safer more vibrant place. In order, as Wendy states, it is “a neighborhood of choice for families
to want to move to.” Donna described her organization in the following way:
Donna: So we have three focus areas: economic development, housing, and health and
wellness…We’re currently doing a ten-week series on how to start your own business.
Because there’s a lot of people who need to supplement their income. They’ve never
been in trouble but they didn’t go to college… We’ve over the years have started building
homes again, rehabbing homes, and trying to bring young people back in. So we were
forced to become a provider of housing, because as all of those homes were being torn
down, and landlords were buying the ones that were left, they were charging $700 for a
two bedroom. And they couldn’t afford that rent. So our one bedroom is 400 dollars a
month. So they can afford it… Health and wellness. So it kind of addresses the gardens,
nutrition, literacy, sustaining cultural pride, all that is involved in it.
The neighborhood associations have also led a number of other significant projects, such
as adding a new public school, and a grocery store with a wider range of food options:
Homer: I think of us as an advocacy group. We advocate for the residents, the
community, and that manifests itself in different ways. There used to not be a public
school in the neighborhood. A neighborhood with its own public school tends to do better
than a neighborhood without a school.
Donna: Like with how the grocery store happened. It took eight years to get that grocery
store, and it should have never taken that long! Yeah, eight years. It was 3.7 million
dollars. We raised all of it except a million. So we’re still paying a loan on it. We owe
about 597,000 dollars. One of the goals of the organization is to get that paid off.
Families of Love has its personal connections with police and political connections in
local government, but they have also been a major advocate for the rights of citizens, and
increasing police accountability. Donna raved about Families of Love’s strong, positive
influence in Dartmouth and Melissa gave examples of how they’ve tried to help citizens in
criminal justice matters:
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Melissa: We worked with the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), along with local
defense attorneys, to do the whole “know your rights” forums and town hall meetings.
just understanding your responsibilities… And part of that work is talking with
individuals and telling them about their rights. That goes to the education piece, but it’s
also responsibility, especially interacting with public safety, law enforcement in general,
and the courts. So how do you do that? And a big part of this knowing your rights is
educating individuals to the point where you have an interaction with a police officer, we
want you to live. We want you to make it home, we want you to be safe, and we want
you to be able to tell the story, and address it. But we also want the same thing for police
officers...We’ve been a huge supporter of making sure police officers have appropriate
equipment, audio, video, bodycams, that’s available for protection. That’s not only for
the citizens, but the police officers, and a way to document interactions as well.
Rhonda serves a crucial role, as an employee of the local non-profit Hope Initiative, and
someone who CPO Kevin described as their “go to” for referring people to various non-profits.
She was not only a former officer herself in a local county, but she’s also married to an officer,
and described holding a deep amount of understanding and empathy for police, which helps her
foster relationships with the HPD. Rhonda described the work at Hope Initiative in the following
way:
Rhonda: Well what we strive for at Hope we provide education, employment services,
and training to families. That way they can achieve self-efficiency. That’s the mission
statement. I’ve been with them for seven years. Basically, my job is to get them to the
point where they’re ready to work, then to get them in the program so that they can get
work experience…We have a financial coach. So once they get a pay check, they get a
financial coach who works with them one-on-one, who can help them budget. They can
maybe help them with their credit scores, understanding that you know? Because a lot of
people don’t even know. We also have G.E.D. at our corporate location as well. So that’s
free in case someone wants to get their G.E.D.
But Rhonda’s main relationship to community policing is through HPD’s GVI program.
In my interviews with Rhonda it was clear that GVI was her main passion, and she saw it as
having the potential to combat crime, while also repairing police-community relations:
Rhonda: One of my roles there is the social services lead for the GVI strategy. My role
for GVI is kind of the case manager, and I’ve been doing it for three years. My name is
on the custom notification letters… my role is to make sure the GVI candidate is alive
and free. Like that’s my job. I’m successful if they’re alive and out of jail or prison. And
so far, since I’ve gone out to the custom notifications and shared my message with
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people, nobody has reoffended… we’re trying to as a community change the perception
of law enforcement. We’re not just out there to arrest people right? If we think you have a
fighting chance, then by god we’re going to give it to you.
Susan works as the executive director of Heartland Improvement, which according to its
company website, seeks to foster citizen collaboration and increase social capital, resilience,
civic engagement, and overall quality of life at the block-level of neighborhoods. She described
some of the history of the organization, as well as the programs that it operates:
Susan: Heartland Improvement (HI)…was a service learning opportunity for students
who were juniors and seniors, to organize in urban neighborhoods, and support
neighborhood associations. Ultimately, it was over the course of the semester that they
were recruiting residents over an area made up of 35 to 55 households big. They would
get maybe 8 to 15 households to participate, and those houses would have access to a
pool of money, which they would then democratically pool to one another. It was used to
work on home improvement projects. They have to be street side and exterior.
Ultimately, those physical projects were the vehicle by which people were building
relationships with each other in areas that were experiencing unique challenges
associated with poverty. And from that, the program as I just described it, stayed very
much the same until 2011 to 2012… So in 2012, he (the leader of HI) started organizing
with those groups that started organizing during those twelve-week periods, and he did
that over a period of years. A lot of outcomes were shutting down drug houses, putting up
more safety lights/yard lights, building a community garden, and all sorts of things that
the group themselves had the resources for…I came in in 2014, to help formalize the
sustained program, because it was just this name, and it didn’t have a sound idea behind
it. It was this lose structure, and the beauty of the program is that there is a lot of
flexibility within the framework, and it’s a nice structure. We say: “Hey we support you
indefinitely as a resident group.” You got to recruit every year, we got to have a number
of meetings, you all have to contribute in some way, and you got to take action.
In HI we have two main programs. Our catalyst program, which is twelve weeks, in the
spring time, we’re able to run about eight sites. And we run them either through the
neighborhood association, or a partner organization. Then we have the sustained sites,
which we started to pilot in 2012. Those are the block action groups. They’re started in
the catalyst program, then there’s maybe one or two that move into the sustained
program. So we have nine in Soho, and two in Wells. And it just a matter of our own
capacity as to how fast we can grow. We can’t manage to take all eight sites in the
catalyst program and move them into the sustained program. It’s sort of strategically
minded for us then. We’re working with the Ministry Alliance in Dartmouth this year.
It’s likely the catalyst programs we have in mind up there will be able to turn into
sustained programs up there, and then they’ll become action groups.
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Susan also provided details on the ideal neighborhood situation in which they’d want to
operate. One of her programs main requirements is that they only work in neighborhoods that are
Community Development Block Grant Eligible (CDBG). CDBG’s are described as a “flexible
program that provides communities with resources to address a wide range of unique community
development needs,” they must foster citizen participation, and be intended to address blight
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2018). Susan also described the strong
relationship her organization has formed with Soho and Wells CPOs Austin and Martin and how
the block action groups will sometimes work with their CPOs:
Susan: A lot of the active sites have formed relationships with the public liaison officers
in the neighborhood to address different issues. Issues such as public urination in a park,
or a vacant house that’s being used for drugs and prostitution. Any sort of number of
things are happening, or a house that’s being suspicious with a lot of traffic, but they
aren’t sure what’s going on.
Travis is a prominent religious leader at the Wells Church and member of the Wells
Coalition, which is self-described on their website as “A coalition including residents,
individuals, churches, businesses, agencies, organizations and all those passionate about making
the Wells neighborhood a great place to live, work and play.” Wells Coalition meetings are
hosted by Travis’ church and, as Wendy confirmed, he is also a board member of the Wells
Neighborhood Association. Travis also stated in relation to his service on the Heartland Citizens’
Appeal Board that he: “was on the past two boards post-retirement,” then in the third formation
of the board he stated, “the city manager asked me to be the city facilitator for it.”
Through his work in the Wells Coalition, the neighborhood association, and the Wells
Church, Travis sees himself as a facilitator, promotor, and referral source for the citizens of
Wells:
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Travis: This church was primarily a commuter church that was built back in the 1950s by
the Polish immigrants who built many of these houses in Wells. With urbanization,
growth, and what have you, that population is no longer here. So this church became a
commuter church. The people going here weren’t primarily from this community. And
the people across the fence were looking across the fence at those people going to the
parish. It was a sort of “look at those people” kind of thing. I told the bishop if you were
to send me here, it would be part of my outreach to make the parish part of the
neighborhood, and neighborhood part of the parish. So that’s what I’ve been doing for the
past six years. If you were to put “hashtags” around that, you could say I was in
community policing, now I’m in community churching. So a lot of what I’m involved in
now is frankly in the same rhythm. Building relationships, connecting people, connecting
resources, collaborating with other organizations. There are a lot of other great
organizations in this neighborhood that preceded that were active in the neighborhood,
serving the neighborhood, helping with development, and all that stuff.
Travis also referenced a number of active organizations in Wells, that he has collaborated
with, and that he advertises through church documents and other sources:
Travis: Anything that I do in the community is done in collaboration, between the church,
and other organizations in the community, or that serve the community. So probably the
ones that have engaged the community in a grassroots way the earliest are the Islamic
congregation. There’s a commercial stretch on Main Street that used to be very active and
is boarded up now. And when crack came onto the scene, it was like the O.K. Coral over
there. Gangs were trying to establish turf, selling turf, what have you, and people being
shot. So the folks over at the Islamic congregation established shop right in the middle of
that. A local Methodist church on Jackson Road established a food pantry, and a free
store. It’s kind of like a Goodwill, except everything is free. So they’ve established great
outreach. They also have an urban garden. So I’ve kind of jumped on their coattails a bit.
Heartland Solidarity is made up of Quaker and Catholic families, who live and serve in
the neighborhood, and get involved with the youth. Whether that’s after school
mentoring, helping with raising families, or what have you. They have been active in the
neighborhood for years before I came around. So I’ve been jumping on board and trying
to work with that outreach.
Patrick also comes from a local church, which has an active role in the community, and
has had extensive interaction with the HPD. Among his church’s accomplishments includes
being a founding member of Interfaith Community Outreach, which attempts to work with police
to prevent group violence. His congregation is located in the central, downtown district of
Heartland:
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Patrick: I’m the vice-chair of the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board. And I am a member
of the executive committee for the Heartland Philanthropy Association. So my work with
the Appeal Board is what connects me most with community policing. Our church has a
close relationship with the homeless population in town. We have about thirty members
of our church who struggle with homelessness. Our congregation is about 600 in
membership, and had a strong community outreach focus. And I’ve worked with the
homeless and the police for my entire adult career.
Before I came, I think it was three years before I came, a homeless man died outside the
church sleeping under a pine tree. And you can see a memorial stone in his honor. So the
church felt a great deal of shame about it. They tried to make an effort to get him help,
but there was still a sense of duty there. And the pastor at that time said very publicly that
this is our shame. So it’s not my doing, but one of my positions is one of radical
hospitality. We believe that every person who walks through the doors of this church is
made in the image of god. And that some of them may very well be angels, some may
very well be Jesus Christ himself. So when we are anxious about hospitality, when we
refuse people, we could be refusing angels, or turning Jesus away. The Bible is very clear
about this, especially in the New Testament. And we’re not pushovers. Part of having
hospitality is having a safe building. So we don’t let people roam freely. But people know
that they can come here and use the bathroom, get something to eat, they’ll be treated like
a human being.
Patrick’s role with the church has placed him in the position of collaborating with the
police in positive ways, while also being an outspoken critic of the HPD. As we will see later,
this has intersected with the congregation’s desire to help the homeless, and Patrick’s work with
the police.
The last two community members, Shannon of Brotherhood Over Violence and Juan of
the Heartland Urban Association in Franklin, work with local non-profits, and serve the
important role of what Juan calls “street outreach workers” for GVI. Shannon was a former drug
dealer who served multiple prison sentences, while Juan was a founding member of the Franklin
Street Boys (FSB) gang of the Franklin neighborhood, that sold drugs, and committed various
other crimes. Both men turned their lives around and conduct what they call “street ministry,”
and take pride in their ability to bridge the gap between police and at-risk youth:
Shannon: Juan and I we walk the streets, we give out our sermons, we give out food like
hotdogs. Juan will come in my driveway with the grill and he’ll come and grill the
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hotdogs. Everybody comes, people from across the street, drug dealers, and they get
chips and hotdogs and stuff. Then we pray with them. I didn’t usually pray for nobody.
But then I’d ask them if they wanted to pray together. And they got drugs, and guns in
their pocket. (Shannon recites a prayer) We are the liaisons for the cops in the streets.
And some people will come up to us and give us information on what’s going on. Cause
they don’t want to go to the cops…They’ve been getting scared of those guns man. And
we have a couple of pastors who come down with us. You need a different kind of pastor
for the stuff we do. I don’t need Mr. man with the white robe, and all that other stuff on. I
need ex-drug dealers. My pastor been to prison before. My pastor needs to totally
understand the streets. I can’t take much knowledge from a man that hasn’t lived my life.
Don’t counsel me on those things if you haven’t been through them man.
Rhonda spoke highly of her GVI work with Shannon and Juan stating that “If I were
coordinating support and outreach, they’d be my guys.” More details of the story of how
Shannon and Juan became involved as collaborators for GVI will be given in chapter six.

Content

Community members and police I interviewed showed a strong willingness to share and
utilize a wide range of financial, human, physical and organizational resources Both police and
the community were the recipient of said resources, with the content varying greatly depending
on what the specific goal of the partnership was. 4
The most common issue raised in relation to financial resources was the need for more
funds to pay to increase the number of CPOs. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the
CPU unit was susceptible to budget cuts and economic recessions as a “non-minimal staffing”
unit of the HPD, which led to various calls by police and community members to increase the
staffing of CPOs, in order to better accomplish community policing goals. Some funding has
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begun to appear from the federal level to hire more officers in recent years as stated by
Supervisor Harris and CPO Will:
Harris: We get some funding from C.O.P.S. grants federally.
Will: We did get a grant this year that allows us to hire more officers. It’s called a
SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response).
According to a document obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice’s website,
Heartland received 1.375 million dollars to hire 11 officers in 2017 through the COPS grant.
Plus, according to The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) website, Heartland
received approximately 1.548 million dollars in August of 2017 for hiring purposes. SAFER
grants are geared towards fire safety personnel, but since all officers are cross-trained in fire and
police functions, this grant will also go towards the hiring of more officers at the HPD. The
DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs website has also stated that Heartland has received six “Byrne
Grants” since 2012 totaling $459,874. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants are the
largest source of federal funding to state and local criminal justice entities (Department of Justice
2018).
But community organizations have also stepped in to fill the void of lower staffing levels.
Patrick provided one example of how local churches chip in in this situation:
Sam: Now you said that your church helped pay for the salary of a CPO?
Patrick: Yeah all the churches in this part of downtown helped contribute. So we don’t
pay taxes, so we try to find things to do in lieu of paying taxes. Different churches do it in
different ways. We allow our building to be used free by the community free of cost, or
expectation. We have about 140 different community groups that meet here… But we
also help pay for the salary of a police officer. It’s a good way to give back to the
community. The CPO position is hugely important. Those officers are highly respected.
The CPS Unit also has a school resource officer Charlie who is stationed at one of the
city’s larger high schools:
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Charlie: And my position is actually funded by the school. They want me here. They
enjoy having me here…I do know they pay my salary. They pay it to the city, then I get
paid by the city.
Neighborhood associations, religious organizations, and the HPD work together to throw
pop-up block parties, thanks to planning and grant money acquired by an event management
organization in Heartland. According to documents obtained from the event management
organization, the idea of “placemaking” defined by the organization as “an inclusive process that
brings people together to take part in shaping the public spaces that will serve as platforms for
the daily life of our communities” provides the rationale. The pop-up block parties are intended
to connect youth with police and build relationships, as well as potentially connect residents with
other valuable neighborhood resources. Since 2014, fifteen parties have been thrown, with
$25,000 in grants written by the event management organization.
Human resources are a crucial aspect of partnerships. They have the potential to tap into
valuable sources that an individual organization is not able to obtain such as expertise, mentors,
and additional staff (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006). Both police and community members were
able to take advantage of resources from the other side. In the wake of mass shootings across the
country, the HPD has attempted to prepare its citizens for these emergencies through active
shooter trainings:
Wallace: Active shooter trainings. These guys have been certified in them since 2016. To
date we have done 31 active shooter training sessions. We have seven more on our
schedule to do in the next 45 days.
Travis: We just had the Unit come here to do an active shooter training for the church. So
if we had a shooter walk into the church, what to do, how to respond, and that sort of
thing.
Numerous other situations occur where current and former police officers in my sample
are able to lend their knowledge in ways that are beneficial to citizens. Policing traditionally has
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a working culture that promotes secrecy and isolation (Loftus, Goold, and Giollabhui 2016), yet
police officers often acknowledged that it was beneficial for them to disclose some of their work
to the community, and citizens were often appreciative of this. Initiatives such as National Night
Out and Coffee with a Cop are intended to allow citizens to converse with and ask questions to
police about policing. Travis also mentioned how his time served on the HCAB, and that of other
former police officers, has been beneficial to providing insight into police use of force during the
appeals process. But two examples, neighborhood watch meetings and the Citizens’ Academy,
were a common forum to educate citizens about policing. Travis gave the example of
neighborhood watch meetings at the Wells Neighborhood Association:
Travis: We allow people to come in and voice concerns about what’s happening on their
block and Martin is always there. There’s questions taken about the criminal process.
This is the process that occurs when you report suspicious activity, drug dealing, what
have you. This is the investigative process, this is the prosecutorial process, and it
certainly takes more time than reporting a street light out or something…It paints a
realistic picture to hopefully encourage them to get involved, and provide those witness
statements, and step up and be willing to testify and report. Nothing happens without
citizen support.
The Citizens’ Academy provides an even more in-depth view into the world of policing
geared mainly towards prominent community members. Officers Will and Wallace describe how
the Academy is a tactic they try to use to maintain a positive image of the department and
increase feelings of transparency in the community:
Will: The Citizens’ Academy is an event we do…It’s basically a training for our citizens
and stakeholders in the community to come get a bird’s eye view of what we do as police
officers. So we’re fortunate enough to get people such as our apartment complex
managers, church leaders, community organization leaders, business owners, just
stakeholders in the community. They come into a room, they get briefed on what we’re
doing. Each person gets broken up into teams, then they go out to different police
stations, and they go over police related trainings and activities. It can anything from
knowing how to hold and shoot a gun, traffic stops, how our S.W.A.T. operations do
things. They also get to see all the S.W.A.T. related equipment, and a whole host of other
police related things we do on a day-to-day basis. So the goal is to be able to build those
relationships. So that when something does happen in the community, those stakeholders
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can say that they went to a training, and they can say that they got a bird’s eye view of
why an officer does certain things in a situation. They can kind of piggy back on, like if
someone in the community says something negative about our actions, then they can
revert back to the training that we were able to put them through. They can go “Okay this
is why that happened.”
Wallace: One of the complaints that we would get is that citizens would see what they
call the “tank” rolling down the road. You’ve read and seen in the news that police
departments are getting military-type of equipment, and there’s citizen outrage behind it
because they don’t want to see this tank rolling down the road right? So what we did is
that the S.W.A.T. team has an armored vehicle. It doesn’t have any guns on it, it’s simply
something we use to shield us between the bad person whose got firearms and us. It’s a
rescue or transportation tool. So we bring that armored vehicle to the Citizens’ Academy
where people can sit in it, they can jump on it, look at it, ask questions about it, push the
buttons. That way they can see that this thing doesn’t shoot missiles, it doesn’t shoot
freaking 1,000 rounds of .50 calibers semiautomatic ammo. It’s not a tank right?
It has been argued that citizen police academies can increase the quality and willingness
of public cooperation, which is essential to community policing (Cohn 1996). Research has
suggested that academy participants find their experiences overwhelmingly positive and
informative, with regards to police behaviors, and how these interact with community problems
(Lee 2016; Schafer and Bonello 2001). Numerous community leaders in my sample participated
in the Citizens’ Academy, and often encourage residents to inquire and learn more about the
police. Patrick is an example of this through his church congregation:
Patrick: We encourage our members to go on ride a longs and to attend the Citizens’
Academy…The point… is to teach citizens the things they don’t understand about
policing. It’s to confront them with the complicated nature of policing. So you do a lot of
trainings. You do shoot/no shoot trainings. It raises questions like: are police officers ever
justified shooting someone in the back? The answer is yes. He’s got a gun and he’s going
to go shoot that kid over there. They try to help you understand the daily life of a police
officer. You also do trainings on a lot of other things. It’s fun. It’s catered. It’s free. You
got to fire all the different weapons which was cool. I got to fire an M4, and that was
pretty awesome.
But citizens also provide essential knowledge to the police of various fields and areas of
the community that cops are less attuned to. One way that this is commonly done is through
neighborhood associations being the “eyes and ears” of their communities, and being a source of
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information as a liaison between the police and the community. Citizens also provide valuable
information on social services and how to acquire additional funds for collaboration. The police
not only see Rhonda as the social services lead for GVI, but as their chief referral source for
outreach services in the community:
Kevin: We have Rhonda whose are go to. She knows everyone who does everything. Her
organization does a lot of housing and employment services, and job training. But what
they don’t do, Rhonda knows someone. So a lot of times we refer people to her, knowing
that somehow those people can get help. We used to hand out pamphlets of non-profits
and other resources to people. But they were changing constantly, so that the pamphlet
was useless…instead we settled on having our go to person, to help us, and refer
individuals. And that’s where Rhonda comes in.
The CPOs also strongly value citizens who are able to write grants, which can then go
towards collaborative efforts. In a department where staffing and funding have been recent
issues, CPOs such as Martin rave about the ability of citizens with grant-writing knowledge.
Kevin and Claire also described how their combination of financial, human and organizational
resources helped to create a CPTED project in Franklin:
Martin: Now some neighborhoods are way ahead of the curve. Like if I talk to Claire
from the Franklin Neighborhood Association, she’s on top of her game. She’s really good
about writing grants, so they always get money to fix up Franklin then. If you have
someone like that, it does wonders. Franklin has come a long way in the last five
years…It’s usually Dartmouth or Franklin that gets the funding.
Kevin: She [Claire] got a $50,000 grant. There were only two in the entire nation. So her
and I did some work on one of our hotspots. It was a liquor store close to her office. We
just looked at the crime stats. I went through a CPTED class (Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design). So we came up with some ideas on how we could improve the
design of the outside in order to prevent crime. She wrote up a grant and won! So now we
got to figure out how we’re going to spend $50,000 to improve the outside of a liquor
store!
Claire: I was awarded a $50,000 grant for this year, which will be started in midFebruary…in a troubled spot in the neighborhood centered around a liquor store. We’re
looking at formulating a committee to insert extra lighting, serious upgrades to the
parking lot, some plantings, and other ways to make the store a more welcoming place.
There’s a new owner there, he’s had it for about a year and a half now. The idea is to
make the store a more upscale beer and wine, with craft beers, and expensive wines
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available. Before him, there was an owner who was more about selling the individual
cigarettes, and the beer-in-the-bag kind of thing…Get rid of some of the drug dealers
who go there, and some of the crime folks with there. So we’ll be working closely with
public safety on that design. We already have been. That’s how I got the grants, I worked
with them to formulate ideas to put into the grant.
Physical resources tended to consist of providing facilities for meetings and other events,
or equipment for other initiatives. The most common use of facilities for police and community
members was the neighborhood association buildings for monthly neighborhood board/watch
meetings. Association leaders stressed the importance of having a physical landmark in their
neighborhood, which was reflective of its aspirations, and welcoming to residents. Neighborhood
block parties, art fairs, and other neighborhood events help to celebrate their neighborhoods and
give residents a chance to interact informally with officers. Homer provided a good example of
this when speaking about the importance of a new neighborhood association in Soho:
Homer: We opened the door for residents to come in and suggest the direction we needed
to go, what do we need to do, what’s going on here? Probably two to three years ago we
were able to purchase this large building we have our office in now. That has changed
our direction somewhat, because it has allowed us to offer up opportunities,
entrepreneurial opportunities, and hopefully hiring opportunities. It’s a pivotal piece of
landscape in the neighborhood. This is the first thing many people see in our
neighborhood corridor. So we wanted to make sure it was reflective of what our
neighborhood is about.
In turn, neighborhood associations have become an important place for association
leaders and their CPOs to meet, with some even offering their associations as an office space for
CPOs:
Sam: Does your CPO have an office somewhere in the neighborhood?
Claire: (Claire taps the table to indicate that Kevin has an office in the room we’re
interviewing at in the neighborhood association) This is his space he can use if he needs
to sit down and have a discussion with someone. Or they’ll all pile into my office.
And in some cases churches also provide space for officers to use, such as in Wells:
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Travis: We have the Wells Coalition. It is a group composed of a couple dozen nonprofits
that are service oriented. Our church hosts those monthly meetings and Martin is always
invited to be part of that component. We had an event here last fall where 200 neighbors
came in and did fun activities like a hayride and Martin would provide the escort for it as
it rode around the neighborhood. The K-9 unit over on Jackson Road is used mostly for
searches. But they’re also invited out to our church to use the facilities for training. The
dogs will run around the playground and we have around 15 acres, with woods, and
grass. This is more convenient for them instead of going all the way to the training center.
Local government has also provided resources for police and community members to use
during blight sweeps:
Charlie: Blight sweeps, like Franklin and Dartmouth, we did those two last summer.
Essentially, we go into the neighborhoods and work with people from the city (Housing).
They will essentially go down the streets and pick up trash to make things look better.
We’ll usually work with them to let people know what things can be a violation, such as
trashcans in a certain place, or overgrown weeds. If residents have any sorts of concerns
about neighbors, or portions of the neighborhood, we give them information and let them
know who to call.
Wallace: Literally, you take a five-square block and visit each house. And those areas are
identified by the neighborhood associations. Unfortunately, this area is a complete mess
right?... they provide the trash bags, big dumpsters, all their hardware stuff, and come by
to pick it up afterwards.
Organizational resources provide arguably the most valuable type of content for
successful collaborations. Affiliating with organizations can provide new opportunities such as
access to new programs, increased publicity, exposer to “new networks” of partner beneficiaries,
and even enhanced reputations (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006:259). This can not only result in
material benefits through community policing, but even the ability to enhance legitimacy given
the right partnerships. As stated previously, working with national organizations like National
Night Out and Coffee with a Cop provides a level of exposure and resources, through websites,
and other means of these national brands. Working with the HPD can also provide citizens
access to weapons, training, equipment, and other means of exposure to police work through the
Citizens’ Academy that many individuals do not get to experience firsthand.
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The local media has published negative stories about the HPD, but has also shown them
in a positive light, which officers acknowledge can be useful in getting the word out about their
efforts to repair police-community relations:
Red: You can fix things and then publicize it so that the community knows. One day the
news was just following me around and filming. It’s so goddamn important because I
can’t meet all the tens of thousands of citizens. But if they can see it within their
neighborhood, then their like “oh that’s cool,” and you’re immediately building
relationships. And you’re showing results and not just talk. That’s how you build an
image.
Martin: Even when we do a news press, for a search warrant or whatever, we will say:
“We want to thank the community, that’s been providing us help on this drug house for
this amount of time.” And so when we put it on blast, the criminals know there’s people
feeding us information, and it keeps them on their toes.
Local television affiliates publish stories online about HPD’s blight sweep operations,
which included video of police officers, including the chief, and volunteers, picking up trash, and
having friendly conversations with residents. One resident of Dartmouth commented in the story
that “It’s good they’re giving back instead of arresting all the young kids out there” (Heartland
News 2014c).
Public schools are also identified as a significant partnering organization to help identify
and deal with juvenile offenders. Numerous former HPD officers hold security positions at the
schools, and supervisor Harris described these and relationships with other school officials as
being crucial. One example he gave was this:
Harris: We have the school resource officers in two of our high schools, because we work
very closely with the schools to share information…We had a kid that was beat up at a
bus stop waiting for school. There was a retaliation assault. There was a kid who got shot
on the south side. Another kid was in his classroom. And a kid who didn’t even go to the
school went into the kid’s classroom and assaulted him. So what we were seeing is
groups on the north side and south sides of town going back and forth with each other.
And it kept escalating and escalating. We knew that if we did nothing, there would be a
shooting or a homicide. So what did is sit down with the school’s principal at that
particular high school, their security team, our officers, and juvenile probation. We sat
down and we brought in the kids with their parents on one side of the dispute and talked
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with them to get their take on the story. Then we brought in the other kids and their
parents from the other side of town to get their perspective. And we brought them in
together and did mediation.
Organizations which can enhance legitimacy are essential for community policing, to
make citizens comfortable reaching out for police help, and help solve ongoing problems in the
community. Neighborhood association leaders discussed how citizens often came to them to
report crimes on a one-on-one basis in order to remain anonymous. They would mention how
their standing in the community and the power of their organizations kept them safe and
provided a bulwark against fears of retaliation. Such examples included Claire’s comments in the
previous origin section, and Donna’s remarks:
Donna: Call me on the phone; have one of their relatives call. I’m trying to get them to
see that I’ve been around so much that it’s kind of like “Well, Donna’s always fussing,”
so they got to come forward. They feel if they come to me, no one’s going to retaliate
against me.
But community groups also had the ability to foster group action by residents alongside
the police in situations where residents may not have otherwise felt comfortable. Susan
mentioned multiple examples from Heartland Improvement including the following situation in
Soho, where a particular house was becoming a hub for drugs and prostitution:
Susan: So in that particular instance, I’ll draw from this group in the Soho neighborhood.
We’re having meetings with the residents and helping to facilitate those meetings. We’re
figuring out from them what’s bubbling up here? What are your priorities? This became a
hot issue. This particular house where there would be a lot of guests, and they would be
solicited for sex at night. We don’t feel safe taking our guest out on a walk and we don’t
feel safe. And we’ve seen people get into fights, and violence on the streets. Issues
bubble up, and we say here are different options that you may take here, and let’s make
sure you have the right numbers to the liaison officers that are there. Let’s invite them
[officers] to a resident meeting. If you guys are noticing it, then for sure they have been
called on this, and know it’s an issue. So let’s talk about their perspective, and let’s attend
a neighborhood watch meeting at the neighborhood association.
Then for direct actions, people isolated alone are afraid of tacking action for fear of
retaliation. And so we then encourage people to build a phone tree. You call the liaison
officer, then call your neighbor. Make sure they call the liaison officer for the next person
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on the phone tree. The officer then says we’ve had multiple calls about this issue within
the last hour and a half. So that being true, that house doesn’t necessarily know who’s
calling. Because there have been multiple homes within a short time frame, and you can’t
just point to one particular person…the more people you have united, the more you can
kind of look out for each other. Also, you can inform the liaison officer and put pressure
on them to show up and be there. And also, they [the officer] want to fix the situation. So
they want to respond when they can actually catch people doing stuff. So in that way, it
helps them too, especially if this is already a problem house on their radar. So that’s the
role we’d play. Make sure everyone has the information, people have talked to each
other, make sure the officers and residents understand each other, make sure the
neighborhood association knows, and that there’s real time action when it’s happening.
Homer gave another example of being able to reach the young artists scene in his
neighborhood in order to address recent sexual assaults in his neighborhood:
Homer: There’s groups for our younger people in the music scene…a meeting of the
“house leadership” because one of the houses in the neighborhood was not safe, and there
had been sexual assaults there. People felt like they wanted to address it as a community,
but they wanted me there just to know what the options were…There were people who
were adamant about not wanting police involved, but I said to them later that there are
limits to how far you can go with this. There’s limits to how much the community can
police itself. And if you want to bring in public safety, what I can do is promise you that
we can set up a respectful environment, where we can then set up this conversation with
the officers. The officers will come here with an understanding that your part of this
community, the fabric of this community, we want them here, we like the houses, and
we’re not interested in addressing “house parties” necessarily. We’re interested in
addressing behavior from this one specific house… To me would that have happened 18
months or two years ago? Probably not. So I think there’s more a willingness to include
public safety into the fabric of the Soho neighborhood. Before if they showed up it was
like nobody on the block called them. Now there’s more of an understanding.
Another situation arose surrounding an intense police-citizen encounter. In this situation,
Families of Love tried to communicate the community’s perspective, and collaborate in order to
try and ease tensions as described by Melissa:
Melissa: There were some things going on, and a police officer ended up chocking the
young boy is what it boiled down to. Right, wrong, or indifferent, we know that’s not an
appropriate way to sustain someone. Trust me, I believe that the young man was
completely out of order, but just as much as people get out of order, police officers are
trained to respond in a certain type of way. As a result of that, we got with the
department, and told them what our priorities are as far as policing the community. Then
we also, in the area where this happened at, this place had a lot of blight, empty houses,
drug activity, and stuff like that. So we got with the neighbors and public safety, and we
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cleaned that place up. We cut down trees, we picked up glass, we really did a
beautification project as a way not to dismiss the action of the officer, but as a way to try
and build some type of relationship between police and community. It turned out very
well. The community came out and participated, helped in the cleanup, and the officers
did to and brought some resources in to help with the blight.

Form

Smith and Wohlstetter (2006) state that partnerships may take the form of either informal
or formal agreements, where the former tends to be established through pre-existing
relationships, while the latter can take the form of contracts, leases, and other regulated contacts.
In Heartland, partnerships were overwhelmingly informal, whereas the most formalized aspects
of community policing tended to be isolated to the HCAB’s appeal process, and the criminal
justice agency partnerships in GVI. 5
Many examples of informal agreements were already mentioned previously, such as
Melissa’s use of political connections, the development of Rhonda as a social services referral
source, or Travis opening the Wells Church to events for police and community members.
Neighborhood association buildings were the most common sight for meetings in the
community, such as neighborhood watch meetings during an agreed upon time once a month.
Two advantages that Heartland has are its small size, and the deep connections between police
and community organization leaders. This relationship has been a sight of disagreement and
negativity at times, but both parties rated their working relationships as overwhelmingly positive
and as having the potential to effect positive changes in the community. These feelings help to
facilitate arrangements where individuals felt as though they can rely on their pre-existing
relationships to address issues.

5

See Appendix B for typology of partnership forms.
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In Dartmouth, where police-community relations have been more contentious than in
other parts of the city, Donna still expressed a large degree of optimism throughout in her
relationships with the HPD:
Donna: I think one of the reasons why I stay is because I feel like Heartland is small
enough to make a difference. We’re not a huge city. We’re small enough where we can
make a difference… Do I have a good relationship with them? Yes, I do and I believe
people like Harris and them are really trying to make a difference. Because people will
say that Harris was one of the horrible ones. But then I said did you change? Have you
made a mistake? All of us have made a mistake. What I see is that Harris believes there’s
another way than just locking teenagers up. And because he wants to try, then yeah I’ll
stick with him until I see different.
Some police members in my sample also did additional work in the community, which
helped them to build even stronger bonds with community organizations:
Kevin: And we’re also seeing that the real estate market is making a comeback, and
people are investing in the community. Which when I first started no one would invest in
Franklin. We have a thing called the Franklin Collaboration, is an organization I’m in. It
tries to make improvements to the neighborhood. Claire is in it…
CPOs and neighborhood associations provide a common source of informal
arrangements, where crime and quality of life issues are communicated, within some arranged
set of parameters. When these relationships function properly, they can help address problems,
and build relationships as is the case in Soho:
Austin: Homer’s a great guy. A lot of people will contact him and we talk regularly. But
a lot of complaints or a lot of tips will come into Homer. And a lot of patrol officers get
sent to a call down here about an ongoing problem, and they’ll often send me an email or
get ahold of me. I kind of view my email as my dispatch center. I get calls too. But my
email serves as kind of a guide to what’s going on in the neighborhood.
Homer: I generally do emails, unless there’s an immediate sense of urgency. Then I’ll
make a phone call. Generally, I’ll do emails because I feel like I can throw a lot of
information in there that they can get back to. Most often I write directly to CPO Austin,
but in a case like last week where we had lots of rerouted traffic due to flooding, and that
dramatically increased our traffic. Then I included Wallace in the email, and I always try
to be respectful of the chain-of-command. If I have to go up the chain, I want to make
sure my officers know about it early on, so it’s not something they get caught off guard
with. But I think the communication is good. I meet with the chief fairly regularly, I meet

97
with Austin, he comes in fairly regularly, and in the ten years I’ve done this I don’t know
if I’ve had more than a 72 to 48-hour response time.

Depth

As stated in chapter two, community policing is necessarily a multi-level effort due to
decentralization and involvement of mid-level managers and CPOs in significant decision
making (Kelling and Moore 1988). Furthermore, multi-level buy-in throughout a department is
necessary to change the organizational culture of policing, which has often been resistant to
community policing (Chappell 2009; Rosenbaum and Wilkinson 2004). In the case of Heartland,
an overall support for the cultural shift was expressed by upper-level officers, down to CPOs.
The previous chief, who left at the end of 2017, was lauded in the local press for leading a
departmental shift towards community policing. One piece stated that the chief recognized the
HPD was “heavy on enforcement, stat-driven by tickets and arrests, and needed to play ‘catch
up’ with the profession that had evolved away from that traditional focus,” and the chief stated in
2008 that the HPD needed, “an enhanced focus on community policing, a diverse command staff
and an internal-affairs office that was transparent” (Heartland News 2017). Supervisors and
CPOs also discussed the importance of organizational culture during interviews:
Harris: It starts from the top. If you don’t have people in the organization to get the
message down to the lower people it doesn’t work. Whatever part of the puzzle is
preventing you from getting the message out, you need to take care of it. This is very
important that everyone’s on the same page so you can complete the mission.
Wallace: So you got to have the direction from the top. So if the chief, the chief’s office,
and the senior staff support community policing, then that’s the direction of the
department. Which it currently is. The officers, the boots on the ground, they don’t have a
choice. If they don’t like it, or adhere to it, they’re going to have a difficult career.
Will: I think there was resistance. The higher ups are very invested in community
policing. Being able to sit out and just talk with people, and also do those other programs
we talked about, our bosses strive for that.
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Austin: I know that the current chief is on broad with how we do things. The higher ups
really support us, and they appreciate when we’re not busy with community policing we
can go assist with a violent crime that’s in progress.
CPOs are also given some flexibility to work with community members to solve
problems in their neighborhood. Some examples mentioned earlier included Kevin and Claire
working together on their CPTED project in Franklin, and the meetings facilitated by Homer to
allow CPOs and “house leadership” in Soho to deal with sexual assaults in the neighborhood.
Officers expressed how much they enjoyed the autonomy that’s given to them in HPD’s
organizational culture:
Martin: I’ve been with the CPO unit for about a year now. I love it. It’s really whatever
you want to make it.
Red: And what I liked about the CPU at the time was that it allowed an officer to take a
deeper dive into finding solutions, rather than just responding to calls, and that’s what I
wanted to do…That’s what makes it so fun. You just take a project, create something
from it, and make it an initiative.

Closing Remarks

Chapter four presented a contemporary overview of the city of Heartland and its
community policing related efforts. Using the typology offered by Smith and Wohlstetter (2006),
we have seen that collaborators in Heartland are made up of numerous independent
organizations, who utilize formal and informal agreements, across multiple levels of
involvement, to share various financial, human, physical, and organizational resources.
However, the most significant collaboration was the HPD’s GVI program, which was
carried out by the CPS division. This program was crafted by the administration of the HPD
because its old tactics of broad-sweeping deterrence were seen as incapable of dealing with
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violence in the city. Furthermore, their old tactics created strained relationships with the
community, and conflicts within the political establishment of Heartland. Focused deterrence
was branded as a dual solution to these problems. In order to fully grasp the reasoning for
shifting community policing’s focus towards violent groups, and why this is so important to the
CPS and the city, chapters five and six necessarily focus on the key events that led to a GVIbased community policing model, mostly from 2006, until the time of this study in 2018.
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CHAPTER 5: AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Pressure to reform law enforcement in Heartland under the guise of community policing
came from both within and outside the structures of the HPD and the city of Heartland. These
pressures were described as a dialectic surrounding social control and social problems (Goetz
2017). The controversies which confronted the HPD arose around the mid-2000s. This was a
time as described by police and community members of seemingly worse neighborhoods, and
more significant problems relating to crime and quality of life. The response of the HPD at that
time was described by current and former police officers as more aggressive, yet necessary.
Whereas community members often used terms such as “militaristic,” or “old and outdated” for
these tactics, and pointed to poor leadership from past police chiefs.
In the case of Heartland, a high profile incident surrounding the traffic stop of a young,
black man named Barry fueled citizen activism, and efforts to reform the HPD. Two studies have
also raised concerns of racial bias by the HPD against Heartland’s black residents. One study,
based on arrest data from 2001 to 2010, found significant racial disparities between whites and
blacks in Heartland and the surrounding county for marijuana possession. But the second study,
which has had a more profound effect on policing in Heartland, addresses pretext traffic stops
being disproportionately conducted against members of Heartland’s African American
community.
The significance of this traffic study was three-fold. First, it was a response to
controversial police-citizen encounters, most notably the traffic arrest incident involving Barry.
Second, this study involved a collaborative effort between the current chief at the time
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(Jefferson), and members of the revamped HCAB. Third, the results of the study led to Jefferson
and members of the HCAB to institute new training and policies, including a new consent-tosearch policy aimed at reducing problematic traffic stops. The efforts to address authority and
accountability within the HPD will lead us into reforms more specific to the CPS Unit in chapter
six.

Old Tactics

When discussing reasons for the department’s shift towards its current model of
community policing, officers pointed to the need to change their tactics. They defended their
strategies as necessary for the context of Heartland at the time, citing America’s higher crime
rates and drug epidemics of the 1980s and 90s, as influencing law enforcement into the 2000s.
The graphs below present violent and property crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants in Heartland,
as well as the United States. These figures include offenses known to law enforcement and
submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR). Part
I offenses are provided, which the FBI categorizes based on violent crimes (murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crimes
(burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle, and arson) (Mosher, Miethe, and Hart 2011).
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Table 2. Heartland and U.S. Crime Rates per 100,000
Heartland and U.S. Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants
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Note: The FBI states that when an agency either doesn’t provide data, or improperly collects
data, then it is omitted from the UCR.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2019. “UCR Publications.” Federal Bureau of Investigation
Criminal Justice Information Services. Accessed February 19, 2019.
(https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications).
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This resulted in broader enforcement of neighborhoods in the city, which was a concept
that current officers called the “shotgun approach.” But the local media has attributed these
heavy-handed approaches to the creation of “collateral damage” that has damaged policecommunity relations. It was described as a time when the police “often arrested first and asked
questions later” (Heartland News 2014h). A similar narrative was told by officers:
Martin: Yeah I think that’s kind of a cause and effect thing. That is history has shown if
you over police your citizens, they’re not going to trust you, they’re not going to call you,
and give you information. They’re going to resent you. You’re looked at as someone who
isn’t part of the community. In our city it’s kind of gone in waves depending on who’s in
charge. For when I first got hired, we were much more heavy-handed…It was that
shotgun effect, stop everything for every violation. That’s what it was man, you’re
looking for guns, and dope. You’re stopping 15 plus cars a night. Anything you saw,
plate light, etc. You’re stopping a lot of good people for very minor traffic violations, and
that’s not the way to build trust…Well I think it comes with whatever was happening at
that time. So back in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, back when crack/cocaine came to the
city, it was a mess, and crime went through the roof. So the department created a bunch
of specialty departments to deal with the problem. We had three drug unit teams, and
other aggressive policing units, to go out and crush crime. I think it was needed for that
time. A message needed to be sent that that wasn’t going to be tolerated… But there was
a lot of hatred for those heavy-handed tactics… then it takes so much time to build that
relationship back up, after they see guys jumping out of cars, and chasing guys
throughout their neighborhood. They don’t know the details and they don’t know why
they’re chasing them.
Harris: Productivity was measured based on statistics…When supervisor George and I
started, it was about how many stops you made. Because if you stop ten cars, then you’ll
get one with some contraband in it. It was more about a shotgun approach, and if I keep
stopping cars I’ll eventually get someone.
Travis: Now when you’re in a huge crime area, that is the mentality I had as a sergeant,
and how I trained people. This mentality is not serving us well in light of what’s on T.V.
today. We arrested a lot of people on that stuff. We found stolen goods in cars. We found
guns in cars, we found dope in cars.
Citing UCR crime data, the city did appear to have higher crime rates overall, beginning
in 1985, and into the early 90s. Based off violence crime and property crime rates (calculated as
per 100,000), many of these rates double, or nearly double, the rates shown during the last five

104
years of available data. The violent crime rate began to see sharp decreases in 1998, and see a
relatively stable rate of approximately 1000, with slight increases around the 1100 mark over the
last four years. Meanwhile, property crime rates have been on a relatively steady decline, from
the 7000 mark during 1995, to remaining in the 4000s by 2017. Further UCR data is provided in
Appendix D.
It is important to note that when discussing older tactics, often labeled as “traditional”
policing, traffic stops are the most common strategy that comes under scrutiny. And it is traffic
stops that were a common source of police-citizen animosity. When discussing organizational
issues and the need to reform, current and past chiefs were criticized for the state of their
department and not being able to provide needed change. Again, officers such as supervisors
Harris and George defended their chiefs at the time, but community members were much more
critical of the perceived direction of the department, and the amount of outreach to the
community was seen as lacking:
Harris: I’m just going to say before Chief Jefferson, we were used to traditional policing.
We still had a community policing unit. We had neighborhood liaison officers. But it was
just a different philosophy. It was about “cops on dots” and looking at statistically driven
policing...And it wasn’t that we had bad chiefs. It was just a different philosophy. That
was just the way you did law enforcement. One think that Chief Jefferson was big on was
changing that culture where it wasn’t about outcomes. As far as statistical outcomes and
how many stops they made.
Melissa: There was a horrible chief there back in 2006/2007, Murphy. He was not a
community policing chief at all. He was a very, you know, he wasn’t community
policing.
Claire: There was more of a community policing model under Jefferson. The previous
chief was more of the military model.
Sam: Now as far as after you changed and got more involved with the community, were
the cops before…did they try to reach out to the community?
Juan: Not quite to the same extent. The had their little camps and stuff but there wasn’t
anything that we did.
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Local government officials and community leaders praised the administration of
Jefferson for being able to tackle the issue of strained police-community relations head-on. But
Melissa was quoted in the local press taking exception to the narrative that an examination of the
HPD did not come about due to public outcry. Melissa stated “It bubbled up out of our
community from an incident that was so hurtful and harmful and wrong that affected a lot of
people and throughout that the whole issue was to come about change.” (Heartland News 2013e).
The incident in question involved the arrest of a young black man named Barry in the Dartmouth
neighborhood. This event would fuel a lawsuit, activism, an evaluation, and reconfiguration of
the HPD which continues to be felt to this day. Below is a table summarizing the key events
from chapters five and six that would lead to the reorganization of community policing to
accommodate the city’s GVI model.

Table 3. Significant Events Leading to Reconfiguration of Community Policing
August 3, 2006
August 21, 2006
November 2006

September 2007
October 2007

March 2008
April-May 2008

Two HPD officers initiate the controversial arrest of Barry in Dartmouth
during a traffic stop due to a noise violation.
Barry's mother Rachel submitted a written complaint to the Heartland
City Commission.
The first of a series of protest occur after the HPD's internal affairs finds
no wrongdoing in Barry's arrest. Group prayers and marches are held at
HPD headquarters.
City Manager Douglas announces the shifting of portions of the internal
affairs investigative process under the Manager's offices control.
Approximately 70 people marched through downtown Heartland,
organized by Rachel, and other mothers who said their sons were victims
of racial profiling and police brutality.
A civil rights lawsuit is filed in federal court against the city of
Heartland.
Conflicts escalate between Manager Douglas, Chief Murphy, and the
police union over Douglas' actions against the department. Murphy
resigns and acting Chief Smith withdrawals as a candidate for permanent
chief.
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May 23, 2008

Outside candidate Jefferson announced as new chief of the HPD.

Chief Jefferson announces the HPD would undergo a racial profiling
studying at the request of the HCAB to be conducted by an outside
consulting firm.
Traffic stop data for profiling study to be collected from March 1, 2012
March 1, 2012
to February 28, 2013.
Jefferson launches review of all homicides dating back to March 2009
March 13, 2012
when 22-year-old Neil, is murdered hours before a prominent state
politician visited the city.
David Kennedy visits Heartland at the invitation of Interfaith
March 25, 2012
Community Outreach (ICO), where he visits neighborhoods, is a keynote
speaker at an ICO event, and pitches GVI.
Jefferson announces reconfiguration of community policing into the CPS
April 16, 2012
division, with the intent to carry out GVI, and perform community
outreach.
National study looking at state and county rates of marijuana possession
June 2013
arrest rates by race find that the HPD arrests African Americans 8.5
times more than whites.
September 3, 2013 Jefferson releases the results of the traffic stop study to the press, which
states that African Americans are discriminated against in traffic stops. A
new consent-to-search policy, along with future plans to collect traffic
data immediately announced.
December 2014
The HCAB is relaunched in its current 12-member form.
May 24, 2011

February 2015
March 2015

June 29, 2017
April-May 2018

May 31, 2018

Chief Jefferson releases open letter to the media outlining department
changes, while specifically citing the traffic stop study as a catalyst.
After efforts stalled in 2012, fundraising is initiated to reinvigorate GVI
implementation. Jefferson, the mayor, and others attend GVI course at
John Jay College in New York City.
First GVI "call-in" initiated to communicate GVI message to those
identified with violent groups.
ICO and local media announce further efforts inspired by GVI to provide
mentorship to 25 kids ages 14 to 16. These kids were responsible for
roughly 676 crimes and arrested 103 times in 2017 alone. Program
partners include HPD officers, juvenile and probate courts, and the
Dartmouth Neighborhood Association among others. Social services and
summer jobs to be provided.
New HPD Chief Miller presents data to City Commission showing drop
in shootings by members identified as part of violent groups, citing GVI
as the reason.
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Barry’s Arrest

Two officers with the HPD were responding to an unrelated trespassing complaint in
Dartmouth on August 3, 2006, when afterwards they yelled at seventeen-year-old Barry to turn
down his music playing from his car (Heartland News 2007b; Heartland News 2007c). At the
time, noise ordinances could result in arrest in Heartland, but ticket citations were much more
common. According to excessive noise arrest reports obtained by the local press from July 2005
to July 2006, out of 5,200 noise complaints, only 1,150 people received tickets, and 130 people
were arrested during 82 separate incidents. Of the 130 arrested, 58 were black. The resulting
arrest and dash cam footage led to complaints that officers fabricated the incident in their police
report and violated Barry’s constitutional rights.
While Barry was told numerous times by one of the officers that he would only be
receiving a ticket “and we’ll send you on your way,” the first officer turned to the other officer
and stated in the dash cam video beyond Barry’s hearing: “Even though I’m writing this ticket, I
need to arrest him so I can get in that car to search it” (Heartland News 2007b; Heartland News
2007c). One method used to try and justify the arrest was claims of “loose tobacco” found on the
seat of Barry’s vehicle, which might suggest material for a marijuana “blunt.” But the arrest
report of the second officer made no reference to lose tobacco. One article also referenced the
following exchange between the second and first officer: “[second officer] asked [first officer] if
he had seen “anything” in the car – an apparent reference to establishing a probable cause for a
search. He [first officer] told him no” (Heartland News 2007c). However, when the second
officer was interviewed by the internal affairs office of the HPD, he said the first officer told him

108
there was tobacco on the seat and that he wanted to search the car, but the conversation was not
captured by any audio or dash cam footage.
The second method used to try and justify a search of the vehicle was Barry refusing to
give up his cell phone number, but state law at the time said motorists were not required to give
their telephone numbers to police (Heartland News 2007b; Heartland News 2007c). Barry’s car
was searched as he was taken into police custody and no illegal contraband was found (Heartland
News 2006). Melissa described more details of the arrest:
Melissa: So anyways, they asked him to get out of the car, he complied, they questioned
him, they wanted to know his cell phone number, they wanted his social security number,
when he couldn’t recall his social security number. He was trying to call his mom, and
they didn’t want to let him call his mom. Then they wanted to search his vehicle, and he
said no I need to call my mom, and they were like no. So it escalated to the point where,
because he refused to let them search the vehicle, he refused to give them his cell phone,
they arrested him. And it just went from there. Of course, one of the things we learned
was that they assumed, because he lived on the south side of town, that then he could be
gang-affiliated or something like that. And we got that information from the audio, and
that video from the officer’s car… It was a long and a very, very toxic process to go
through. We organized marches and rallies in Heartland. We did a whole lot of things.
As referenced by Melissa, the controversial arrest of Barry set off a chain of events soon
afterwards in Heartland. According to a document which outlines the minutes for the City
Commission of Heartland in 2006, Barry’s mother Rachel submitted a written complaint against
the HPD on August 21, 2006. During the same city commission meeting, an officer representing
the internal affairs office of the HPD stated that “as much time investigating a complaint as was
necessary to arrive at a determination” was conducted, and the city’s attorney reported that Barry
would be charged with a noise violation, rather than receive a fine and/or community service.
In the months to follow, several protests occurred after it was determined by the HPD that
there was no evidence to support that Barry was only arrested because he’s black. Protesters
gathered close to the headquarters of the HPD to hold a group prayer before “lining up two-by-
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two to walk seven times in a counter-clockwise direction around the perimeter” (Heartland News
2006). Rachel and other protesters explained that seven is a divine number that can’t be divided
or broken up, and that walking counter-clockwise is supposed to represent reversing “the
negative energy, ill will and discrimination that takes place in the courts and the police
department against the minority community on a daily basis” (Heartland News 2006). Group
members sang and hummed “Amazing Grace” and “We Shall Overcome” as they walked.
Further protests took place in Heartland during 2007. About 70 residents marched through
downtown Heartland chanting slogans like “no justice, no peace” and “black injustice has got to
go” and they held up signs such as, “Stop Racial Profiling” and “Stand up for your civil rights”
(Heartland News 2007d). Rachel helped to organize the march, in direct response to the arrest of
Barry, along with other residents of Heartland who felt that they had been the victims of racial
profiling.
The complaints issued against the HPD eventually led to a civil rights lawsuit being filed
in federal court against the city of Heartland, chief Murphy, the two officers who arrested Barry,
and their supervisor (Heartland News 2008a). In the lawsuit, Barry requested for damages, the
cost of attorney and court fees, and a ruling that the city’s noise ordinance be deemed
unconstitutional. The news article gave the following reasons for the lawsuit:
In the lawsuit [Barry] alleges 11 counts of mistreatment during the traffic stop, including
false arrest, malicious prosecution, illegal search and seizure of his vehicle and racial
profiling… Even if there was probable cause to issue a citation for excessive noise, the
Defendants' decision to arrest Plaintiff rather than issue a citation was pre-text to search
the vehicle without consent or probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment
(Heartland News 2008a).
Outside of the lawsuit, there were a number of significant policy changes effecting the
HPD as a result of the Barry incident and other negative police-citizen interactions. The
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Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board has been the focal point for many of these reform efforts as
stated by Melissa and Travis:
Melissa: He [Barry] prevailed in that lawsuit, and the settlement was two-fold. One, there
was a financial settlement. Two, the bigger part of that was policy. We were advocating
for anti-profiling, racial profiling, policies. So after that, there was some major changes to
the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board.
Travis: It was created out of a number of citizens’ protests that the police department
couldn’t be trusted to police itself… But it wasn’t formed because: “Hey this sounds like
a good idea. Let’s try it!” No it was a response to a crisis.
Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board

After the negative publicity raised by the Barry traffic stop incident, efforts to begin
repairing the image of the HPD created conflicts within city government, and the reconfiguration
of the citizen complaint process against officers helped to try and enact reforms. What was
termed as an effort to “re-establish the department’s credibility,” former city manager Douglas
began to shift some of the HPD’s internal affairs investigative process under his control
(Heartland News 2007f). The article makes numerous references to the Barry incident and HPD
tactics which cause strained police-community relations as being a driving force for attempts to
hold the HPD more accountable to the community:
[Douglas] also has renewed his call for an emphasis on "community policing," in which
officers rely on relationships built with neighborhood residents to prevent and solve
crimes. City officials contend the department now relies too heavily on "pretextual stops"
-- for example, stopping a driver for a minor violation as a pretext to search their car -- to
locate weapons or drugs and make arrests.
The [Heartland Internal Affairs] has had the lead in investigating a series of citizen and
media inquiries about specific public safety cases. Some of its recommendations have
drawn criticism, especially in some recent cases involving minorities. For example,
[Internal Affairs] exonerated an officer from wrongdoing in the stop of a black teenager
on an excessive noise charge that led to his arrest in 2006. But a jury subsequently found
the teen, [Barry], not guilty of the noise violation, and a district court judge said the
officer conducted an illegal search and seizure when he reached into [Barry’s] car and
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picked up a cell phone. [Murphy] later said the judge's ruling was wrong, and the officer
was not disciplined (Heartland News 2007f).
The HCAB, which was founded in 2001 (Heartland News 2009), began to adopt the
process of reviewing complaints that it holds today, whereby investigations are handled by the
HPD and the city manager’s office:
Travis: The way it’s set up in Heartland, if you have a police-community report for unjust
or excessive force claim against an officer, they have an inspector who’s assigned to
investigate it. They give their recommendation to the police chief, and if the people are
not satisfied with the police chief’s decision out of that, they appeal to the city manager.
The city manager has an advisory board called the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board,
then they hear the case and make their recommendations to the city manager. The city
manager then calls it a ball or a strike, and that’s how that works.
Douglas’ reform efforts also created conflicts with the HPD, but led to the hiring of an
outside candidate for chief who would collaborate with the HCAB. Amid negative publicity
against the HPD, Murphy decided to retire early, and then acting chief Smith withdrew as a
candidate for the position of chief due to Douglas’ criticism of the HPD’s handling of the
investigation of Barry’s traffic stop (Heartland News 2008b). Despite conflicts with the police
supervisors’ union, Douglas continued with the search for a new police chief, and the fact that no
internal candidates were among the finalists was “not a surprise” (Heartland News 2008c). This
led to the hiring of Jefferson for chief who promised to “form partnerships with city residents
while being visible and transparent” (Heartland News 2008d).
Patrick noted that the HCAB not only appeals decisions in citizen complaints against the
police, but that it can also be a voice for changes in policing:
Patrick: What we can do then as a board is help communicate our concerns to the police.
If we see evidence of racial bias, it falls to us then to recommend action as a review
board. So it’s not just an appeals board, but to review policy as well, and perhaps
advocate for changes.
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The most significant collaboration that the HPD and the HCAB engaged in centered
around the decision to bring in an outside consulting firm to see whether or not there was racial
profiling in the traffic stop tactics of the HPD. A former chairman of the HCAB told the media
that the board had heard four or five arrest appeals during the time leading up to the study and
that “It became increasingly clear that we needed to do something about it” (Heartland News
2013i). This research would have a profound impact on community policing in Heartland.

Heartland Traffic Stop Study

Adegbile (2017) argues that there are three primary community-centered pathways to
police reform: formal Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations, collaboration with the COPS
office, and the do-it-yourself model. Adegbile notes that who initiates the effort is one major
distinction between the three approaches. In the first pathway, the DOJ normally initiates the
effort, while the latter two pathways rely on other stakeholders to start reforms. The DOJ will
initiate a formal pattern-or-practice investigation, in order to investigate possible police
misconduct, and establish agreements meant to create constitutional policing, and repair policecommunity relations (Adegbile 2017). The first step of the investigation involves the DOJ
preparing a findings report and seeking a court-ordered consent decree, which involves the
resolution of a dispute without admission of guilt, and holds all police, government, and
community members responsible for enacting community policing. One example of this pathway
was Ferguson, Missouri mentioned in chapter one.
The second pathway, collaborating with the COPS office, is where “participation is
voluntary and is initiated by police departments rather than the DOJ” (Adegbile 2017:2253).
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Recommendations are not binding but a commitment to significant change must be shown by
departments, and COPS reviews are often seen as less critical of the police and more
collaborative than formal DOJ investigations. One example includes the Las Vegas Police
Department (LVPD), who was the first agency to participate in a COPS review in 2011
(Adegbile 2017). Some policy recommendations included new use-of-force and de-escalation
training policies.
The third do-it-yourself pathway resonates the most with Heartland’s situation. The
combined effects of the Barry incident, a civil rights lawsuit, political pressure within the city of
Heartland, and other outspoken critics creates a situation similar to the one described below:
Observing the impact of use-of-force incidents on other jurisdictions, police departments
and political leadership may decide to take steps to make sure their department is
embracing best practices. These jurisdictions may seek to avoid a Ferguson moment.
Other jurisdictions may find themselves at the center of use-of-force flashpoints and will
have to respond to the facts on the ground with or without DOJ support. Other may face
litigation or threats of litigation and may choose or be ordered to resolve the
litigation…Often the impetus for change emerges from a crisis when concerns from
various stakeholders boil over. These tragedies – as well as the public outcry and the
threat of a DOJ investigation and/or private litigation – often spur a police force to
undertake reform (Adegbile 2017:2255).
It’s also important to note for the case of Heartland that outsiders, such as consultants,
can be called upon to help provide an objective assessment of department policy in the do-ityourself pathway (Adegbile 2017). Chief Jefferson told the local media that the decision to
conduct a racial profiling study focused on traffic stops came at the request of the HCAB, the
city commission approved $112,990 for the study, and an agreement with an outside consulting
firm which specializes in racial profiling traffic studies was made (Heartland News 2011). Some
of my research participants discussed the issuing of the traffic study as a collaborative effort,
between the chief, and the HCAB. This included Melissa discussing the study as part of the
repercussions of the Barry case and Travis who had a prominent role in the study:
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Melissa: But also, the city implemented a study to find out if they in fact racially profiled.
Travis: Yeah I assisted with that. It was sponsored by the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal
Board. That’s when I was involved with it. So I know some details! I was actually out on
the street counting and identifying drivers and cars as part of the research.
It was the hope of Chief Jefferson that the racial profiling study would be a “trustbuilding exercise” with the community in order to be more transparent with residents (Heartland
News 2012f). Three open meetings were held with community members, Chief Jefferson, and
representatives from the consulting firm in the Columbia, Franklin, and Dartmouth
neighborhoods, in order to educate residents on the study, build police-community relations, and
answer any questions about the study (Heartland News 2012g). During the Dartmouth meeting,
residents expressed gratitude for the HPD deciding to do the study and for reaching out to
residents, but community members stated that it was apparent that racial profiling exists with one
resident commenting: “I’m a black man living in [Heartland]…It’s become a pattern and
practice. I can’t drive or walk down the street at 2 or 3 in the morning without being harassed (by
police)” (Heartland News 2012h).
Traffic stop data was collected between March 1, 2012, and February 28, 2013
(Heartland News 2013b). The study calculated odds ratios to determine how much more likely
black and Hispanic motorists were of being pulled over when compared to white drivers. Odds
ratios determine whether or not the presence of a variable affects the likelihood that the outcome
in question will occur. The report stated the following with regards to it methodology:
The odds ratio is best understood by filling in the ratio in the following sentence: “If you
are Black/(Hispanic), you are ___ times as likely to be stopped than if you are not Black.”
If no racial targeting were occurring, all of the ratios would be 1.0…
It should be noted that we have described an odds ratio of 1 to 1.5 as benign, an odds
ratio of 1.5 to 2 as indicating that the department should be concerned and an odds ratio
above 2 as indicating that targeting is occurring (Consulting Study 2013).
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The results indicated that all eleven street intersection locations showed odds ratios of 1.5
or above against black drivers, with five locations having odds ratios above 2. Black motorists
were being stopped too much, particularly in the Dartmouth neighborhood, while all Hispanic
odds ratios were 1.23 or below (Consulting Study 2013). What was even more concerning is that
the study found that fewer black motorists are given citations, but more are asked to exit their
vehicles, searched, handcuffed and arrested, despite the fact they were less likely to have
contraband (Consulting Study 2013; Heartland News 2013b).
The local press described the reaction of city commissioners to the study as “not a
surprise but still ‘troubling’” (Heartland News 2013e). The study listed a series of
recommendations for the HPD including an immediate review of all policies related to traffic
stops and citizen interactions, continued data collection on all traffic stops, increased supervisor
management of traffic stop related activities, develop a specific policy related to searches, and
continual reporting to residents of Heartland on the progress of cultural changes (Consulting
Study 2013). Immediately after the release of the study in September of 2013, Chief Jefferson
announced a new consent-to-search policy would be implemented in the next 30 days, and poststop data would be collected in 2015 (Heartland News 2013e).

Outcomes

Invoking language similar to Adegbile (2017), a prominent official with the HPD stated
that their department has been focusing on relationship building and community policing since
“before the events in Ferguson, Mo.” (Heartland News 2014a). However, as this local article
states, the traffic stop study was a major catalyst for the perceived shift towards community
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policing, and this did not occur without a ground swelling of discontent with the situation in
Heartland. Another study looking at national marijuana arrest rates also cast the department in a
negative light. Using arrest data from 2001 to 2010, the study showed that African-Americans in
Heartland and the surrounding county were 8.5 times more likely than whites to be arrested for
marijuana possession, despite similar rates of use (Heartland News 2013a; Heartland News
2014a). The study even claimed that the surrounding county had the highest increases in racial
disparity of marijuana arrests during that time span (Heartland News 2013d).
In response to the negative publicity, Chief Jefferson released an open letter to the media,
which discussed the traffic stop study as the start towards a dramatic shift towards a new form of
community policing, with other reforms called for 6. Numerous changes were announced in 2015
to deal with issues of authority and accountability in the HPD. The HCAB was relaunched and
met for the first time in its new form in December of 2014, which included 12 members, with
plans to meet quarterly (Heartland News 2015a). The current city manager of Heartland stated
that “I think it just makes great sense in everything we're working on in public safety around
authentic legitimacy, authentic policing, in light of Ferguson, just having a group put together
and having citizens help us as we try to serve the community.” The board members are appointed
by the city manager and serve two-year terms. Those serving on the board at the time who were
study participants included Homer, Claire, and Travis who served as a liaison between the city
and the board. Also included on the board were a representative from the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender) community, Families of Love, the NAACP, the Black Police
Officers’ Association, the Hispanic community, and religious leadership of Dartmouth.

6

For the full letter see Appendix G.
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CHAPTER 6: GVI AND A NEW DEPARTMENT

In the aftermath of the 2013 racial profiling study, the HPD has made attempts to repair
its image, build stronger relationships with the community, and change the way it combats crime.
All of these goals coalesce together and are often woven into the fabric of Heartland’s GVI
initiative. GVI is part of a growing trend of focused deterrence strategies aimed at containing
group violence, overt drug markets, and the most serious individual chronic offenders (Braga et
al. 2018), which is also known as “pulling levers” (Kennedy 1997:2). Focused deterrence was
not only implemented to address a specific problem in Heartland, gun violence among a subset
of the city’s most serious offenders, but as an adjustment to the old tactics from chapter five,
which brought unwanted publicity for the HPD, and created collateral damage in the community.
It has also effected the way that law enforcement and members of the community both view and
initiate collaboration.
First, the reconfiguration of community policing into the CPS division will be discussed,
along with efforts to repair the image of the department, and accolades that the department has
received for its work. Then two subsequent sections will look at the beginnings of GVI, and its
general strategy. These sections will also consider the motivations for GVI, and the positive
benefits that it has been claimed to show. Finally, the significant events from chapters five and
six will be briefly summarized within my theory of reconciling the state’s use of violence. This is
where controversial police-citizen encounters occur, which spurs a ground swelling of activism
and political pressures, resulting in an effort to enact police reforms, which take the form of
focused deterrence strategies over broad-sweeping enforcement tactics. It is my hope that this
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concept can help us understand contemporary issues in police-community relations and guide
future research, as will be discussed later.

A New Division, A New Image

One of the most significant changes that came about for community policing in Heartland
was the reconfiguration of CPU unit to be housed alongside the Drug Unit within the CPS
division in 2012. When Chief Jefferson presented plans to the City Commission in 2012 for this
new division two main justifications were used. First, the murder of a twenty-two-year-old man
in Dartmouth earlier that year motivated the HPD to study the recent trend of homicides in their
city and reassess their strategies for combating violence. Second, the new division was also
intended to reach out to those communities, with poor relationships with the police, and the most
serious problems of violent crime. As stated by the chief:
It's also about engaging those people in those specific neighborhoods where the most
violent crimes are occurring, looking at housing issues, looking at blight issues, at ways
to prop up the neighborhood and make it a place that is not inviting to the criminal
element (Heartland News 2012a).
HPD’s efforts to build relationships with the community has begun to garner attention
and accolades on a national level. One initiative that has received notice is the department’s
canvassing, which according to Chief Jefferson’s open letter, began in March of 2014. The
canvassing is meant to introduce officers to the community, receive feedback on police
performance, and learn about problems going on in the community. According to the HPD, all
residencies in Heartland had been visited, with plans to canvass more in the future (Heartland
News 2014a; Heartland News 2016b). These efforts were praised by a “global speaking and
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training organization” based in a major Midwest city, who gave the HPD a community
partnership award (Heartland News 2014b).
A national non-profit organization which conducts research into policing also studied
Heartland’s foot patrol and overall canvassing activities. The study found Heartland’s canvassing
approach to be “particularly innovative” (Heartland News 2016b). The researchers conducted
site visits with foot patrol officers, interviewed citizen focus groups, and officers of various
ranks. Their findings concluded that foot patrols can increase legitimacy, improve problemsolving capabilities, and be psychologically beneficial to officers. Other efforts to reach out to
community members include sergeants being required to follow up on calls for service to get
feedback from crime victims, canvassing specific areas after a violent incident, or during highprofile police activities like a police raid (Heartland News 2014a; Heartland News 2016b).
Supervisor Wallace explained the canvassing efforts within the context of the reconfiguration of
the division:
Wallace: The reason they did that was my guys went to the community meetings and
listened to residents, and what was the number one complaint? Drugs right? So when
they complain about drugs… Say you’re a citizen in Wells and you’re like: “I am sick
and tired of the drug activity. I live in the neighborhood. My kids live here. I pay taxes.
What are you guys going to do about the drug activity?” Well unless the CPO sent the
guy an email or something, they really didn’t have any involvement with that case. So
when the citizen comes around and asks what you did about your complaint and you say:
“Well I forwarded an email to the Drug Unit.” And the guy’s like I could have done that
right!? What have you done as a police department? You are a representative of the
department. You are a liaison between Wells and the city. What have you guys done?
What they’ve done is combine them. A Drug Unit officer is combined with a CPO, so
now they can work on the project together. So what they can do is say that we have
established enough probable cause to do a search warrant. And we want you there when
we execute the warrant. So when they do the search warrant, my guys are there, they can
assist with the execution of the search warrant, assist with searching the house and
finding the dope. So they know who was at the house, what they found in the house,
when the search warrant was done, and they did a police report on it. So the next month
when they come back they can say when people ask what have you done. My guys can
go: well let me tell you. I worked with the Drug Unit and this is what we did.
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But we can take it one step further. Once the execution of that search warrant is done, the
guys can go and canvass one block on either side of the house: hey I’m sure you guys
saw that there was a raid executed. You had all these police, with the ram, yelling “search
warrant!” The community knows but they’re like: “What’s going on?” They have a pretty
good idea who’s selling dope there but they have a feeling of wanting to know what’s
going on right? So now my guys will go from one block in each direction and canvass the
area. Hey we just wanted to let you know we did a narcotics search warrants down the
road. We seized some drugs and we’re going to be taking care of the issue. My name is
officer so-and-so, let me know if you have any more complaints. And what we found is
when we do those canvasses we find that people will say that they’ve been concerned
about that house for the last two years. We’ll ask why they didn’t call, they’ll say: “We’ll
I don’t want to be a snitch. It’s none of my business.” …but they’ll say things like:
“Thanks for shutting that house down, but what about that blue one down the street?” So
now we’re there, we’re going to every door and not singling any one out, and we’re
collecting intel on the next one…Again, it’s community policing. You go out and talk
with the people, find out what their priority is, and deal with it. They have the hot spot
sheets. I used to have one that said what are your three biggest priorities as a
neighborhood association? Or I will come straight to you and ask what your three biggest
priorities are and I will be here next month to tell you what I have done to address your
top three.
The goal of canvassing is not only an effort to repair the image of police officers, but to
increase transparency about police actions, and to single out problem people/houses as described
in the drug warrant example above. I discussed this strategy with Patrick:
Patrick: Yeah that’s a big strategy of theirs. Like in Memphis if you saw police action,
and you asked them what was going, they’ll be like: “Get out of here!” In Heartland
you’re like hey what’s going on, and they’re like: “Frank was selling weed! Blah, blah,
blah, and this lady’s a prostitute, and we’re sending them all to jail.” And you’re like
“Woah!” (Laughs) Right from the horse’s mouth; they tell you everything that’s going
on.
Sam: Why do you think that’s important?
Patrick: It’s hugely important, because it convinces the citizens that the police aren’t this
occupying army.
Police officers also stressed the importance of canvassing after violent incidents in
particular. The HPD works frequently with Anonymous Hotline, a local nonprofit that helps
residents report crimes without fear of retaliation, to help acquire leads from the community.
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Supervisor Harris discussed the importance of canvassing and using door hangers7 to help gather
intelligence after a violent crime:
Harris: But we have door hangers for shootings that we’ll put out, and people can call.
Because what we also found if there’s a shooting or an incident, you can’t just walk up to
a crowd and say: “Hey did you see anything!? What happened!?” Because of course no
one’s going to say anything. They got to live in the neighborhood. Just like after we
knock on the door after an incident, people don’t answer because they’re scared to be
seen talking to us. So what we did was develop these door hangers and put them on the
door. Then they can take them off and call us or Anonymous Hotline. It gives them
another way to contact us without been seen talking to us. And there’s a stigma with
talking to us. And I don’t blame people who have to live in the neighborhood.
A specific incident also occurred the day I did a ride along with Austin. Before we went
to the Soho neighborhood, Wallace ordered CPOs Austin, John, Dillion, and Aaron to canvass an
apartment complex where a shooting occurred the night before. I followed the officers as they
split up to knock on doors and talk to residents. Those who were not home had the gunfire
incident hangers placed on their doors. We gathered leads from residents, which eventually led
us to investigate an area behind the apartment complex next to a strip mall area. A blood trail
was found, which abruptly ended between a store and a wooded area. We looked to our right into
the woods and found a Taurus Judge, a revolver which can fire pistol or shotgun shells
interchangeably, with blood marks on it. Reflecting on this with Wallace, he attributed
canvassing efforts to helping reduce crime and improve relationships with the community.
Wallace uses the analogy of making deposits in a bank account, to tell CPOs to use any
opportunity they can to accumulate positive community contacts so that negative police
encounters are not as damaging to the department:
Wallace: It’s follow up right? Because the whole shift was there. The detectives had
collected evidence before. So I sent out text messages to all the guys at four in the
morning: We just had a shooting. I’ll be in at six to get all the details. Be there at 7:30. So
what did I do? I came here (headquarters) and got all the details from the detective bureau
and all the officers on the scene. I sent my guys up at eight to recanvas, they went and
7

See Appendix F for a scanned copy of the two types of door hangers used by the HPD for canvassing.
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talked to every tenant in those two buildings. So what happened? They went there, talked
with everyone, were able to collect more information. And one guy was like: “Yeah my
apartment got hit!” And the officers there never knew the apartment got hit. They were
able to dig the bullet out of the wall and take that as evidence, they found the damn gun,
right? It had blood on it. So you could swab it for DNA. If we hadn’t gone back and done
that canvassing with the community police, we wouldn’t have found that gun, wouldn’t
have found that bullet. And we have a suspect.
Again, who would have found that gun days or months later? With that canvass approach,
we’re going to go knock on doors, tell people what happened, and now we’ve done that a
hand full of times. Every time we’ve done that, it has been successful. It has paid
dividends. We’re making those small deposits in our bank account. It is getting the right
people off the street. You saw it firsthand. Those guys canvassed and sure as shit what
did they find!?
Heartland’s influence has even grown on the national and international level. A
prominent nonprofit research body which studies law enforcement has invited prominent police
and community leaders to numerous conferences since 2014. These events, often cohosted or
funded through grants provided by the COPS office, have covered a wide range of topics such as
constitutional policing, police-community partnerships, and hiring practices. Notably, one of
these conferences took place shortly after the civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri. In the
conference’s report, Heartland and the racial profiling study were presented as a case study of a
department effectively assessing its own practices, sharing the results with the public, and
adjusting their tactics. Heartland was discussed, along with other cities, in the context of the
issue of racial disparities in Terry stops and other policing tactics. The conference report also
cited a 42 percent drop in traffic stops, with crime down 7 percent, and arrest down 20 percent in
Heartland. These drops in traffic stops were also reported by the local media (Heartland News
2013j; Heartland News 2014g).
Internationally, law enforcement agencies from other countries have been inspired by
Heartland’s community policing and have come to the city to learn from the HPD. Austin and I
had a conversation about this and supervisor Wallace told me about it when I asked him:
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Wallace: There’s a group in Heartland. They bring in groups from different locations to
study how they do things. So what they found is that there are other police departments
who have the same struggles…nationally and all over the world. So we’ve had a large
number of police officers, departments, and police administrators, come to Heartland.
They all talk about how they’ve all read articles about Heartland and how we do things
and it’s phenomenal. So we requested that they work with Heartland and set up a day
where they can come, and ask us questions. The last time we had 15 to 20 people come
and ask us questions from police departments from all over that country and ask
specifically about community policing. We’ve had some nice articles about us in policing
magazines. Mexico came once, there was a couple from Asia, I had one from
Belgium…And the hot topic, with everything in the department we offer, every time we
get someone to visit they want to know about the community policing. That’s the wave of
policing, nationally, and internationally. They’re redirecting their focus on community
policing.
I was just in Costa Rica, Martin and I were on a mission trip. And went down and taught
a group of 144 police officers tactics. And there was a professor from a local college who
teaches police administrators. He was there and he was helping with translating, and he
found out that Martin and I were from a community policing unit. And he would bounce
ideas off of me during a break. He’d say things like: “Hey how would you handle this
situation?” He would stop us and show his arms, and show how he was literally getting
goosebumps from all of these ideas. He was actually offering, if he could get the
university to pay, he wanted to get us down here to teach a seminar on community
policing. So it’s not only here, it’s nationally and internationally. And it was interesting
to see all those people intrigued by the things we’re doing in Heartland.
According to the organization’s website, they seek to engage Heartland with the world,
by inviting people from around the globe, to share ideas, and celebrate diversity. My research
into the organization confirmed that thirteen guests from Mexico came to Heartland to learn
about community policing from the HPD.

Birth of GVI

In discussing the new direction of the department and conducting interviews and ride
alongs with CPOs, no strategy was discussed more than their GVI program. Going back to the
City Commission meeting from 2012 where Chief Jefferson announced the reorganization of the
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CPU, the city’s recent trend in homicides at the time motivated the chief to reconsider new ways
to combat violence. One specific incident, the shooting death of twenty-two-year-old Neil from
the Dartmouth neighborhood, was cited by the chief as a motivator to begin considering GVI
(Heartland News 2012a). In the article Chief Jefferson states:
It really came about looking at some of the homicide and violent crime issues within the
city, looking at how we can shift organizationally to be a little more laser focused on
specific neighborhood problems, this being the most visible one right now (Heartland
News 2012a).
The department’s study of homicide trends at the time revealed startling concentrations in
homicides to a few specific areas of the city. From January 2007, to the spring of 2012, of the
city’s 36 homicides 16 occurred in Dartmouth and 11 occurred in Franklin (Heartland News
2012i). Nine of the homicides in Dartmouth were further concentrated to a five-block area, with
five having occurred between March of 2011 and March of 2012. Melissa commented in the
same article that the area suffered from serious dilapidation issues that encourage crime, and the
area lacks the same amount of support that areas such as downtown receive for their
redevelopment. These homicide trends reveal violent-prone blocks, which tend to have a small
network of individuals who commit most of the violence, thus pointing to the idea of “Hot
People not Hot Spots” to borrow from Chief Jefferson’s letter.
Chief Jefferson mentioned “David Kennedy’s approach” during the meeting with the City
Commission in April of 2012, after Kennedy had recently visited Heartland at the time
(Heartland News 2012a). Members of ICO were instrumental in getting Kennedy to visit
Heartland in March of 2012 (Heartland News 2012b). ICO members stated that “the organization
sought out Kennedy to speak at its annual banquet after members engaged in a “porch patrol” in
local neighborhoods to gauge the biggest concerns of residents. One of the major concerns that
was universal … was youth violence and youth drugs.”
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During Kennedy’s visit, he visited the most violent neighborhoods in the city, saw streetcorner memorials, spoke with family members of victims, community leaders and the police.
ICO’s website featured photos from a banquet, where Kennedy was the keynote speaker, and he
signed copies of his then recently released book Don’t Shoot: One Man, a Street Fellowship, and
the End of Violence in Inner City America. In it, Kennedy discusses among other things Boston’s
Operation Ceasefire, which resulted in a 50 percent reduction in homicide (Kennedy 2011), the
arguments for his pulling levers strategy, and obstacles faced in implementing the program in
other cities. Among the justifications Kennedy provides for GVI is that a small number of people
commit an astronomical amount of serious crimes (Kennedy 2011), which was the same pattern
seen in Heartland (i.e. the “Hot People”). He also criticizes other strategies like increased police
presence, prosecution and sentencing reform, or broad efforts to alleviate societal ills such as
education and employment as being “unsustainable, complex and difficult and, frankly, doomed
to fail,” and what the most violent communities need he says is “less crime, and less jail, and less
prison” (Heartland News 2012c).
The HPD was interested in implementing GVI shortly after Kennedy’s visit, but talks
stalled out in 2012 before being initiated again in 2015 (Heartland News 2015c). In 2015, Chief
Jefferson, the mayor, and other community leaders attended a course on GVI at John Jay College
facilitated by Kennedy. After completing the GVI course, the HPD began to explore grant
opportunities, which were estimated to require $800,000 over three years for the program.
Among the announced donors from 2016 were the Heartland Nonprofit Coalition (HNC) and the
Heartland Foundation for Neighborhoods (HFN). Both of these community groups seek to
provide financial support to a wide array of nonprofit initiatives at work in Heartland. The City
Commission announced $316,753 from HNC and the City of Heartland, as well as $50,000 from
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the HFN (Heartland News 2017f). A total of $213,483 was allocated to pay the salaries of
technical advisors from the National Network for Safe Communities based out of John Jay
College.
But GVI cannot achieve its goals of violence reduction without buy-in from key
community members that are addressing the same problems. Two important men in this regard,
Juan and Shannon, are street outreach workers, who are able to relate to the individuals identified
for GVI intervention, and provide support for the social services aspect of the strategy. Both men
were former offenders, who had moments of epiphany, which caused them to find religion, then
engage in work in their communities to stop other young men from going down a similar path.
In Shannon’s case, he was a former drug dealer, who witnessed significant violence in a
major city, and served multiple prison sentences. Then he moved to Heartland later and founded
Brotherhood Over Violence with his partner, who was the opposite side of a street beef from
him:
Shannon: His cousin died, I watched his cousin die, my friend killed his cousin. Then the
friend and I went to prison. We were both traumatized, and he was trying to get me killed
in prison. But I had guys in prison doing life who protected me. I got out and went to
college, then me and him ended up in the same class.
But both men decided to squash their conflict when they ended up in the same college
class together. Then the organization, Brotherhood Over Violence, was founded, where they
would go around giving seminars at high schools, colleges, juvenile homes, and other places
telling their story, and how they were able to end the dispute and sue for peace. It was during one
of these seminars that a relationship was formed between Shannon and the HPD:
Shannon: So I was doing Brotherhood Over Violence, and during one of these seminars
the chiefs came… and when they walked in, I saw that one of them was my arresting
officer years earlier. So he was sitting through my seminar. That was officer Harris. He
said: “Hey do I look familiar to you?” I was like: “You look like a cop!” (Laughs) He
says: “Didn’t I raid your house?” I told him yes. Then he said: “This is what you do
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now?” I said: “Yes sir.” He asked if I got paid to do this, and I said no I do it because I
was a drug dealer. I know I destroyed a lot of peoples’ lives and I just wanted to give
back. I hadn’t even graduated yet, because I told him I was in school too. So he started
watching me and paying attention to me. I know he put his snitches on me to see if I was
legit… That’s when I cleared my name and the cops investigated and found out I was
who I said I was. They feel in love with me because they had never seen this before…So
they watched me man and they’re my friends now. We go golfing, we went to New York
for me to be part of the GVI group violence intervention. They chose me to be a liaison
between the streets and the cops. So the cops they have a name of someone if they need
help to get to those people. Not to arrest. Cause I told them: “Hey check my resume. I
won’t help you all with that you hear? That’s not what I do. That’s not what I’m about.”
But if they’re willing to come up with some ideas about how to keep my guys out of jail,
then I’ll work with them. Then that’s what they agreed to. So that’s what we agreed to.
Juan also followed a dark path, before turning his life around and working to stop
violence in Heartland. When he was fifteen, Juan was founding member of FSB, a gang
notorious for drug dealing and being one of the most violent groups in the Franklin
neighborhood. He was afflicted with a crack addiction and narrowly escaped a prison sentence
after stabbing two individuals in a fight and resisting arrest. It was at this time where Juan was at
his lowest point, before becoming involved in the community through religion, and forming a
close bond with the HPD:
Juan: So I didn’t go to prison. I got 5 years’ probation. I went to jail for about a month.
Paid about $15,000 restitution. By that time, about 19 years, I was in a position where I
wanted to commit suicide. My life was all messed up, jacked up, in every single which
way. It didn’t make sense to live anymore. I thought I’d end up better than this. I told
myself: “I’m not going to end up like my mom and dad.” But lord and behold that’s what
I became. I didn’t have kids at the time, so I justified it that way. It wasn’t until I was
about 19 that this miracle happened in my life. I remembered when I was in the streets,
there was this guy who would come and do street ministry… He would come and just
show God’s love in a simple way. He wouldn’t expect anything from us, he wouldn’t
judge us. He’d just show God’s love in a kind way through his actions. Random acts of
kindness. I built a relationship with him over time and he would encourage me. There
was one day I was thinking about all of this stuff and I was like man. And he told me
“just pray.” And I said “God if you’re real I need you to be real.” “I need you to be real
Lord, I need you to take this addiction, and I will consider your ways.” At that moment I
was free from this addiction that was oppressing my life… In that part of the restoration
process that the Lord helped me with was that I felt guilty for a lot of the things I did. I
felt that a lot of it was my fault. He started giving me more wisdom about who he was,
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and who he is. So it got to the point where I was free from these interpretations of what
people are, or who people are, and what certain groups of people are.
So about four years ago I get a call from this guy Chet… At that time, he was a
supervisor with the Community/Problem-Solving Unit (CPS). He said: “Hey I got your
number from someone. Can we sit down and have coffee?” In my mind I’m like: “What
the hell do you want?” But in my mind I was in a reality where I was like: “Whatever you
want from me God, have at it.” So I realizing God’s will for me. So the suspiciousness
did arise somewhat but I went to lunch with Chet, he bought me lunch at Panera and we
talked. His first question was: “How do we get police to engage with community, and
community to engage with police?” So we started talking around this point. And it was a
paradigm shift with what was taking place in the police department, and what was taking
place in the community of Heartland. It was something where a collaboration started to
burst. It was something where it was necessary for this to happen. He heard me because I
was throwing block parties, and I had done street ministry for ten years, and it was part of
who I was. And he figured that he could sit down and talk with me. So he asked me:
“What do we need to do?” I said: “We need to serve.” And that was the year that
Heartland PD hosted the first Halloween Block Party… I’m part of this thing called GVI.
So that whole thing is city-wide. It’s about getting guns off the streets and keeping people
out of prison. So I meet with one of the chiefs of police once a week. I have supervisor
Wallace’s cell phone number and we talk… And at that point, Shannon, Chet, and others
went to New York to hear about it. So it became something that the police got
momentum behind. Then they came back, talked about it, organized behind it, and it
became something we got involved with man. I think the thing was that we had the
notion that: “This could work.” “This has to work.” And think it’s done what it’s
supposed to do you know? When you got individuals who have lived the life in the
streets, partnering with police officers, to see that be transformed and addressed, then you
have the right combination, and you start to see things happen.

GVI Strategy

As the relationships began to form in 2014, and funding and training was acquired
beginning in 2015, the GVI strategy to address violent shootings in Heartland started to take
shape. Through a popular stat that was communicated during interviews and through the local
media, the HPD states that less than half a percent of Heartland’s population belongs to a violent
gang or group, yet they are involved in more than half of the city’s homicides and shootings
(Heartland News 2017f; Heartland News 2018c). This fact goes to the heart of focused

129
deterrence, which intends to reorient the attention of law enforcement towards a select group of
individuals, rather than a broader section or neighborhood of a city.
The strategy also seeks to be preventive rather than reactionary towards violence,
whereby “issues of respect and cycles of retaliation drive violence” according to police
(Heartland News 2017f). Supervisors Harris and George explained how GVI seeks to change the
response of police and prosecutors, which was flawed in its approach:
Harris: Yeah it’s just getting ahead of stuff. We weren’t getting ahead of things like we
are now. Most shootings we have aren’t necessarily fatal. And people won’t prosecute.
So in other words, if you get shot in the arm, I come to you and ask who shot you, then
you say: “You know what I’m not talking to you.” So what are you really telling me
there? If you’re the victim of a shooting and you’re not telling the cops, then what?
George: …you’re on the other side of some retaliation. You’re just going to take care of
it yourself…So we get ahead of that by talking to both sides and addressing the problem.
We know you’re going to retaliate. Normally we take care of the shooting as it happens,
whether we have someone just hit, or killed. That whole philosophy has changed. And
that’s using that GVI model. Like we had a kid with this girl, who got into a fight with
another girl. Someone got out of the house to stop the fight and the kid pulled a gun on
them. What do we do if they don’t want to prosecute? The guys got a gun. We’re actively
trying to find the gun. We’re looking for the kid who has the gun. So if we don’t get
ahead of those things, sooner or later he’s going to shoot someone.
Harris: But in the old days it was not a prosecuted shooting. Officers or the detective
bureau aren’t going to follow up. Because if you aren’t going to press charges, why
would we spend the time investigating if there’s no prosecution? So basically we’re
telling them in that situation: Okay you don’t want to help us, then forget we’re not going
to help you or look into it. It’s basically saying that it gives the green light on a
retaliation. It’s not just you the individual. There’s group dynamics involved. If you’re in
some gang and you get beat up or shot, then it’s expected that you’ll retaliate. If you
don’t you’ll lose face among your peers. Now what we do is assign a CPO to go to the
victim of a shooting and say: Hey we know about the shooting. We’re not necessarily
looking to press charges. We just need to know about the person who shot you if they’re
out there or not. Because they’re probably going to shoot someone else and we need to
figure out a way to get them off the street. So you don’t have to tell us because you’re not
pressing charges. But we need to know about this guy because they’ll probably shoot
someone else.
Groups who are at-risk for being the most violent are identified through the HPD
studying its homicide and shooting trends, and through the weekly crime prevention meetings

130
mentioned by supervisor Harris and discussed in chapter four. The meetings are held weekly at
HPD headquarters, and include city, county, and federal law enforcement officers, prosecuting
offices, probation, and parole (Heartland News 2017g). When a number of violent individuals
involving multiple groups can be identified, a “call-in” can be initiated to communicate the GVI
message to them. According to my conversation with supervisor Wallace and a press release
from Interfaith Community Outreach, a call-in was done in June of 2017. Also called a “forum”
(Kennedy 2011:59), Wallace laid out how the call-in was conducted:
Wallace: Now the call-in is you see tension in the community between gangs, or just
violent groups. It could be a family thing. You see this tension. We took two or three
people from each gang in the city, and we brought them all into a room together. We did
that because we identified these people that were on probation or parole already. They
were also the ones committing a lot of the crimes. So we identified over 20 individuals to
be a part of this GVI message. And we had Harris speak, Jefferson spoke, the county
prosecutor spoke, the U.S. attorney spoke. We also had local pastors speak about how
gun violence was effecting the community. It was about how they had to do so many
funerals for victims of gun violence. We also had a guy who committed gun violence,
went to prison, got out, and now he’s doing good in the community. We called that the
“voice of reduction” right? We had a mom come in and speak whose son was killed by
gun violence. She was the “voice of pain” there. She talked about how the gun violence
affected her life, her family’s life, everything. If you feel like you have to retaliate against
someone who sends you a Facebook post, or something like that, then they’re picking up
guns. Old school people used to fight with their fists. So we took these 22 guys and said:
“Hope you don’t pick up guns but if you do, we’re coming after you. We’re going to
hammer you!”
The announcement ahead of time is a narrow, directed focus on a specific problem, that
clearly communicates to potential offenders the consequences of their actions, and can spread the
knowledge to others who may commit violence (Kennedy 2011). Supervisors Harris and George
agreed that this direct, focused kind of deterrence was not only an effective crime fighting
measure, but also increased legitimacy over other police tactics:
Harris: And that was the trouble with traditional policing. For a long time, when I was in
drug units, we’d arrest a person with drugs and maybe this person had a criminal history.
So this person was used to dealing in state courts. Since that’s the case, they’d go on
probation, then get right back out and get slaps on the wrist. Then we’d catch them with a
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substantial amount of crack. Then we’d have a DEA person that could take the case
federally. And they’d get hammered for like 15 to 20 years. And they legitimately never
saw that coming. They never thought they’d get that much time. Because the federal
system is no joke, and once you get put in the federal system you get hammered. And I
always thought that hurt our legitimacy.
Harris: I can tell you we had two examples where we gave someone this letter and they
didn’t listen. We had one who was served this letter go to jail within a day or two. When
he got out he shot up a house in the Wells neighborhood. Then the U.S. Attorney, since
we served him this letter, took the case federally, and he went to a federal prison. And the
judge actually red this letter and played a video of us serving this letter. That’s
legitimacy. You can’t tell him we didn’t warn him. So when he goes to federal prison, he
has got no one to blame but himself. He should have listened. And that’s a powerful
lesson we tell the rest of the people we serve these letters. And a lot of them know each
other and know the guys in prison. They know we’re not playing here. Again, the whole
goal of the GVI is we want to keep people alive and out of prison. If we have to lock up a
bunch of people, then our message isn’t working right. We have to use targeted
enforcement and it’s got to be done the right way. But it’s got to be legitimate, swift and
certain. That way if we tell them, by giving you this letter, you can’t pick up a gun again,
or you’ll go federal. And if we don’t follow through, then we just lost credibility. But
when we follow through, we say if they didn’t listen then we’ll go after them, and we’ll
hunt them down. And they know.
George: And their groups know.
Harris: Absolutely.
The letters that supervisor Harris refers to are custom notification letters, which members
of the GVI team hand-deliver to individuals during their meetings. It outlines what was stated
above, where groups being placed on notice not to commit more acts of violence, with the handwritten signature of the chief of police, and the threat of federal prosecution. But the second half
of the custom notification letters offers individuals a way out through social services:
Wallace: Well if you need some help though, we’ve partnered up with the Hope Initiative
to be our resource center. We had representatives from Hope there and they can give you
help with an I.D., or employment. If you need schooling, transportation, child care,
housing, this is your opportunity.
Rhonda, Shannon, and Juan discussed the importance that the social services role plays in
making GVI a unique program, that has a heavy-handed enforcement end, but which also offers
a way out, and thus can help increase legitimacy:
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Rhonda: On the custom notification the police will speak first. They’ll say: “Look you’re
on our radar. We know you’re up to some inappropriate behavior. Here’s what happens if
we catch you again, or you can call Rhonda.” And I’ll take it from there if we get
connected. That means I can help them with an I.D., I can help them with documents like
getting a birth certificate, housing referrals, stuff like that. I can work with them to the
point that they’ll be ready. Let’s say they don’t have a job, but they need a job, I also run
the jobs program at the Heartland Initiative. That is a temporary work experience, part
time, that they can get paid and have something on their resume. Then I work one-on-one
with them to find employment in the community.
Shannon: We do these custom notifications, where we go to these peoples’ houses and
tell them: “You hot. We’re on you.” If you’re name gets connected to one more shooting,
or anything like that, you’re cooked. But if you don’t we got opportunities for you. We’ll
ask did you finish high school? No. Then we got this G.E.D. program for you. We got
some job opportunities for you. We got some people from social services who can give
you counseling if you need it. We’re willing to help you get out of this life. We’ll give
you a week to contact us. If they contact us, we’ll offer them the services. But if they
don’t and they get caught with guns in the future, they get booked. They get a lot of time.
But they offer you a way out and you got to take it.
Juan: And part of the reason why I’m involved with GVI, is that I get to come with the
narrative of love. And I get to change what people feel. I get to change peoples’ lives
through that. And it’s my obligation to do that. For the flip side of the coin. For the police
it’s proactive. The police have never shown their cards to the community about what
they’re going to do. So again, it’s a paradigm shift. The police are saying: “Look it’s all
right here. You pick up another gun and get involved. You’re up against the wall.” But in
that letter the second paragraphs says: “Look if you want help. You want out of this, then
we can help you with housing, a GED, with employment, with all of these things.” So it’s
like you can get hit with the book but I’m going to give you an opportunity. That’s what
got me so excited because the way we’ve been doing policing for the last 100 years:
“Book ‘em Dano! Lock ‘em up and throw away the key!” But now this gives people an
opportunity to go: “These people could have thrown me in jail. But they gave me an
opportunity.” So that’s where me, Shannon, and other street outreach workers come into
play. We help develop that portion of GVI that needs attention.
It is important to note that during Boston’s Operation Ceasefire it was argued that there
was a strong undercurrent of fear running through the violent gangs and groups, where they
would form gangs and arm themselves out of fear of the group dynamics and hostile
environment they faced (Kennedy 2011). But there was also a fear of stepping back and losing
face amongst one’s peers, or else you would be called out. Therefore, the concept of an
“honorable exit” developed, where the threat of law enforcement action could give individuals an
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opportunity to break the cycle of violence without losing face (Kennedy 2011:71). These
negative forces, combined with the opportunity to start over were seen as being essential:
Harris: Then the second part goes into the help. And there’s a number to call for Rhonda.
And a lot of times she’ll come to the Custom Notification Meetings so that they know
who she is. It put them on notice. And we find a lot of times is that they’ll take a picture
of it, so when their buddies ask them to go retaliate on the guys who shot you. We’ll
that’s not the verbiage they’ll use, but they’ll show the picture and say: Look the cops
were here, I got federal attention, so I got to lay low. It gives them that honorable exit
which is really important…And this person reached out to Rhonda and got job training.
So some take advantage of that. One guy graduated through the Hope Initiative’s
employment training, he was a shooter who had 170 police contacts throughout his
criminal career, he was referred to Hope, graduated from there. It’s where they pay you to
work at Hope Initiative and other things, and now he’s working at a factory full-time and
making good money. So he fully turned his life around. So if we could save just a couple
of them, then look at the damage they caused the community. That’s community policing.
According to the HPD, the initial results of the GVI-based strategy seem to have paid
dividends. Supervisors Harris and Wallace cited significant drops in shootings and police
contacts that they attribute to the combined strategies of the weekly crime meetings, the
delivering of individual custom notification letters, and call-in sessions:
Harris: Since we’ve been doing these crime reduction meetings in 2014, our shootings
have gone down, with people actually being hit by gun fire, by 62%.
Wallace: What I can show you is how many of those people have committed acts of
violence after the call-in. So if you look at this. (Wallace shows me a report on a
projector in the HPD conference room) This is part of a GVI report I did. We took the
attendees, all 22 of them, and this is how many police contacts they had. Now this is the
police contacts after the call-in. The call-in was June 28th. This is total police contacts,
and look at these, 128, 135, 117 police contacts rights? And if you look at that same
number across the board of police contacts since June 28th, like this guy with 155 had the
most contacts, he has had zero contacts since the call-in. Police contacts since June 29th
involving weapons is zero. How is that possible? We took gang bangers, drug dealers,
people who were shooting at people. Not one person committed an act of violence since
June 29, 2017. That’s what six months now? In six months we took care of 22 hardened
criminals. And these 22 represent a very small portion of the population of Heartland, not
even half of a percent.
HPD’s newest chief, Miller, presented data to the City Commission in May of 2018,
which also shows a drop in shootings (Heartland News 2018c). These included shootings
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involving members of identified groups dropping from 18 to 3, from 2014 to 2017. Non-fatal
shootings were said to decrease from 47 to 12 during the same period. This is consistent with
cases such as Indianapolis and Lowell, Massachusetts, which both saw significant declines in
homicides and aggravated assaults with a firearm respectively (McDevitt et al. 2007; McGarrell,
Chermak, Wilson, and Corsaro 2006).
Still, there has been skepticism about focused deterrence strategies, which have often
been pitted as the “Boston Model” versus the “zero tolerance” of William Bratton and the NYPD
(Braga et al. 2018; Kennedy 2011). In an effort to address those who criticized the focused
deterrence model, and/or the methodological rigor of the studies which supported it, Braga and
colleagues (2018) conducted a meta-analysis of twenty-four quasi-experimental studies of the
effectiveness of focused deterrence strategies. The meta-analysis measured an “effect size
statistic” and “mean effect size” for each study defined as:
The “effect size statistic” is the index used to represent the findings of each study in the
overall meta-analysis of study findings and represents the strength and direction (positive
or negative) of the relationship observed in a particular study…The “mean effect size”
represents the average effect of treatment on the outcome of interest across all eligible
studies in a particular area (Braga et al. 2018:213).
The meta-analysis of effect sizes suggests a statistically significant effect favoring
focused deterrence strategies as a whole (Braga et al. 2018). But the program type was influential
in determining effect sizes, with gang/group focused programs being the most effective, followed
by high-risk individual, then drug market based interventions. Furthermore, the overall mean
effect was moderate in favor of focused deterrence and no significant crime displacement effects
were found. Rather, crime control was diffused into adjacent areas and connected groups who
did not receive direct intervention.
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To my knowledge, there are no studies that have been done, or are in the process of being
done, to establish whether or not Heartland’s group-based focused deterrence strategy has a
causal link to decreases in violent crime. It would also be fair for critics to point out that with the
call-ins having only occurred a little over a year ago, more time may be needed to assess whether
or not Heartland is on a safer trajectory due to its GVI program. Still, its philosophy of groupbased focused deterrence has had a profound impact on the department and seems to be here to
stay. For example, Interfaith Community Outreach issued a press release in the spring of 2018
mentioning a task force on youth violence prevention, which seeks to work with the HPD, and
other community groups in an GVI-inspired model. Donna and Harris confirmed the existence of
this initiative, which involves both the CPS division and the Dartmouth Neighborhood
Association among others, but did not want to disclose significant details too early in the
program’s running. But supervisor Harris did mention “25 kids...responsible for 676 crimes” as
being the focus of mentoring.

Reconciling the State’s Use of Violence

The theory of reconciling the state’s use of violence can be thought of as a way of
looking at contemporary police-citizen encounters and how they affect the tactics of modern-day
police departments. Given the amount of scrutiny that law enforcement faces to combat crime,
while also respecting the rights of citizens, it is imperative that they try to balance these
competing demands, especially since Ferguson. Hence, reconciliation captures the difficult task
of making these needs compatible with one another, through collaboration, and community
policing. Again, the steps in this process include a controversial police-citizen encounter, a
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ground swelling of dissent with the status quo of policing, efforts to enact reform, which results
in focused deterrence strategies.
A controversial police-citizen encounter, of course, is often a tragedy; although these
encounters can provide motivation for change, such as in Ferguson, Missouri or New York City
(Domanick 2015; Stamper 2016). It may seem cruel to try and see the positive when police and
citizens have been harmed, or even killed in some instances. But as Travis has stated, policy
often comes about as a “response to crisis,” and there is no reason to expect that policing would
be any different. The example of Barry’s traffic stop is a case in point. It was not just that the
officers were white, Barry was black, and they were pulling him over in a predominately black
neighborhood with a history of strained relations with the police; rather, the fact that it was a
pretext stop, based on an unpopular noise ordinance law, probable cause was lacking, the HPD’s
Internal Affairs did not discipline the officers, and the ensuing civil rights lawsuit all contributed
to the controversy.
A police-citizen encounter can lead to a ground swelling of opinion of dissatisfaction
against the way policing is done in a community. Protests, activism, and political pressure can all
provide fuel for a movement to enact later reforms. Shortly after the Barry incident, Barry’s
mother Rachel began to exert pressure by filing a complaint against the HPD in the form of a
letter read during a City Commission meeting. Protests were also held throughout the city, which
included Rachel, Families of Love, others who had felt victimized by the criminal justice system
in the city, and their supporters. These feelings of resentment also boiled over within the city’s
political establishment in the form of open conflicts between the former city manager Douglas,
against the police union and high ranking officials in the HPD. It is important to note how much
of a precedent the involved individuals and the nature of the specific police-community incident

137
have in the reforms that follow. Since pretext traffic stops were the initial focus of controversy,
these tactics would later come under scrutiny. But Melissa and Families of Love would continue
to exert influence on policing, and the city manager’s office would be the site of major reforms
through the relaunching of the HCAB and the reconfiguration of the appeals process.
Reforms that were enacted included the placing of the HCAB under the control of the city
manager, and the reorganization of the board to include six spots reserved for community
organizations representing diverse populations, while the other six board spots are chosen from
the community at large (Heartland News 2017c). Families of Love was listed as among the six
community organizations and Melissa confirmed to me that they are a “place holder” of the
board. The reconfiguration of the board coincided with City Manager Douglas’ hiring of an
outside candidate for chief who would try to enact community policing reforms.
Meanwhile, the HCAB advised that the HPD be subject to a racial profiling study of its
pretext traffic stop tactics. When the results indicated that there was racial profiling, various
reforms were enacted including a new consent-to-search policy, which was based of policies in
place in Austin, Texas and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, whereby officers would have to get
supervisor approval and give justifiable reasons for seeking consent to search individuals or their
vehicles (Heartland News 2013b). Discretionary (officer-initiated) searches of vehicles have
been argued to be an effective crime fighting tool, but have been shown to result in racial
disparities, decreased police legitimacy, and less willingness to call the police (Briggs and
Keimig 2017; Gau 2012; Gibson et al. 2010). Departments looking to reconsider tactics like
pretext traffic stops and stop-and-frisk must consider the predicament raised by Gau (2012):
Police executives, therefore, must make a choice, as there is a trade-off between the
convenience and possible short-term benefits of consent searches and the longer-term and
more enduring effects of a populace that trusts and cooperates with its police (Gau
2012:771).
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An interesting collaborative relationship formed, where rather than police and citizens
partnering to address issues more in the purview of law enforcement (like crime fighting), a
partnership formed to place the practices of policing under scrutiny, and adjust accordingly.
Travis stated the importance of this when we discussed the implications of the traffic study:
Travis: But if we hadn’t changed our tactics, and we’re still at full-force, then these
people aren’t feeling crime pressure anymore. Now, they’re just feeling police pressure.
There’s some calculus for the crime story in 2018. So police departments must have
enough of an ear to the community so they can feel that… Because if they don’t, they’ll
still be acting like cops who have ten burglaries in a month in a neighborhood, as
opposed to a neighborhood that has one burglary a month. That calls for different
policing.
Broad forces such as the decline in overall crime rates create a new opportunity to
examine policing practices in conjunction with community desires (Tyler 2017). It’s the same
dynamic that is discussed when officers like Austin and Martin mention the old ways of policing
during an era of higher crime rates; which is the same dynamic at play when community
members like Patrick and Donna rail against mass incarceration in the same breath when
discussing community policing in Heartland. When the right opportunity arises, reforms can be
enacted to deal with criminal justice, that is, to deal with the state’s use of violence. This
connection is obvious when Chief Jefferson cites the traffic study in the introduction to his open
letter in Appendix E, which is later followed by the following statement under the “Community
Policing and Crime Reduction” section of the letter:
Building upon our focus on the relationship with the community, we have moved to
being much less random in our approach to crime reduction. We focus on the individuals
we know are committing crime or have a high propensity for violent behavior. We meet
weekly to discuss "Hot People", not "Hot Spots", and we focus on those individuals
causing harm to our neighborhoods- not the whole neighborhood itself (emphasis added).
Despite having criticisms of the study, supervisor Harris also echoed the positive benefits
that it had for enacting change:
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Harris: But like I said it did have good, unintended consequences. It challenges us to look
at how we’re doing things and if we can do them better. Well let’s not worry so much
about putting cops on dots, let’s identify those few who are causing problems, rather than
police the whole neighborhood. That really got the focused strategy going, and that was a
very good thing.
HPD stop data shows significant differences in police-initiated encounters with citizens. I
submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the City of Heartland to obtain stop data
from the HPD, from 2012 to 2017.8 This timeframe captures the year that traffic stop data was
captured for the racial profiling study, announced reforms from 2013 onward, with the most
recent full-year of statistics. The overall drop in total stops in noticeable, from 17,677 in 2012, to
8,029 in 2017, with traffic stops decreasing by over 50 percent from 16,517 to 7,233 during that
time. “Post stop” activity as described by the profiling study (what an officer decides to do after
conducting a stop) also saw reductions. “Consent” searches decreased dramatically for contact
(person) and vehicle searches, from 737 to 238 and 622 to 129 respectively. Fewer individuals
had to exit their vehicles (2,506 to 1,263), and fewer were handcuffed (1,257 to 545) as well.
Consent searches, vehicle exits, and handcuffing were all the subject of controversy in the local
press.
Efforts to reform resulted in a collaboration meant to address troublesome police tactics,
and form a new strategy for the HPD to fight crime. Focused Deterrence developed around the
ICO inviting David Kennedy to Heartland, the reconfiguration of community policing into the
CPS division, and through partnerships between the police, community members, and social
service providers. Chief Jefferson realized the connections between community policing and
focused deterrence, when stating in the open letter that:
15 people from Heartland traveled to John Jay College in New York for training on the
Implementation of a Group Violence Intervention Model… This is a promising and

8

See Appendix G for the full data set.
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compelling approach to reducing violence in our community while at the same time
maintaining community trust.
When done properly, focused deterrence takes on many of the same characteristics as
community policing. These include utilizing problem-oriented principles to assess local crime
issues, developing a wide-range of solutions to prevent crime, forming partnerships with
community members, and the goal of increasing police legitimacy (Braga et al. 2018). Focused
deterrence is not going to be the solution to all crime. Yet, if police departments are going to
confront the dual demands of combating crime, while also doing so fairly, then focused
deterrence seems to be a logical conclusion. Decreasing crime rates, the growing awareness of
the ineffectiveness of professional and coercive models of policing, and the potential of
strategies that increase trust in the police to solicit law-abiding behavior, have all changed the
conversation around police-community relations (Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun 2015). Now that
focused deterrence inspired strategies have gained influence at the federal level (Bureau of
Justice Assistance 2018), they will need to be considered in contemporary discussions of
community policing.
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CHAPTER 7: ESSENCES OF COLLABORATION

Essence is meant to capture all the essential components of the phenomenon in question
(Creswell and Poth 2018; Giorgi 1997). This chapter is intended to describe the essence of
collaboration between police and community members in order to understand this complicated
relationship. The four themes described below are drawn primarily from the in-depth interviews I
conducted, while also considering the context of community policing that occurred in Heartland.
The following points will be addressed: relationships, legitimacy, and transparency,
nontraditional police contacts, normative order of policing, and focused deterrence.

Relationships, Legitimacy, and Transparency

The first essence is borrowed from my final interview with supervisor Wallace when he
stated: “it’s a constant battle…we’re trying to overcome…it’s building relationships, legitimacy,
and being transparent.” This refers to the relationships between police and community members,
community support for law enforcement, and when one’s actions are self-evident. All three of
these values weighed on the minds of all participants. But the ways in which police and
community members view these traits are connected, yet different from each perspective.
For police, efforts are made to go out and initiate relationships through endeavors like
school-related interactions and block parties. But officers often framed their own strategies for
increasing legitimacy and transparency as being key to fostering better relationships. This work
is what Wallace called the “small deposits in our bank account,” with examples such as the CPO
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and Drug Unit officer being able to work on a case together and reporting it to the Wells
neighborhood, or our canvassing trip which found the gun at the apartment complex. So it
becomes a matter of results achieved based on the complaints that are raised by the community,
as stated by Red, Austin, and Martin:
Red: But if they can see it within their neighborhood, then their like “oh that’s cool,” and
you’re immediately building relationships. And you’re showing results and not just talk.
That’s how you build an image.
Austin: The relationship building to figure out what’s going on beforehand, then to go
and solve the problem, then you maintain the communication and report back. We can
say I heard your complaint, this is what we did to address it, and then whatever results we
get we continually communicate with the community…So I think it’s continuing to build
that trust and rapport that gets the buy-in from them.
Martin: I’ve got a lady who lives at that other apartment complex we just passed. She’s
just sick and tired of the drug dealing, because a bunch of her neighbors are selling.
We’ve built that relationship over the last six months, she’s got my phone number. She
tells me what’s going on all the time. She watched an illegal gun transaction in her
parking lot and she called me about it. We’ve been working on a big drug dealer who
lives by her, and she’s constantly giving information. That’s right down to the license
plate. She’ll take pictures of the buyer’s vehicle plate and send it to me. I think it’s just
really important to have that info. Whereas before, they wouldn’t call us, because they
don’t trust us. It’s much more effective. For us as a CPO, I have time to do that stuff.
Whereas a regular officer doesn’t have time for that…with me, I have my work phone
that I can give out to people, and they make that connection. Instead of calling dispatch,
and working your way down to get someone to come out. They already know me, and
they can just call me, and they know I’ll take care of it.
Transparency from the police’s perspective involves an effort, particularly over the last
five plus years, to provide more clarity about their practices. This takes place informally through
interactions such as neighborhood association watch meetings that CPOs are regular attendees of
and the example with Martin above. But strategies like the citizens’ academy discussed in
chapter four are meant to explain police behavior and give community leaders insight into the
daily lives of law enforcement, with the intent of breaking down the perceived barrier between
police and the community:
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Jim: We put on a citizens’ academy, where we bring in leaders of the community, and we
show them what we do. It gives them a chance to learn hands on of what we do. Once we
can build trust with those community leaders, they already have the trust of people in the
community. So we have this web of trust. So if you lose trust with one community
member, now you’ve lost trust with that branch of the community. So keeping the leaders
up to date, keep them in touch with what we’re doing, is really beneficial.
The media has also been discussed here for its ability to keep citizens appraised of police
initiatives and to promote a positive image of the HPD. Yet when the media functions properly,
it also critically examines the police during times of controversy, and the police response is
essential as described by Red:
Red: If your officers are engaged in being visible and talking to people and
communicating, then you’ll build respect. And you have to be open and communicate
with the media. You can’t be the department that is “no comment” that’s perceived as
some sort of cover up. The cameras are chasing the chief out of a building after a
shooting, and there’s no response. Whereas here and modern day departments it’s: here’s
what happened, here’s what we’re doing, what do you need to know? This is what we can
say.
The media played a crucial role in the racial profiling study and its subsequent reforms.
Chief Jefferson and members of the HPD announced the intention of doing the study, holding
meetings with the community, announced the results, and planned reforms, while also discussing
the ways in which community members were involved through efforts like the HCAB and GVI.
Communicating with citizens and members of the media has been recommended as a way to
build trust and legitimacy, and foster an environment of collaboration (President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing 2015). For the HPD, increasing legitimacy and transparency is key to
building relationships.
There was a similar narrative from the community of police efforts to build relationships,
by trying to increase legitimacy, and transparency. Using Jim’s concept of the “web of trust,”
CPOs discussed having formed bonds with neighborhood association leaders, property managers,
and other community leaders in an effort to reach the community to solve problems. Conversely,
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community leaders mentioned their close bonds with CPOs, other members of the HPD, and
government, which helped them to stay appraised of issues, and the overall feeling towards
CPOs was positive. Claire and Homer described a relationship of frequent communication meant
to build their relationships, while Homer gave an example of how this transparency can be useful
in his relationship:
Claire: I feel like we have a good connection. I can call them any time, any day, and vice
versa. I can talk to my CPO officer at three in the morning on a Sunday, because this is
what was going on, and we needed to find a solution. We have a really good connection, I
got their back, and they got my back.
Homer: I have a relationship with the officers, where they’ll come in and I talk to them…
We were involved a couple months with a massive meth bust…I walked out of the music
store and saw a man running down the street. Then I saw another gun running behind him
with a gun. That guy was dressed up like S.W.A.T. from the Drug Unit. They ran down
South Avenue, then two big, black SUVs came flying down the street, then turned up
South Avenue against traffic. They blocked traffic, they jumped out, and everyone had
guns…So I called my officer and said: “Hey Austin this is what I saw.” And he told me it
was a federal case, this was a very dangerous individual who was armed. For about fortfive seconds the situation was very hairy, and you were standing on the corner watching
for about thirty of them. But the fact that we can have that conversation allowed me to
talk to other people in the community who may have seen it.
CPOs did discuss the importance of more formalized collaborations like GVI, block
parties, and the citizens’ academy, but much of their day-to-day work to try and foster strong
relationships was more informal in nature. Much of it could be described as police wanting
citizens to be their “eyes and ears” in the community (Rosenbaum 2002:191), or as an
“information sharing partnership” (Makin and Marenin 2017:429). But community members
tend to stress matters of legitimacy and transparency (often framed as trust and accountability)
that place them in a role that is far more active. Patrick stated it best:
Patrick: What’s our relationship with Heartland PD? We believe that they can be the
finest police organization on the planet. We want our police to be better paid, so we
attract the highest caliber of candidates. We encourage our young people through our
youth programs to consider a career in policing. We want police from Heartland to police
Heartland. But we also want a high level of accountability with that support. The police
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expect high standards from us; we have high expectations from police. That doesn’t mean
that you’re anti-policing; you expect the best out of policing. The least use of force that’s
needed. Use of force should be an absolute last option.
Legitimacy and transparency are promoted through reform and the involvement of
community members and the valuable resources they provide. Chapter four discussed how
collaborations with the right organizations can help police reach new networks and enhance the
credibility of initiatives. Community members took pride in knowing their neighborhoods and
city well, and being able to serve as a liaison between the police and hard to reach populations.
Residents such as Homer, Shannon, and Susan gave examples of how they were able to facilitate
meetings between police and community members, and action among community members as
well. But community members also have an eye towards empowering their fellow residents to
take it upon themselves to build trust and accountability with the HPD. Susan describes how this
process can start on a one-on-one basis:
Susan: Our approach is very grassroots based. It’s very neighbor-to-neighbor and
relationship based. So our focus would be: “I know you’ve had trouble with the city in
the past, or with this community officer, but meet this person.” They’re willing (the
police) to do ride a longs, would you be willing to? Just see if people are willing to have
the conversation that might start to shift their perspective. And sometimes that’s not
possible. And we’re not going to push where people want to be. When there’s an issue of
safety, we’re going to bring in a liaison officer, and people may roll their eyes. They’ll
say: “Nothing’s been done before.” But hopefully something gets done, or hopefully
perspectives change. They’ll think: “Oh wow! Someone is listening.” I think what would
matter most in that situation, and what’s very important to Heartland Improvement, is
that the residents are making those calls, and building those relationships. So we can
make that first introduction, then encourage them to call the officer, and get them to a
meeting. You know say hi and have conversations with them. Hopefully, they’re doing
that but that would be our approach.
Transparency follows a similar pattern, where we cannot forget the role of citizens in
trying to hold the police more accountable, and how this subsequently effected the HPD’s
practices. The most significant efforts at transparency came through the relaunching and
reconfiguration of the HCAB, which then led to a collaboration between citizens and the chief to
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examine HPD’s pretext traffic stops as a form of racial profiling. It would be wise for future
researchers to consider the specific community-centered pathways that are taken to enact police
reform, such as the formal DOJ investigations, versus the do-it-yourself model (Adegbile 2017).
Despite the obstacles encountered in Heartland, one advantage is that citizens have
shown an ability to lead their own police reform efforts, and high-ranking officials with the HPD
have been willing to utilize community partnerships; whereas other places such as Ferguson
ultimately had DOJ-led investigations. Many of my community participants, such as Travis,
Melissa, Homer, Donna, Claire, and Patrick, have had direct involvement with the study, and/or
other activities of the HCAB. Patrick discussed how the Board can not only hear appeals, but
also be a sounding board to “review policy as well,” and this represents a way from the
community-side that transparency can be enacted through their action.
The HCAB has also partnered with high-ranking officials of the HPD to create and
implement a body camera policy (Heartland News 2017d; Heartland News 2017e). In a mediaobtained copy of the department’s body camera policy, its intended purpose is to provide safety
and support for police and their functions, while also providing a level of citizen accountability:
The purpose is to establish the procedures and provide guidance for the use of body worn
camera equipment. Body worn camera equipment is intended to increase officer safety,
enhance training, assist in prosecutions, improve public relations and facilitate the
investigation of citizen complaints (Heartland News 2017d).
Public opinion has begun to shift dramatically in favor of body worn cameras on officers
as the ultimate “point of view” to reduce liability issues in controversial police-citizen
encounters (Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell 2015:480). They are argued to benefit citizens and
officers by increasing police transparency, reduce police use-of-force complaints, and assisting
with the gathering of evidence (Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland 2015; Jennings, Fridell, and Lynch
2014). But research has been mixed about whether or not cameras have improved police-
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community relations. Ariel and colleagues (2015) conducted the widely cited “Rialto
Experiment,” which showed significant drops in complaints filed against officers. Meanwhile, in
Denver, Colorado, less use-of-force complaints were filed and arrest rates dropped, but no effects
were found on actual use of force and complaints for misconduct rose (Ariel 2017).
Many community members also hoped to foster responsible, citizen-led accountability of
the police. Examples of this included Donna’s navigation of her relationship between the police
and community as she teaches citizens how to file complaints, Susan and HI’s “phone trees” to
push citizen action and hold the police culpable to respond to problems, or Melissa and Families
of Love’s “know your rights forums,” all of which were discussed in chapter four. For people
like Melissa, equipping citizens to hold police more accountable is crucial for a safer
community:
Melissa: …a lot in the education we do, especially with the young people, and knowing
your rights. I think it’s not only knowing your rights, but what your responsibilities are.
Do’s and don’ts, how to stay safe, how not to trigger any anxiety from officers, and also
how to best respond to situations where you feel like you’ve been done wrong. And most
times, it not right there with that interaction with the police officer. Our thing is that we
want you to make it home safe and alive, and to be able to tell your story another day.
The constant battle to maintain relationships, legitimacy, and transparency is one that is
imperative for community policing to work. It requires a relationship that is symbiotic between
police and civilians. To foster collaboration and stronger relationships, police need to promote
trust and show they have nothing to hide, while citizens must be vigilant in their desire for
legitimacy and transparency. All this serves to advocate for democratic policing, which is
contingent on democratic accountability, and the rule of law (Friedman and Pnomarenko 2015).
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Nontraditional Police Contacts

Nontraditional police contacts are often the result of collaboration, and are meant to
improve relationships. These are activities outside of the norm of “traditional” police activity like
arrests, specialty unit raids, investigations, and so on. In Heartland, nontraditional contacts
included efforts such as block parties, blight sweeps, youth mentorship programs, and other
situations to connect police with the community in situations besides enforcement. What is
interesting is that both sides felt that cynicism was a common issue.
Police officers discussed how their occupation has the custom of placing them in the
patrol division, responding to calls for service, and dealing with overwhelmingly negative citizen
encounters. Martin expressed a particularly pessimistic view when first working for the
Department on patrol in Dartmouth:
Martin: Just seeing the filth of human race. You’re always dealing with the worst of
mankind. I was punched in the nose, I’ve been in knock out drag out fights, I’ve had
bottles thrown at me. I’ve been by myself, fighting someone in a backyard, with a guy
with a felony warrant who doesn’t want to go back to prison, and you got a crowd of
thirty of people cheering and throwing stuff. And you can hear your guys coming, but it’s
a lot of different things that wear on you.
But one of the advantages that the HPD has is that it allows its officers a lot of flexibility
in work roles once they have acquired seniority. The CPOs in my sample discussed wanting to
do a different kind of policing that did significant things in the neighborhoods, and the problem
of the seemingly endless, negative grind of patrol work was also acknowledged:
Will: …I wanted to do something different. I wanted to be the officer… who did things in
their neighborhood. I wanted to do things about problems that were ongoing and
important, and working with programs that could be mutually beneficial. Also, seeing
police in a good light was important. When you actually take time to do programs, and
take time to talk to people, you begin to see them differently.
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Charlie: But up here [at the high school] I think it’s huge to have that community policing
element. To have that community contact and not give the impression that all we want to
do is run around and arrest people, or take peoples’ parents to jail. We don’t want to give
that impression. And being up here, it’s really cool. It forces the kids to be around me. So
they’re around me, all day, five days a week. And they get to see me and say: “Hey
officer Charlie is not a bad guy. And he’s police you know?” So as far as the community
standpoint of it, just the fact that I can be around, and I’m not being called to the school.
Kevin: One of the benefits to community policing that everyone forgets about is the
benefit to the officer. Everyone talks about how we got to do this for the community. If
an officer is burnt out from dealing with the same 3% of the population, then they’re
going to become a liability for your department. Get them out in some way, where
they’re not dealing with the same 3%. They can get that stigma away they’ve built based
on their knowledge. Where if you get them out doing nontraditional police contacts, and
they’re out dealing with good kids and not having to arrest them, then it’s so rewarding
and beneficial to the officer and the community. And it’s beneficial to the community.
Where the kids can say no not all officers are bad.
Community members also talked about how nontraditional police contacts can be
beneficial for having police and community members interact outside the purview of normal
police work. They made a point to discuss the importance of these events for reaching
populations such as youth, and residents who are not affiliated with community organizations:
Wendy: The residents are familiar with public safety when they come around. It’s not just
for a raid.
Claire: Every year they do a couple of youth oriented events in the neighborhood, to help
kids to have a positive interaction with police, as opposed to the solely negative
interactions, daddy’s being arrested, or whatever. So they have events like basketball
tournaments. Last year we had a carnival right out in front of our office in Cedar
Square… tons of kids came and played the games, and they interacted with the officers. It
was a great time. Trunk-or-treat is another activity, where kids and public safety get to
meet and work together and talk to each other, all with the fun of costumes and candy.
Those kids of events, and bike safety events, are invaluable in my opinion.
Homer: You know I think there has been a lot more ground covered because we’ve had a
lot of events. Whether it’s an open house, or whatever, we always invite the officers. I
think that gives our residents a chance to rub elbows. And there isn’t anything going on
per se. A couple of years ago we started to get highly visible foot patrols, and the
residents wanted to know what’s going on? These officers are walking around knocking
on doors. And I tell them they’re just doing foot patrol. And once they figured out what
the officers were doing, the response was overwhelmingly fantastic. They’d love to have
an officer walk by their house a couple days a week and go: “Hey Sam! How’s it going?”
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Nontraditional police contacts have the obvious intent of breaking down perceived
barriers between police and the community. But there is also an underlying enforcement
component to nontraditional contact, which attempts to incorporate ideals of relationships,
legitimacy, and transparency, while identifying problems in the neighborhood. Charlie gave a
definition of community policing that was similar to all of the other officers; meanwhile,
supervisor Wallace discussed how blight sweeps can not only build relationships, but repair the
cynicism of law enforcement, and lead to later law enforcement action:
Charlie: It’s building relationships with the community and handling problems that are
occurring in the community. Or complaints in the community that people are having. So
kind of that target approach. It’s like targeting the problems based on what the
community is telling you are the problems. Based on whatever makes the neighborhood
better for them. While still that in it of itself makes the relationships with the community
better. Because they come to you and say: “Hey we have a problem.” And you say:
“Okay I understand that’s frustrating. Let’s see what we can do about it. And hopefully
we can come up with a solution as a team or individually. And we leave them feeling
like: “Hey that officer cared and they fixed my problem. Or they tried to fix my
problem.” That builds a little trust.
Wallace: And it’s a good way to build relationships with the community. Because you’re
going and knocking on every door saying that we’re not here for an investigation, we just
want to provide you with help and information. And people will express their concerns.
What we found doing those door-to-doors, 95% of those people may not choose to live in
those neighborhoods, but for whatever reason they have to. And they’re not bad people.
It’s just that small percentage causing trouble for everyone. Really, those are the people
we work for. The 95% not causing the issues is the people we work for. We deal with the
same people over and over again. It’s a small percentage.

Normative Order of Policing

It has been argued that policing exercises a normative order defined as “the interplay
between bureaucratic structures and procedures, agency substructures, and the microfoundational aspects of organizational life, i.e., the cognitive orientations of state actors and their
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“taken-for-granted” assumptions about what particular agencies do” (Goetz 2017:14). This has
applied to community policing where crime-fighting is emphasized over outreach, and policecommunity relations are placed at risk. The conflict between crime-fighting and outreach is
nothing new in implementing community policing and scholars have noted organizational
resistance at play (Chappell 2009; Skogan and Hartnett 1997). When crime-fighting has won out
in community policing it has been attacked as overemphasizing order-maintenance (or zero
tolerance) policing as discussed in chapter two (Crank 1994; Reisig 2010).
Officers were well aware of the perception that community policing faces, to use their
own words, as being “soft,” “not real policing,” or for “lazy” officers. Grappling with this
reputation was discussed in chapter four as the image of the NLO versus the CPO. The officers
in my sample held a positive view of outreach and a willingness to engage with the community
in beneficial ways, but there was a strong desire to balance and tie-in enforcement. Supervisor
Wallace described the old NLO role as he saw it and how the department attempts to shift from
that image:
Wallace: The NLOs were a unit, like I said, they were officers with a different direction.
At the time they were called NLOs there was a different direction of policing. They did
exactly as they were told. Narcotics guys did narcotics. The taskforce we used to have did
nothing but strict enforcement. NLOs did nothing but the dog-and-pony show. They did
nothing but go to schools and read to kids. They did nothing but parades. So there wasn’t
a balance. The pendulum was totally in one side. So they did nothing but P.R. events and
that wasn’t helping them with the legitimacy. They had a bunch of complaints when
they’d go to apartment complexes, meetings, and other things. Since they did nothing but
P.R. events, when they went back and did meetings the complaints were the same
because they didn’t do anything. So when they switched it from NLO to CPO, they
combined that enforcement and P.R.
We kind of made it now that it’s three things that community policing focuses on:
outreach, education, and enforcement. There’s got to be a balance. Enforcement is in the
center, and we also tailor to the outreach and education we do. We educate people on
why we do the enforcement we do. We do the outreach to build relations with the
community. But we also tailor that to enforcement. Like when we do the search warrant,
we also do the canvassing. That’s community policing. Historically, we’d never do that.
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We’d hit the place we had to, then we’d leave. We’ve also followed up on it. If it’s an
apartment complex, we follow up with the manager the next day. If it’s a tenant-landlord
situation, we follow up with the landlord. So it’s a lot of work that is behind the scenes.
It’s not as much driving in the car and arresting people. A lot of it is paperwork. But it is
building that relationship. That way the next time I have to do a search warrant, they
know what’s coming, there will be follow up, and they appreciate it. They’ll let me know
if tenants have drugs or guns and I have to evict them, because they don’t want that on
their property.
A delicate balancing act takes place with outreach and enforcement. This is a battle that
officers convey in defining what community policing is, and listening to the demands of the
community:
Red: It is a targeted effort by a police officer making a conscious decision to solve an
ongoing crime-related or quality-of-life related issue in a neighborhood. At the citizen
level and at the business owner level. That would be the basic definition… It is an
ongoing effort to build and maintain relationships and maintain lines of communication
where that officer works.
Sam: I think that’s pretty good.
Red: I can tell you what it’s not.
Sam: Sure.
Red: It’s not walking around. It’s not foot patrol. It’s not riding a bike. It’s not just
dropping in and going to a meeting. That’s what most agencies do. It’s not putting
stickers on your car that say: “community policing.” That’s not community policing,
that’s advertising. Community policing is taking the time to dig into an issue and solve it.
Sam: So I guess it’s the difference between talk and political rhetoric right?
Red: Yeah, talk is cheap, and that’s what citizens will say.
Harris: Community policing is not just, you know, I think some people think it was just
going out and being super nice and helping people rake their yard. That’s not…...if you
do community policing with just outreach and with no enforcement aspect, that’s just as
worthless as traditional policing for reducing crime and making your neighborhood safe.
When you build a relationship and people get to talking to you, the purpose of that is
people want to live in a safe community, and they want to be able to tell their officer:
“Hey this is going on.” They may not want to necessarily testify but they may want to
help and say: “Hey look at this house.” And if we don’t respond or do anything, then our
outreach looks insincere and fake, and we’re not doing anything to help the community.
So you have to balance that outreach with purpose.
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The recognition of balancing outreach with enforcement was recognized among a number
of community members. While they cherished their outreach collaborations with officers, or
attempted to seek more opportunities for outreach, community members were not naïve to the
crime problems in Heartland. It’s this rationale that led Juan to collaborate in GVI since it
balances enforcement with an effort to provide social services. Travis compared the amount of
resources he had before the community policing unite faced budget cuts, and how the CPS has to
operate since he became a pastor active in the community:
Travis: Well the CPS division has to do all that with what they have. So the CPO is also
the tactical response officer. And there’s nothing wrong with that. In fact, there’s some
downsides to specializing too much. You don’t want some officers to be the “glad-hand”
police, and others to be the “kick-ass” police right? You really want the neighborhood
police officers to have enough skin in the game. That way they’re seen as real police,
who can deal with real criminals, and problems and threats. And you’d like to have your
officers who primarily do enforcement and hard-edged stuff, be able to handle
themselves in a public forum, with kids shooting hoops and stuff. So you really don’t
want to be too specialized but you’re calling on a small number of people to do it all.
However, the balance between outreach and enforcement is far from solved from the
perspective of some community members. Martin told me how the Wells neighborhood CPO is a
position that had been under threat of being eliminated many times, and Wendy discussed how
their CPO has faced constant turnover and a lack of the constant contact of the NLO:
Wendy: Recently, we’ll see our public safety officer once every couple of weeks. But
even that is something we try to understand. And that can bring up some animosity
though, because they don’t see them around. They look to public safety for a number of
things, but it’s not the kind of friendly relationship that it was when I first came here.
Donna also pointed out this difference between the NLOs and CPOs, while
acknowledging the reality of the current make-up of the department. Meanwhile, Homer
discussed a problematic situation approximately two to four years ago involving the Drug Unit:
Donna: Now the difference in what we call the CPO program, and the neighborhood
liaison officers the NLO program that I see. The officers in the beginning one were way
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more involved in the neighborhood. They helped planned ice cream socials. They helped
plan and participate in yard sales. So they were so much more involved…
Sam… you mentioned the NLO in the past compared to the CPOs now. Do you have
specific years or timeframes for that difference?
Donna: So I would say it would have been maybe 1990 to maybe 2000, possibly later.
Like 2006 maybe. The concept of being engaged is totally different now. Because the
NLOs, they were just that. The CPOs, they’re supposed to help the businesses, they’re
supposed to go to the colleges, they’re supposed to go downtown when they have a
parade. So they have all these other duties that’s attached to it. So they can’t focus their
real strength on trying to build neighborhood relations. So what they do is build
relationships with organizations not people.
Homer: I watched a situation with two deeply entrenched communities, public safety
being one, and the residents being the other, where if it wasn’t for the brilliant
intervention of another officer, it would not have been hard to imagine this turning into a
full scale brawl. You can go back to figure out what the source of this was, and it turns
out it was the Drug Unit pulling up on two sixteen-year-old kids smoking a joint. Are you
kidding me? That is not what I want the Drug Unit to do. We don’t need the Drug Unit
busting kids smoking joints in cars. The fact that we almost had a massive civil
disturbance over this, I think that’s the difference between a unit like the Drug Unit, and
community policing. The Drug Unit thrill is jumping out and kicking doors.
Balance enforcement and outreach, and the use of authority more broadly speaking, is
one of the more difficult tasks facing cities implementing community policing. It has been noted
that police will often hear conflicting demands for more and less enforcement from the same
community (Thacher 2001a). Crafting an appropriate response becomes extremely difficult
without alienating some segment of the community (Muñiz 2015; Thacher 2001b). Much like the
constant battle for relationships, legitimacy, and transparency, balancing community policing
with the normative order of policing will be a tall task. Given the issue of an organizational
culture that can be resistant to community policing, coupled with austerity measures, community
policing which maintains some degree of the normative order of policing may be the most
practical for Heartland.
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Focused Deterrence

When considering focused deterrence as an essence of collaboration, it is useful to not
only think of it as a specific crime-fighting strategy from Boston, John Jay College, or what have
you. Rather, focused deterrence is a philosophy that effects the way that collaboration and
community policing is viewed in Heartland. And the previous three essences in many ways
coalesce around focused deterrence.
An improvement of relationships, legitimacy, and transparency are all goals sought
through a focused deterrence mindset. In the wake of changing crime trends and policing
controversies in Heartland, officers discussed a reorientation of their work from the “old tactics”
from chapter five. This process was described as a shift from a “shotgun” to a “laser” approach.
Also, “cast netting” was a popular term, with subsequent “collateral damage” to innocent
community members, and the need to do “damage control” mentioned:
Austin: Like before in the 90s when everything was get tough on drugs, jump-out teams,
to get tough on crime. We took the “shotgun approach” where we said this is a high crime
area, we’ll stop a lot of people, pullover a bunch of cars, find drugs, and arrest a lot of
people. But we realized, and by “we” I mean law enforcement as a whole, was that that
wasn’t getting to the core of the problem. The way our CPU unit does it is that we have a
model that’s more of a “laser approach.” Whereby establishing relationships with the
community we find out what the problems are from them. You know we look at street or
block that is bad, it’s usually one or two houses that are going to bring that whole area
down. So we build rapport with the good people with the area and say: “Hey what are the
problem people or problem houses?” So that we get the laser approach, and we figure out
what houses are recruiting people to stand on corners and sell dope…number one our
approach works because we are building trust with residents, and two we are addressing
the core of the problem rather than continually addressing symptoms of the problem.
Wallace: I don’t know if they ever mentioned “casting the net” right? Say the problem is
in the 900 block of a particular street. Well we can’t just go in there cast a net and see
what fish we can find. Hopefully, you know, a few of those fish are going to be trophy
fish right? There will be people that are committing the criminal acts. Well there will be
some species of fish (or other people) that will be living there and not committing crime.
So rather than taking that shotgun approach, where you’re just shooting and you got this
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wide pattern of enforcement, and hopefully you got the right target. Let’s do the laser
approach. Let’s study it. Let’s use the laser approach and know where that laser is hitting.
So we get the right person, the right house, the right target. So I think we’ve slowed down
with our reactions. But we’re getting better reactions. And we’re getting the trust of the
community.
Sam: What was the reason for that department shift?
Wallace: Complaints. We were getting a lot of complaints because of the shootings. We
were getting a lot of complaints because of the drugs. The community was getting tired of
it. So they asked us to as the enforcers to enforce city and state statutes. Well there was
something I call “damage control” going on. We had a lot of damage from that fishing
net approach. From casting a wide net over an entire street we were catching good people
who actually lived there…I assign five officers to go handle that 900 block of the street,
and every car that leaves that 900 block gets pulled over, for whatever minor traffic
offense. Then they ask them to search their car, then they ask them if there’s any drugs in
their car, then they have a canine come search the car right? If that occurs in every one of
those instances, you’re going to have to do damage control. Especially after you as a
resident has been stopped three times in the last four days.
This hearkens back to the language of Chief Jefferson’s letter of being less random,
focusing on “Hot People,” all to help build relationships with the community. It is where the
police begin to reconcile the demands for combating crime with the need to treat law-abiding
citizens with respect. This strategy is intended to increase legitimacy by focusing on as Austin
said “problem people of problem houses” in an area. Canvassing efforts and community
meetings where CPOs can discuss Drug Unit work are meant to increase transparency and show
legitimacy by following through on citizen complaints. Wallace discussed canvassing:
Wallace: So a big part of the change was let’s interview the community. Let’s interview
that street. Let’s go door-to-door and talk to residents. Who are the problem residents?
What are your concerns? So that’s what we did. So on that 900 block of the street that
was killing us with shootings every night, homicides, and fights every night. So my guys
went door-to-door and said: “Mam you live here, do you have any concerns about the
neighborhood?” They’ll say things like yeah we noticed that you had a search warrant for
the house down the road but what about the one across the street from me? And if we tell
them we don’t have anything on the house we’ll say: “Well what exactly are you talking
about sir? Can we step in the house mam? Here’s my card. You can call me or you can
remain anonymous.” So having that transparency with the community and building those
relationships and following through. So it gets resolved, or we look into it and decide that
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we couldn’t find everything. That kills the curiosity and it also shows legitimacy that you
are following through on those complaints.
Transparency is also firmly in the context of focused deterrence through the custom
notification letters. The concept is based on “retail deterrence” where a “message to a small
target audience regarding what kind of behavior would provoke a special response and what that
response would be” (Braga et al. 2018:210), is given. Supervisors Harris and George discussed
this as being an important element of the GVI model in the previous chapter. When they know
and their groups know, it can have the intended effect of increasing transparency and influencing
groups of people. This delivery of a direct message alongside an offer for a way out is seen as
crucial for community leaders like Juan when he said “you can get hit with the book but I’m
going to give you an opportunity.”
Nontraditional police contacts in focused deterrence are crucial because of their ability to
deal with peoples’ cynicism, and hopefully encourage cooperation between police and the
community. Consider the comments from Martin under the previous section on nontraditional
police contacts, along with the stat-driven mantra of an overwhelming amount of crime being
driven by a small number of individuals. When I talked with Kevin about the jaded view that
police and community members get of each other, he attributed that to things like the loss of
police athletic leagues (PAL), and the disproportionate amount of negativity that cops face:
Kevin: Very jaded. But it’s what they know to be true based on what they deal with 100%
of the time. But what they deal with 100% of the time is only 3% of society. So it’s so
easy to become jaded in this job.
In turn, officers would often argue for their Unit’s strategies with the use of stats to
convey that most community members are good people who deserve respect:
Kevin: The way I explain it to officers is the difference between a laser and a shotgun.
We know where the target is. Are you going to shoot it with a laser or a shotgun?

158
Because with a shotgun you’re going to hit 97% of your population which isn’t doing
anything wrong.
Will: But here most of the people are really good. You’re just dealing with the same
people 80% of the time. Those are the people doing the assaults and stuff all the time.
Those 10% of people or whatever it is, that doesn’t mean that the rest of the population is
all bad people. We serve a lot of good people.
Nontraditional police contacts, like blight sweeps, can help to deal with cynicism on both
sides. Consider the example from chapter four where Melisa and Families of Love utilized a
blight sweep in an area that had a tense police-citizen encounter to help build relationships with
police and that community. Wallace’s perspective from this chapter discusses how blight sweeps
help officers build relations with the community, and remind them of the overwhelming number
of good people who live in even the most disadvantaged communities. The examples of blight
sweeps, block parties, and foot patrols can all be seen as ways to combat cynicism.
One of the key advantages of focused deterrence is that it still adheres to the normative
order of policing by having enforcement alongside outreach. This not only helps to secure
support from key community members, but it’s also useful for surviving the organizational
culture of a department. The following passages describe the perspectives of the CPOs, the
presentation of data to provide legitimacy for the CPS division, and community policing within a
focused deterrence mindset from CPO Austin, and supervisors Wallace and Harris respectively:
Austin: Yeah the patrol guys give us a hard time sometimes. Because they’re like: “Oh
you guys give out hugs and teddy bears and stickers.” When they hear community
policing the perception they have is only the outreach stuff. It’s going to the schools, the
block parties, and nothing else for them. But then…because a large part of what we do
now is when something group-related comes up that’s GVI stuff. We’re the guys who are
on that, getting the guns off the street, and confronting the violent groups. So when they
hear us actually talk about the legwork that goes on behind the scenes, there’s some
respect and acceptance with what we do. Then there’s these email blast that send out all
this info with who the main guys are and what they do. People are realizing that that is
because of our legwork we’re doing. And there’s some buy-in to what we do.
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Wallace: Here’s shootings in Heartland. In 2014 we had 47 shootings. We’re talking
about “non-fatal” shootings. That’s me shooting you, and the bullet hits you. So that’s the
year we started the GVI program because we saw we had a huge problem. Red means
gang-involved member [Wallace points to projector]. Blue means a random person, or
they couldn’t be identified with a group. So in 2014, we had 47 shootings, in 2017 we
had 18. There has been a decline of group-involved and non-group-involved shootings
since 2014. The numbers are there. It’s working. It’s unbelievable. This is a way to get
legitimacy in the department. We’re focusing on GVI and we do a presentation to a
platoon. We tell them that they haven’t been taking as many shooting reports and this is
the follow up we do to your reports.
Harris: It used to be if I wanted to go out and arrest felons and my shift was structured
around arrests. And the feeling was if you were doing community policing you’re not a
real cop. And there was a lot of people who felt that way. But then as officers started to
see the outreach put into place it changed. One, it’s super beneficial to the officers.
Because if you do the traditional policing all the time like we did, then it’s always
negative, hand-to-hand combat-like all the time. You’re just dealing with the worst of the
worst all the time and it burns officers out. Then you forget that the vast majority of these
people who live in high crime neighborhoods are good people because you don’t interact
with them. But when you get out of the car and go door-to-door, you see that there’s a lot
of good people and it recharges your batteries. Then you realize why you’re out there.
You don’t want the officers to get into a mindset where they paint a broad brush of
saying that the whole community is a bunch of felons or they’re a bunch of criminals.
Then you start to dehumanize them, then it creates tension within the department and
citizens. Those positive interactions are good for the officers. I remember the first time I
had the officers go door-to-door in a four-block area of a high crime neighborhood. One
of the officers was talking to someone and the person said: “Hey you might want to look
at so-and-so down the street.” That led to an arrest later and that’s when more and more
officers realized that it’s not one or the other. It’s both traditional policing and outreach.
You’ll be a much better crime fighter if you’re building relationships in the
community…It takes time to build that culture. I think Jefferson got the ball rolling with
that but the staff is buying in now. At first people though the crime prevention meetings
were a waste of time. But as they started seeing the results of it. When you go from 47
people shot in 2014, to 18 this last year (2017), you’re starting to see that this stuff works.
You can be more effective without doing the collateral damage and turning citizens
against you.
You don’t want to work in a city where everyone hates your guts. And I’ve been here
when you could feel the hatred from the community. And that’s not a fun place to work.
So I give our young men and women a lot of credit. Arresting people is easy. Crime
fighting is easy. It’s the relationship building, problem solving, and getting ahead of
problems, that’s hard work.
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With regards to the effectiveness of Heartland’s GVI in reducing crime, we need to take
some of the HPD’s claims with a grain of salt. The violent crime rate in 2017 remained relatively
steady compared to recent years, while murder/nonegligent manslaughter reached double digits
for the first time since 1991, and aggravated assaults were their highest since 2002. But we must
also consider that the UCR lacks incident-based data on city agency violent crimes, which is
important given the specific types of offenders that GVI targets. It’s also impossible to
underestimate the importance of the “call-in,” which had only occurred in June of 2017, and the
long term effect that it’s supposed to have on violence in a city. Therefore, the jury’s still out and
more long term analysis of crime in Heartland is needed.
Still, despite the nuances related to measuring crime and evaluating crime fighting
programs, it is important to stress how the above statements reflect the competing demands that a
department, as well as the community place on its community policing officers. In Heartland
focused deterrence became a narrative whereby community policing was able to present itself as
an effective crime fighting unit, while also gaining the respect and legitimacy of the community.
Contending with these dual demands has always been a major obstacle for officers and modern
day policing tactics will need to be considered in this light.
In conclusion, for Heartland, collaboration equals compromise. The police’s desire to rely
on community assistance must be balanced with citizen-led accountability. Nontraditional police
contacts have a degree of outreach and enforcement, while dealing with cynicism on both sides.
An attempt to incorporate more outreach must respect the normative order of policing which
stresses an enforcement culture. Focused deterrence then becomes a mindset used to reconcile
the competing demands of CPOs, the community, and the HPD’s organizational culture, to bring
them into harmony with one another.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

A phenomenological case study on community policing was conducted in a small,
Midwest city called Heartland. The scope of this research emphasized police-community
collaboration between the HPD’s CPS division and members of community organizations. Indepth interviews with ten police officers and eleven community members constituted the main
source of data. Also, a variety of secondary sources were collected including newspaper articles,
organization documents and websites, various studies involving Heartland policing conducted by
third-parties, and police-initiated stop data.
The HPD showed a willingness to work with a wide range of organizations. These
included city government bodies, criminal justice agencies from the local to the federal level,
along with national organizations with Heartland chapters, and numerous community groups.
Among the community groups were neighborhood associations, nonprofits, business
associations, schools, religious organizations, and the HCAB. Financial, human, physical, and
organizational resources were shared between police and community members. Among the most
noteworthy resources shared were money to fund CPOs, legal knowledge, social service
referrals, and the ability to facilitate collaboration and enhance legitimacy. Heartland’s
community policing was able to rely on a combination of informal and formal partnerships.
Informal agreements were common between police and neighborhood associations, and other
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friendships and partnerships that were formed between community and government agencies.
Formal arrangements tended to be restricted to the City’s appeals process and HPD’s GVI
initiative. Multiple layers of police and community agencies were involved in collaborations.
The most sophisticated forms of collaboration were the HCAB and HPD’s GVI program
to address violent shootings. These partnerships as they are currently constructed were the result
of controversial police-citizen encounters, and efforts by police and the community to enact
reforms. In chapter five there was an acknowledgement for the need to move away from
traditional, aggressive styles of enforcement that were common in Heartland into the 2000s, a
pretext traffic stop was the focal point for frustration against the HPD, and the reconfiguration of
the HCAB was a major result of this incident. The HCAB advised then new chief Jefferson to
hire an outside consulting firm to study the department’s pretext traffic stop strategies. When the
study indicated that racial profiling was occurring against the city’s African American residents,
reforms were announced, including the relaunching of the HCAB, and a new consent-to-search
policy.
Chapter six discusses how the concerns with homicide trends starting in 2012, along with
anger towards broad-sweeping enforcement strategies, motivated the department to rearrange
community policing and the Drug Unit under the new CPS division and adopt a GVI strategy.
This approach being brought to the city was due in part to the ICO inviting David Kennedy, who
was involved with Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, to Heartland, and prominent leaders from the
city attending a conference on GVI at John Jay College. GVI involved police, other criminal
justice actors, street outreach workers, social service providers, religious leaders, and victims of
gun violence to provide warnings of enhanced enforcement alongside a way out during “call-in”
sessions. This phenomenon of shifting from broad-based enforcement, to focused deterrence,
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was described as the theory of reconciling the state’s use of violence. The theory states that a
controversial police-citizen encounter brings to light strained police-community relations, which
enhances a ground swelling of dissent with how policing is done, followed by efforts to enact
reform, which results in a focused deterrence type of strategy under the guise of community
policing.
In the spirit of phenomenology, the essence of collaboration was discussed based on the
perspectives of police and community members in the case of Heartland. Relationships,
legitimacy, and transparency means that there is a dual force of the police trying to show results
and appear as though they have nothing to hide, along with the community’s wish to try and
broker legitimacy, and hold the police more accountable for their actions. Nontraditional police
contacts must have elements of outreach and enforcement, and attempt to address cynicism on
both sides. Any efforts to assimilate outreach and a more nuanced approach in law enforcement
must contend with the normative order of policing which stresses enforcement actions. Focused
deterrence becomes not only a specific policing strategy, but a mindset to meet the competing
demands of the community, while still upholding aspects of the policing tradition. In short, the
essence of collaboration involves compromise, between police and the community, and the
enforcement and outreach aspects of police work.

Problems Facing Heartland

This section raises some of the most pressing concerns expressed by police and
community members. Two issues in particular will be briefly discussed. First, community
members and CPOs described the difficulty that Heartland has in dealing with its homelessness,
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mental illness and drug abuse problems. Second, some community members with strong ties to
the HCAB showed how the power of the city’s police union effected the ability to hold certain
problem officers accountable. These two issues coalesced around the controversial death of a
homeless man Walter Woods while in police custody. The main point of focus will be to draw
out these issues into a critique of a community policing model with a GVI focus. In particular,
while GVI seems to hold promise in reconciling some demands for outreach and police
organization culture, and has been shown to reduce violence in other jurisdictions (Braga et al.
2018; McDevitt et al. 2007; McGarrell), we need to question whether or not all of the intended
outreach goals of community policing can be achieved through this model.

Homelessness, Mental Illness, and Drug Abuse

The presence of a significant homeless population (often with mental illnesses), and drug
abuse combined to place a heavy burden on police, community members, and the general
infrastructure of the city. Organizations like Patrick’s church seek to fill the void of an
inadequate system for dealing with the city’s homeless. He discussed how the police are often
treated as a “taxi service” for these individuals, and more CPOs would be welcomed to protect
this population. CPO Martin described how they and regular street officers are placed in frequent
contact with mentally ill and homeless people, who should be medicated, or institutionalized. He
described a process where if people go with them they’ll receive some vague form of
“counseling,” then be out of the hospital in no more than a couple hours.
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Drug abuse in it of itself has also been a major concern and a burden on city resources.
The types of drugs most commonly mentioned were pharmaceutical opioids, and heroin
sometimes laced with fentanyl. Melissa discussed how there isn’t an in-patient facility in the
county, with the closest one being an hour and 40 minutes away. Community policing was seen
by many community participants as a way to train officers, and make them more compassionate
and understanding of the struggles of drug addiction. What the community policing response can
look like is officers like CPO Jim administering narcan through the nose to reverse a heroin
overdose. His efforts in one case got him a “lifesaving award.” But Martin mentioned that narcan
is even carried in syringe form by many users, and it only last 20 minutes. Therefore, officers
have to quickly get patients to the hospital so they can be monitored.
According to the website of a local historical society, a state-run hospital used to provide
in-patient services of the type mentioned by Melissa before severe budget cuts were made in
2000. This webpage cited a book written on the history of this old facility. The result is that
police and community members are left to pick up the slack of eliminated social services. Local
media outlets reported as of July 2018 there were 79 reported drug overdoses, compared to 90
during all of 2017, with fentanyl and more pure forms of heroin being responsible for many of
the cases (Heartland News 2018b). Problems such as these can have the potential to further strain
police and community organizations in the city, and compromise police-community relations.

Police Union and Accountability

The HCAB represents the most formalized mechanism for the community to exercise
accountability over the HPD. This study has shown that the HCAB does have a significant
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amount of influence over policing in Heartland, with the racial profiling study being the most
evident example. However, the death of a homeless drug addict in 2016, Walter Woods, while in
police custody is an example of how holding problematic officers accountable is still an issue.
Patrick, who was especially critical of the officers involved with Woods since he works with the
HCAB and the homeless, described the incident where an $850,000 tax revenue based settlement
was made to Woods’ family.
Woods was in the ER (emergency room) of a local hospital, when the police were called
to remove him, and Woods left on his own power. Then he had an “episode,” but rather than
bring him back in to ER, Woods was handcuffed by two officers and taken into police custody,
all while the officers repeated several times “you’re faking it,” on tape. While at the jail, Woods
died from his medical issues. The result was that the two officers received two days’ suspension
with pay.
Patrick explained that due to police union contracts, there’s a two-day threshold where
the chief of police can suspend an officer before a dispute is triggered. Melissa confirmed that
the Woods’ family brought the case before the HCAB, and the police admitted that the officers
were in the wrong to the local press (Heartland News 2018f). It was a situation that triggered
protests across the city. What was especially infuriating to community members who were aware
of the situation was that the officers were trained first responders, they got off with such a soft
punishment, and the settlement to the family was paid by taxpayers. Furthermore, one of the
officers has had multiple complaints filed against him, while the other was recently promoted to
detective.
This situation reveals two major problems that could compromise future community
policing efforts in Heartland. First, and most obviously, one has to wonder whether or not the
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presence of an in-patient facility like the city used to have and/or other treatment options could
have saved Walter Wood’s life, and how valuable of a partner these additional public health
services could be to the HPD. Second, if a situation such as this that continues to place HPD
officers into controversial encounters with citizens is allowed to go on, then how will this
compromise other efforts to enhance legitimacy? Supervisor Wallace discussed how he
encourages his officers to make “deposits” in the form of frequent contacts with citizens that
build trust with the community, but allowing these problems to fester for too long could prove to
make these efforts unsuccessful.
Similar issues like these have been seen in other jurisdictions. Scholars have noted how
when officers are placed with too excessive of a burden to provide public health services, they
can often come up woefully short in serving citizens (Klinenberg 2015; Telpin and Pruett 1992).
Also, researchers have noted that the rationale of civilian review boards is that they can offer
more legitimacy and effectiveness to the reviewing of officers over traditional police-led internal
affairs processes (Bartels and Silverman 2005; DeAngelis and Kupchik 2007; Hryniewicz 2011).
But critics have said that these boards have proven largely unable to provide necessary
enforcement due to the power of police unions (Wilson and Buckler 2010).

Reconciling Enforcement and Outreach

One of the most importance lessons to take away from this study of community policing
is the constant struggle to balance, or reconcile, the competing demands for how to best police
neighborhoods. In many ways the HPD and its citizens should be lauded for their efforts to
promote public safety in a more effective manner. Heartland has to cope with austerity, including
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years of staffing cuts to the HPD, all while contending with a population that has socioeconomic
issues, drug abuse, homelessness, and mental illness.
There is a lot of signs of optimism if one considers how much organizations such as the
HCAB, Families of Love, Heartland Improvement, Wells Coalition, the neighborhood
associations, and countless other religious congregations, nonprofits, and government actors
have been allowed to have a hand in community policing. The shift away from broader
deterrence tactics, like pretext traffic stops, and towards the focused deterrence of GVI is likely
to be a better strategy in the long run. Although it’s too early to evaluate the effects on crime that
Heartland’s GVI has had, scholars have made a compelling case that focused and preventive
policing strategies are likely to work better towards crime prevention and could help policecommunity relations (Telep and Weisburd 2012). A review of GVI programs in other
jurisdictions has found that these programs have been found to significantly reduce crime (Braga
et al. 2018).
But it is an ongoing debate as to how much meaningful outreach can be achieved if GVI
is the center of one’s community policing, since outreach is mostly aimed at a small group of
violent offenders. In chapter two it was noted that some have argued that increased federalization
of local law enforcement could compromise the integrity of community policing, and make it
harder for residents to exhibit this level of political influence (Balko 2013; Boettke et al. 2016).
GVI’s model often calls for federal partners such as the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), in order to provide severe and certain sentences to
violent offenders (Kennedy 2011). Federal criminal justice agencies often make sense as a
partner to deal with offenders. But it’s an interesting question to consider whether or not the
presence of these groups compromises the outreach component. It will also be interesting to
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monitor whether or not state and federal governments will offer the amount of backing to
outreach efforts that it does to enforcement matters. Furthermore, there is the concern that
framing outreach alongside a crime prevention narrative can help garner more political support,
but that outreach may diminish when crime decreases, or when the crime problem is out of the
realm of discussion (Peaslee 2009).
Achieving the right amount of outreach that’s optimal in the eyes of community members
could also prove difficult for the GVI model. The body of research on crafting law enforcement
responses appropriate to community policing has shown that is hard to police neighborhoods
without alienating a certain segment of the population (Muñiz 2015; Thacher 2001a, 2001b),
while also contending with the organizational culture of police departments (Chappell 2009;
Maguire et al. 2015). The GVI ethos has had a profound effect on how all aspects of community
policing are viewed as evidenced by officer quotes from chapters six and seven. This program
has the benefit of crafting education and outreach with enforcement in the center to borrow
supervisor Wallace’s phrasing. Much like the changing of officers from NLOs to CPOs, it seems
as though all community policing initiatives are always outreach and enforcement at the same
time, in order to do more with less.
While it seems impossible to entirely remove the enforcement aspects of an officer,
concerns need to be raised about the general contamination of outreach with enforcement. This
was referred to earlier as a “net widening” (Peaslee 2009:126) of police surveillance, or the
placement of adolescents into a “youth control complex” (Rios 2011:xiv) of
hypercriminalization. It would be fair to argue that if police take the time to really study crime
problems and identify really troublesome individuals, then increased surveillance is necessary.
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But it does result in an increased number of other arenas such as schools being subject to
combined enforcement/outreach efforts.
It was also concerning that community-based GVI workers Rhonda, Shannon, and Juan
were expected to do more with less. While GVI has received significant media attention and
some funding for consultants, assistance seems to be lacking for Rhonda, Shannon, and Juan.
Rhonda stated that her, Shannon, and Juan were all “basically volunteers” attempting to execute
GVI in addition to working full time at other jobs. There seems to be a need for funding for
additional staff to help execute the social services aspect of GVI. Unfortunately, Rhonda has also
said that GVI is “not the focus of our CEO” at the Hope Initiative. Donna also expressed the
frustration of community members in Dartmouth who found the employment services of Hope
Initiative to be woefully inadequate. Given these concerns, it will be imperative for the leaders of
Heartland to see that GVI becomes more than a political maneuver and a comfortable strategy
for the HPD. If the outreach components of GVI are not fully executed, then the legitimacy of
the program could be compromised, and the valiant efforts of Rhonda, Shannon, and Juan could
be all for not.
We also have to wonder about those individuals on the periphery of this net widening
who are in need of outreach. While community members like Wendy and Donna enjoyed the old
NLO officers, and former NLOs like Travis and Red expressed great pride and importance in
their work, the feeling of current CPOs and supervisors was mostly negative towards NLOs. The
danger with Heartland’s staffing issues and newer GVI focus is that chances as Red said to “take
a deeper dive into finding solutions” may be compromised. Hopefully, expected increases in
staffing levels, along with a possible decline in violent crime due to GVI, will lead to a chance to
solve other problems in the future using community policing.

171
Study Limitations

Scholars have noted that there is a significant difference between the rhetoric of “the
community” that community policing is supposed to help empower, and the reality of who
participates in its initiatives and partners with the police (Buerger 1994; Skogan 2004). This
study was intended to use members of the community who were part of community
organizations as the main focus. Although my participants made significant efforts to reach out
to the community at-large, they also frequently reminded me that the perspective of the average
citizen who doesn’t have organizational resources at their disposal is likely to make their
interactions with the police much different. The participants that I recruited had the advantage of
significant knowledge of Heartland’s community policing process and connections with others
who share a lot of wisdom.
But these sometimes cozy relationships formed between police and prominent
community members can create a situation as described by Donna: “I think what happens is that
you’re working with them. So then you don’t want it to seem like it’s not working.” Police
officers were willing to provide me with a nuanced, pragmatic view of the situation in Heartland.
But a discussion of incidents like Barry’s traffic stop, and the death of Walter Woods, was
confined to a select number of my community interviews, and required more independent
research of my own into how these situations were handled by non-CPO officers. Therefore, this
study only partially captures the experiences of the everyday citizen in Heartland, and students of
community policing need to keep in mind the differences between organization leaders and
average citizens interacting with the police, as well as CPOs versus non-CPOs.
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Future Research

In line with the above comments about capturing the perspective of a wider range of
citizens, readers will notice that youth and young adults are frequently involved in Heartland’s
community policing. This includes visiting schools, Shop with a Cop, programs to recruit kids
interested in law enforcement careers, stationing an SRO (Charlie) at a local high school, and
most notably HPD’s GVI program since young men tend to be the most violent offenders.
Brunson and Weitzer (2009) have noted that much research on police-community relations
focuses on adults rather than youth, despite the fact that young men have a disproportionate
amount of contact with the police. Scholars have noted this glaring gap in the literature and have
begun to examine how youths’ attitude of the police are influenced within a community policing
and procedural justice framework (Leroux and McShane 2016; Slocum and Wiley 2018). More
articles focused on the experiences of youth and larger evaluations of community policing
programs which incorporate the experiences of youth would be very beneficial.
This is especially the case if teenage boys become subject to GVI-based community
policing in other jurisdictions. Readers will recall in the timeline of events from chapter five that
it was announced by the ICO in the spring of 2018 that further programs based on violence
prevention would be implemented. The program claims a GVI-based preventative model aimed
at a small number of kids responsible for a massive proportion of crimes. Partners included the
Dartmouth Neighborhood Association, HPD and other criminal justice actors, among others.
Attempting to capture the perspectives of youth subject to these interventions, and to see the
results over time, would be a worthy endeavor.
Researchers have noted that continuing to analyze the optimal mix of tactics to optimize
collaboration is essential to community policing (Gill et al. 2014). Relating to the theory of
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reconciling the state’s use of violence, scholars have begun to question whether or not ideas
within the realm of community policing such as procedural justice, collective efficacy, and
legitimacy can be improved through focused deterrence programs (Braga et al. 2018). The
researchers pointed to the example of Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) as a
promising program that can prevent crime while seeking to enhance legitimacy (Papachristos et
al. 2007).
It has been noted that it may be wise to examine the short term benefits that community
policing tends to show such as citizen satisfaction, legitimacy, and improved quality of life, and
how this can lead to long term outcomes like crime reduction (Gill et al. 2014). Conversely,
focused deterrence scholars note the crime reduction effects of these strategies, while also
theorizing the ways in which they can be used to accomplish the goals of community policing to
build relationships, enhance legitimacy, and improve transparency (Braga 2015; Brunson 2015).
Initiatives which rest on collaboration, problem solving, and improving communities have had a
massive influence, such as PSN, SACSI, and the National Network for Safe Communities
(NNSC) (McGarrell et al. 2010; National Network for Safe Communities 2015; Roehl et al.
2008). My research shows a contemporary example of a department that is not only using
focused deterrence to combat homicides, but to try and improve relationships with the
community as well. A logic model which can capture the potential short term and long term
benefits of focused deterrence within a community policing framework would be beneficial to
understanding the complex nature of police-community relations.
I would also urge researchers to place the tactics of police departments under close
scrutiny in other ways. One essential source of secondary data was the FOIA requested data on
police-initiated stops. A key feature of reconciling the state’s use of violence is that agencies will
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make significant changes by using their authority in a more efficient and just manner in response
to community pressure. It is one thing to have a few officers walk a beat, or to place a nice
mission statement on one’s website which invokes a community policing message, but it’s a
whole other matter to fundamentally change the tactics of a police department. The extent to
which a police department complies with FOIA requests can be indicative of how committed it is
to being transparent. Examining how much departments engage in controversial tactics like stop
and frisk and pretext traffic stops, can show the degree to which police are committed to
improving relationships with their community, and be a variable which significantly effects
perceptions of legitimacy. Neighborhood rates of crime and police-initiated contacts, as well as
the rate in which illegal contraband is found, and racial proportions should also be considered in
this context.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Police and Community Member Questionnaires
A. Police Officer Questions
1. Background Information:
Tell me about yourself?
How long have you been employed with your police department?
Why did you become a community police officer?
2. Reforms/Rationale of community policing:
What was the reason for your department’s shift towards community policing?
Was it guided by the professional model of policing (rapid response, reactive
investigations, randomized patrol) or some other philosophy?
To what extent was improving community relationships central?
What was the context for the departmental shift towards community policing?
3. The Specifics of community policing:
How would you and/or your department define community policing?
Your department’s website mentions the terms “quality-of-life” and “crime
prevention” frequently. Could you define these terms for me and how they relate
to community policing measures?
The website also mentions broken windows theory as a guiding philosophy.
Could you elaborate on what this means, and describe how this fits within, and/or
interacts with the community policing model?
What about the use of crisis intervention teams (CIT)? Do these exist within the
department? How are they deployed? And how do CIT’s relate to community
policing?
What about violence prevention programs? Do they exist within the department?
And how do they relate to community policing?
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Is pre-booking diversion an option for officers? In what types of instances would
these strategies be used? And how do they fit within the community policing
paradigm?
How many officers are regularly assigned to the community policing division?
Are these assignments full time or part time?
Do community policing officers respond to dispatch calls while performing
community policing?
In what other ways is your day structured specifically with regards to community
policing?
What role do community organizations play with regards to crime prevention?
What about quality-of-life? Broken windows policing? CIT? Pre-booking
diversion?
4. How does one collaborate?
Describe how the process of collaboration works with citizens? For example, if an
individual citizen had an issue related to community policing, then how would
they go about requesting assistance from your department?
What about if a community organization had an issue related to community
policing?
To what extent has external funding supported collaboration efforts?
What types of grants have supported community policing officers?
What sort of collaboration efforts has external funding been geared towards?
How many collaboration efforts are in effect and what is the nature of these
collaborations (violence prevention, youth outreach, etc.)?
5. The results of collaboration:
Do you feel like community policing achieves its objectives as they relate to
crime prevention and quality-of-life?
Does community policing appear to build trust between police and the
community?
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Are any of these results related to the collaboration efforts with members of the
community?
A. Community Member Questions
1. Personal Background:
Tell me about yourself?
What is your history in this city?
Your history with social work/community work?
2. Organizational Details:
In general, what does your organization do?
What are the goals of your organization?
3. Collaborations with the police, the context and objectives of various initiatives:
Describe some of the partnerships that your organization and the police have engaged
in?
What specific community policing initiatives are occurring? In what state are they in?
To your knowledge, are there any future plans for these or other initiatives?
What problems related to community policing are occurring within your community?
What type of external funding has affected you and your collaboration with police
officers?
Do these grants require community meetings, specific types of collaboration, or any
other things specific to community policing?
4. The formalized mechanisms/processes of initiating collaboration:
Research has shown that the means through which police-community actions are
initiated can make or break a community policing program. If you were to have some
sort of issue which required the attention of the community police program, how
would you go about contacting them?
Is there a specific procedure for this process or is it informal?
Does your neighborhood have community meetings? If so, how often are these
meetings held?
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Describe the nature of these meetings? (Who leads them? Who attends? Do numerous
people get an opportunity to speak? Etc.)
Do you feel as though community meetings allow for your input into community
policing initiatives?
5. Results and thoughts on community policing overall:
Overall, how would you assess you and your organization’s relationship with the
police?
What were some of the positive outcomes that came as a result of collaborating with
the police?
What sorts of obstacles arose through collaboration?
Have you noticed any significant differences between this chief and past chiefs?
Did your level of trust in the police improve as a result of collaborating with the
police?
In your opinion, what could be done in order to improve community policing efforts?
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Appendix B: Expanded Typology Table of Heartland Partnerships
Independent Organizations That Have Been Identified as Having Partnered with Heartland Police
Local Government: Parks and Recreation
Housing Department
Zoning Department
Criminal Justice: Adult & Juvenile Probation
Parole
Heartland County Law Enforcement
Heartland Prosecutor’s Office
U.S. Attorney’s Office
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms (ATF)
U.S. Department of Justice
Heartland Juvenile Homes
Heartland County Courts
Heartland Community Corrections
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
National Groups: Boys & Girls Club
Boy Scouts
Young Men’s Christian Organization (YMCA)
National Night Out
Coffee with a Cop
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Red Cross
Comm. Groups: Neighborhood Associations: Dartmouth (Donna), Franklin (Claire)
Soho (Homer), Wells (Wendy)
Franklin Collaboration
Families of Love (Melissa)
Hope Initiative (Rhonda)
Heartland Neighborhood Improvement (Susan)
Heartland Anti-Human Trafficking League
Heartland Philanthropy Association
Religious Organizations: Wells Church (Travis), Christian Homeless Relief,
Interfaith Community Outreach, Ministry Alliance,
Islamic Congregations, Heartland Solidarity
Wells Coalition
Child Safety Project
Businesses and Business Associations
Daycare Centers
Heartland Public Schools
Drug Rehabilitation Centers
Local Colleges & Universities
Heartland Nonprofit Coalition
Local Hospital
Landlords/Property Managers
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Heartland After School Program
Brotherhood Over Violence (Shannon)
Heartland Urban Association (Juan)
Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board (Patrick)
Heartland Event Management Organization
Heartland Foundation for Neighborhoods
Content/Resources Shared Between Police and the Community
Financial Resources:
• Funding Salaries for Additional CPOs
o Downtown Churches
o Heartland Philanthropy Association
o Public Schools
• Block Parties
o Heartland Event Management Organization
o Local Churches
o Neighborhood Associations
Human Resources:
• CPS Active Shooter Training
• CPOs Volunteer at Camp for Poverty-Stricken Kids
• Legal Knowledge from Current/Former Law Enforcement
o Neighborhood Watch Meetings
o Citizens’ Academy
o Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board
• Navigating Social Services
o Hope Initiative
• Grant Writing
• Knowledge of the Community
Physical Resources:
• Use of Facilities
o Neighborhood Associations
o Churches
• Blight Sweep Equipment
• Neighborhoods for Block Parties
Organizational Resources:
• National Night Out
• Coffee with a Cop
• Local Media
• Public Schools
• Citizens’ Academy
• Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board
• Facilitating Collaboration and Increase Trust/Legitimacy:
o Religious Organizations
o Neighborhood Associations
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o Families of Love
o Heartland Improvement
Forms of Partnership
Informal Agreements: CPOs & Neighborhood Associations/Community Groups
Use of Facilities
Coordinating Government Services
Social Service Referrals
Examples: Emails, Phone Calls, Volunteering Use of Facilities, Building Rapport, Friendships
Formal Agreements: Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board
GVI Criminal Justice Partnerships
Examples: Formalized Appeal Process, Weekly Crime Prevention Meetings, Custom Notification
Letters
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Appendix C: Hot Spot Sheet

Note: This is a copy of a Hot Spot Sheet obtained from the Soho Neighborhood Association.
These Sheets are particularly a favorite in Franklin, but the same basic concept is used across
many Heartland neighborhoods. Omitted information includes the name and contact information
of the neighborhood association and police, as well as a web address in the lower right hand
corner.
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Appendix D: Heartland Uniform Crime Report Statistics 1985 to 2017

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
1363.3
1646.8
1383.3
1054.5
964.7
1053.9
1169.5
1092.1
892.5
676.3
807.9
1016.3
1168.5
1030.4
981
964.2
815.3
878.4
1064.3
1165.4
1128.1
1210.9
1197.2

Violent crime total Violent Crime rate Murder and nonnegligent
Legacy rape
Manslaughter
Revised
/1 rapeRobbery
/2
Aggravated assault Property crime
Property
totalcrime
Burglary
rate Larceny-theft
Motor vehicle theft
1333
1689.3
4
90
245
994
7547 9564.1
2480
4765
302
1797
2310
3
115
364
1315
8661 11133.5
2504
5823
334
1712
2206
5
132
321
1254
7514 9682.1
2081
5105
328
1603
2045.7
16
116
289
1182
7058 9007.1
1600
5107
351
1714
2238.1
12
119
325
1258
7368 9620.8
1626
5231
511
1968
2451.5
12
70
432
1454
6392 7962.4
1537
4435
420
1686
2084
12
53
366
1255
6648 8217.1
1678
4621
349
1625
1993.9
2
61
307
1255
6395 7846.6
1608
4382
405
8
248
1112
5883 7206.8
1308
4082
493
9
59
219
828
5784 7072.1
1315
3963
506
7
53
310
982
5944
7240
1160
4280
504
8
48
234
851
5238 6350.2
1055
3797
386
2
68
222
529
4640 5959.9
1084
3195
361
6
79
176
478
4777 6236.1
1019
3240
518
9
94
189
521
5169 6700.4
1195
3489
485
4
102
200
601
5388 6947.6
1366
3539
483
6
40
158
648
5464 7003.9
1171
3697
596
4
51
144
480
3649
727
2527
395
1
45
146
319
4117 5448.9
815
2989
313
3
55
178
362
4543 6137.5
1107
3117
319
5
55
238
439
4967 6849.2
1327
3243
397
9
81
302
443
4472 6257.9
1039
3088
345
2
60
220
461
4259 5906.3
1174
2816
269
2
72
202
427
4334 6047.7
1434
2632
268
8
81
183
444
3536 4761.5
1039
2323
174
3
64
155
383
3262 4395.9
1012
2080
170
9
77
165
406
3120 4171.3
835
2135
150
9
107
198
488
3083 4091.5
839
2084
160
6
111
157
610
2907 3832.2
677
2040
190
2
92
172
595
2686 3519.2
650
1865
171
7
125
182
611
3221 4216.6
755
2228
238
10
130
152
621
3174
4162
710
2132
332
1115
1352
1141
821
739
813
907
852
679
511
598
737
835
743
703
716
605
657
802
884
861
925
913

Note: Data was not properly calculated for crimes in 1993 and 2003, and data was not available
for 1997.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2019. “UCR Publications.” Federal Bureau of Investigation
Criminal Justice Information Services. Accessed February 19, 2019.
(https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications).
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Appendix E: Chief Jefferson’s Open Letter Released to the Media
Heartland Police Department Progress 2015:
"On December 18, 2014, President Barack Obama signed an Executive Order establishing the
Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The Task Force seeks to identify best practices and make
recommendations to the President on how policing practices can promote effective crime
reduction while building public trust. It also will examine, among other issues, how to foster
strong, collaborative relationships between local law enforcement and the communities they
protect."
The Task Force structured the work underneath 6 core areas of focus with experts in the field
providing testimony, written statements and opinions on where policing should move
prospectively. The core areas are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Building Trust and Legitimacy
Policy and Oversight
Technology and Social Media
Community Policing and Crime Reduction
Training and Education
Officer Safety and Wellness

Using the framework of the President's 21st Century Task Force on Policing as a way to
categorize and convey the work, the Heartland Police Department has been engaged in since our
traffic stop study in September 2013. It is my hope that the community appreciates the intention
and honest analysis of ourselves, the critical thinking involved, and the foresight and the genuine
effort put forth by the men and women of the HPD.
Building Trust and Legitimacy:
An intentional focus on our relationship with the Heartland community has been at the heart of
our approach. Since March of 2014, we have been canvassing Heartland neighborhoods by
knocking on doors and engaging residents as a way to understand from them how we are doing
and what we can do better. This allows for a genuine dialogue between officers and residents in a
relaxed atmosphere. These interactions bring a "human" element to the relationship that impacts
the citizen as well as their officers.
Internally we recognize, support and reward positive community engagement and service as
much as we reward excellence in traditional police work. The number of arrests, citations and
traffic stops used to be the standard measuring stick in Law Enforcement and the HPD was no
different. We are changing the lens in which we view "good police work" and are setting a new
definition.
We partner with many people and organizations in this community creating engagement
opportunities for our citizens and officers. From fun events like block parties and "Coffee With a
Cop", to more serious endeavors such as participating in many forums on police/community
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relations where the topics of police use of force, race relations and police reform are discussed.
Whatever the tone or mood of the experience is, we are intent on the engagement as a sincere
effort to listen, to understand and to be understood.
Policy and Oversight:
We developed and implemented a "consent to search" policy which gives officers specific
guidelines to follow when asking for consent to search. This was a direct recommendation from
the traffic stop study and was developed in collaboration with the Milwaukee Police Department
and Austin Texas Police Department, respectively.
We have repopulated the Heartland Citizens’ Appeal Board with a cross section of our
community. It is our intent to utilize this board outside their normal scope of hearing appeals, to
serving as a sounding board for the HPD relative to community relations, policy and problem
solving.
Technology and Social Media:
We are in the midst of our Body Camera Pilot program where we have tested numerous Body
Camera products. There is a wide range of issues involving their implementation that must be
considered ranging from costs, data storage, policy development, FOIA implications, and
immediate and on-going funding. With that said, we are approaching all these dynamics
methodically and responsibly so when the time comes for implementation we have done our due
diligence and the program is set up for success.
Honestly, we do a poor job of integrating the value of Social Media into our operations and must
explore through budget and practice the best way to move forward. Our aspiration is to have a
full time Public Information Officer that serves as a liaison with the media, will develop a social
media presence, and help develop both internal and external communication strategies.
Community Policing and Crime Reduction:
Building upon our focus on the relationship with the community, we have moved to being much
less random in our approach to crime reduction. We focus on the individuals we know are
committing crime or have a high propensity for violent behavior. We meet weekly to discuss
"Hot People", not "Hot Spots", and we focus on those individuals causing harm to our
neighborhoods- not the whole neighborhood itself.
In congruence with that philosophy, recently 15 people from Heartland traveled to John Jay
College in New York for training on the Implementation of a Group Violence Intervention
Model, or what has been commonly known as "Operation Ceasefire". This training was
facilitated by David Kennedy, Director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. This is a promising and compelling approach
to reducing violence in our community while at the same time maintaining community trust. We
look forward to implementing this method in collaboration with the community, and hope we get
the necessary support for its success.

198
While crime rate data can be impersonal, it is one measure for a community to consider. With
that said, in 2014 the City of Heartland had a 6% reduction in overall Part I crimes and a 30%
reduction in the last 6 years.
In addition, the investigations clearance rate on homicides over the last 8-10 years is above 95%.
For an urban city, this puts us 30% above the national average. This is remarkable, and a
testament to the dedication, pride and commitment of those investigators.
Training and Education:
Much work has been done in the training of our men and women of HPD. I believe the most
significant and timely training is the "Fair and Impartial Policing" curriculum that our entire
department has been through. The FIP training specifically addresses human bias in the context
of policing. We now have four officers who are certified to facilitate this curriculum and just
began training other agencies in the region.
In the fall of 2013 the entire department received training from the Vistelar group on verbal
defense and influence as a way to continually look at and evaluate how we interact and
communicate with our community.
Since 2008, HPD and other local law enforcement agencies have been receiving on-going Crisis
Intervention Training (CIT) that teaches de-escalation techniques and emphasizes referrals to
services as opposed to incarceration for mental health consumers. In 2015, in partnership with
local mental health care providers, HPD has committed a staff member to be the (CIT)
coordinator so we can further advance the model and program.
In 2015 we will develop and facilitate "Police Legitimacy and Procedural Justice" training for
the entire department. This training is replicated and modeled off of training developed between
the Chicago Police Department and Yale University. In 2014 members of HPD, local law
enforcement agencies, city officials, and other community stakeholders traveled to Chicago to be
learn about and to be trained on this curriculum.
Officer Safety and Wellness:
The Police Legitimacy Training, the Crisis Intervention Training and the Verbal Defense and
Influence Training all have significant components relative to officer safety. In crisis and in
emotionally tense situations, the more we can de-escalate, gain compliance through words, and
solve the circumstance without the use of any force, the safer our officers and the community
are. However, let me be clear that these trainings do not replace or obviate the right and
obligation of our officers to protect you or themselves from an immediate threat to their life and
yours. Everyone deserves to go home safe, including the men and women protecting this
community every day!
HPD has a Chaplain Program and a Family Support Network that is available to our officers in
time of need. I believe we take great pride in being there for our officers whatever the challenge
they may be facing.
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I tried to highlight the most significant pieces of our efforts and by no means is this meant to be
all-inclusive, but I believe it captures a significant body of work and a clear trajectory of
progress.
I want to thank the community for their support and pushing us to be the best we can be. Your
questions, perspectives, and participation in your department is welcomed and appreciated.
I want to acknowledge the hard work of the men and women of the HPD. As we have moved
forward over the last few years they have steadfastly and honorably served this community and
lace their boots up every day with a clear intention of being the best they can be.
As the Presidential Task Force submits its recommendations to the President by March 2, 2015,
we should be ready to receive those recommendations, to evaluate them in terms of what we can
reasonably accomplish independently, decide which ones would require other partners, resources
and discussion, and which ones may be out of our ability and scope. The community is a critical
piece of this process and should lend itself to the analysis, discussion and manner in which we
move forward prospectively.
Professionally and Sincerely,
Chief Jefferson
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Appendix F: Canvassing Door Hangers

Note: These are scanned copies of two door hangers obtained from the HPD. The left-hanger is
used after reports of gunfire, while the right-hanger is used during general canvassing when a
resident doesn’t answer their door. The top of each hanger has the official logo of the HPD at the
top, and contact information for the HPD throughout. The left-hanger where it says “To leave an
anonymous tip” has the phone number and web address for Anonymous Hotline. Each hanger
also has a backside that’s written in Spanish.

201
Appendix G: Heartland Police Department Stop Data 2012 to 2017
Heartland Police Deaprtment Stop Data 2012 to 2017
2012
2013
Total Stops
17,677
16,963
Traffic
16,517
15,784
Pedestrian
453
419
Other Occupant
268
321
Other
439
439
Reason For Contact
Public Relations
73
75
Non-Traffic
2,082
3,182
Other
652
649
Speeding
1,976
1,479
Drugs/Alcohol
232
215
Traffic Violation
7,739
6,600
Equipment Violation
4,155
4,165
Seatbelt Violation
729
558
Citizen Arrest
8
5
BOL
31
35
Contact Searched
Consent
737
730
Inventory
5
4
Not Searched
16,335
15,609
Probable Cause
118
175
Post Arrest
384
409
Reasonable Suspicion
28
33
Vehicle Searched
Consent
622
603
Inventory
15
15
Not Searched
16,587
15,894
Probable Cause
335
396
Post Arrest
29
24
Reasonable Suspicion
17
27
Evidence Seized
None
15,692
13,576
Drugs/Alcohol
486
621
Money
10
9
Other
75
73
Paraphernalia
19
21
Weapons
7
5
Action Taken
Arrest
441
356
Other
185
79
Ticket Issued
9,659
9,747
Warning
7,368
6,775

2014
10,189
9,364
260
229
335

2015
8,651
7,942
181
253
274

2016
7,633
6,987
143
206
297

2017
8,029
7,233
175
200
421

18
2,793
384
891
166
3,906
1,824
176
7
23

5
2,620
330
952
162
3,094
1,342
131
3
11

10
2,643
374
647
80
2,570
1,195
105
3
6

3
2,905
318
654
118
2,508
1,415
104
1
3

220
2
9,590
93
266
16

168
0
8,190
81
194
16
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1
7,133
74
192
30

238
4
7,521
86
161
19

144
14
9,732
257
26
11

111
13
8,222
268
24
11

136
13
7,147
292
25
20

129
15
7,522
324
24
15

7,324
418
8
37
25
6

5,827
426
3
54
17
5

4,747
396
5
35
24
15

4,932
505
10
62
25
3

252
38
6,293
3,604

165
33
5,314
3,137

165
18
4,932
2,516

107
19
5,341
2,561
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Exit Vehicle
Yes
2,506
2,326
1,255
1,135
1,093
1,263
No
13,900
12,015
6,611
5,248
4,200
4,338
Handcuffed
Yes
1,257
1,149
684
531
520
545
No
15,149
13,192
7,179
5,849
4,769
5,052
Source: FOIA request of police-initiated stops submitted to the City of Heartland on October 20,
2018.
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Appendix H: Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) Approval Letter

